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Editors’ Note

A

s the ongoing battle in the United States Congress over
climate change legislation demonstrates, a legislature
or parliament is not always the key to progressing sustainable development strategies. It is often in the courts where
progress can be made, and it is this exact idea that our staff
endeavored to explore in our fall issue.
SDLP’s work on this topic has brought to light a number
of unexpected realities. For example, South Asia and Africa are
doing more than we previously believed to proliferate sustainable development, with constitutional guarantees of the right to
life and a clean environment common within legal systems in
those regions. Canada, on the other hand, is not as green as we
once thought, with its provincial system building barriers to sustainable development unique to that nation.
On the home front, many environmental lawyers were
thrilled to see so many cases dealing with sustainability issues
go up to the US Supreme Court in the last few terms, but Professor May paints a much bleaker picture, laying out the true
impacts those new precedents may have dealt. One of our student writers points to another domestic strategy—take the victories we do have in the US courts and spread them far and wide.
This shows that even in the face of little Congressional progress
and negative precedent, the courts can be used by creative and
innovative litigators to push the envelope.
An additional article covers the September proceedings of
a conference titled Transformation: The Road to a 21st Century Energy Infrastructure Impediments and Opportunities for
Renewable Energy Deployment sponsored by the ABA Section
on Environment and Energy and by SDLP and the WCL Environmental Law Society, held at the Washington College of Law.
Our hope is for this issue to broaden the discussion going
on among litigators at every level and to encourage them to look
outside their own system and their own paradigm to see how
sustainable development driven litigation is happening—and
succeeding—everywhere.
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Introduction
by Marcos Orellana*

W

hile its exact legal nature and status remains the
object of controversy, sustainable development, at a
minimum, requires the integration of environmental
concerns in development decision-making. The Iron Rhine Railway arbitral tribunal recently affirmed this notion. While the process of integration required by sustainable development occurs
mainly in the planning and implementation stage of projects and
policies, the resolution of disputes concerning those economic
activities also calls for an attempt to integrate the various relevant legal fields. In this regard, sustainable development invites
a normative dialogue between competing norms and interests,
and courts have a central role in providing a forum for such dialogue, both at the international and national levels.
Sustainable development finds its roots in the Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment, endorsed by the UN
General Assembly in 1972, which deals with the integration of
economic, environmental, and social justice issues. In 1975,
a decision of the UN Environment Programme’s Governing
Council employed the term sustainable development as a concept “aimed at meeting basic human needs without transgressing the outer limits set to man’s endeavours by the biosphere.”
In 1980, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources prepared its World Conservation Strategy which emphasized integration in its definition of sustainable
development: “integration of conservation and development to
ensure that modifications to the planet do indeed secure the survival and well-being of all people.” The concept of sustainable
development acquired international recognition as a result of the
report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, “Our Common Future:”
Sustainable development is development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts:
• The concept of needs, in particular the essential needs
of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority
should be given; and
• The idea of limitations imposed by the state
of technology and social organization on the
environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.
Sustainable development carries profound implications for
economic activities. The transition towards sustainability in
response to the alarming deterioration of the earth’s environment requires both immediate and gradual changes in production
and consumption patterns. The required regulatory changes will
affect not only new activities, but also those economic activities
already under way, as clarified by the International Court of Justice in the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case. It is thus foreseen that
the necessary changes in the legal structures governing the local
and global economies will impose costs on existing activities as
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well as foster new opportunities in the marketplace. At the same
time, investments in activities that reduce humanity’s “ecological footprint” are indispensable to fuel the transition towards
sustainability.
It is also foreseen that sustainable development requires
adaptive management and evolving norms in order to incorporate new scientific insights and lessons learned regarding the
operation and effectiveness of legal tools. In a long-term perspective, the international community has come to realize that
while the challenges involved in sustainable development are
formidable, they are also indispensable to maintain the viability
of the planet and to safeguard the rights of unborn generations.
With the emergence of sustainable development as the overarching policy framework, the international community faces
the challenge of finding channels for normative and institutional
dialogue between economic, social, and environmental regimes.
An important tool for dialogue is sustainable development’s call
for science-based decision-making, including with regard to the
precautionary principle. Indeed the 2002 Plan of Implementation concluded at the World Summit for Sustainable Development expressly recognizes the need to “[p]romote and improve
science-based decision-making and reaffirm the precautionary
approach as set out in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development.”
In the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, governments officially adopted sustainable development
as the development paradigm. Since that adoption, the concept
of sustainable development has influenced not only the legal
structures governing policy-making, but also those concerning dispute settlement. Accordingly, international and national
courts have a critical role in clarifying the contents of sustainable development in concrete historical circumstances.
The role of domestic courts is particularly important in
regard to sustainable development, given that courts address
particular disputes that reflect concrete tensions and interests
and not abstract controversies. In addition, the societal balance between competing economic, environmental, and social
considerations are often mediated by domestic laws, both substantively and procedurally. It is thus incumbent upon domestic
courts to interpret and give effect to internal laws embodying
societal preferences, with the aid of the principle of sustainable
development. In this light, this volume explores how national
and international courts are using the principle of sustainable
development to reconcile tensions that surface between environmental, social, and economic issues.

*Dr. Marcos A. Orellana is a WCL alumni from Chile. He is Senior Attorney at
the Center for International Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and Adjunct Professor at American University Washington College of Law.
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The Role of International Forums in the
Advancement of Sustainable Development
by Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger*

T

Introduction

his article briefly discusses emerging trends in international policy and law on sustainable development, focusing on how international forums can advance sustainable
development. Drawing on recent experience in global policy
making processes, international treaty regimes, and decisions of
international courts and tribunals, this article argues that international forums can contribute constructively to global efforts
to balance and integrate competing economic, human rights,
and environmental priorities for development that can last over
the long term. It notes that diverse international regimes quite
appropriately contribute differently to sustainable development,
depending on the specific challenge being addressed or the particular resource being jointly-managed. The devil, this article
suggests, is in the details.

Global Commitments to More Sustainable
Development
Finding one accepted, universal definition of sustainable
development that is appropriate for all cultures and regions of
the world is not straightforward. International understanding of
both sustainability and development has evolved a great deal in
recent decades. Like other important global objectives (peace,
democracy, human rights, freedom), sustainable development
can take on new meanings in different contexts.
In the Preamble to the 1986 Declaration on the Right to
Development, States focus on development as iterative processes
to improve human well-being.1 While debates persist in certain
contexts, major international institutions active in development,
as well as international development agencies, adopt variations
of this approach.2 This article takes both a principled and a practical approach. First, as a matter of principle, development can
be understood as the processes of expanding people’s choices,
enabling improvements in collective and individual quality of
life and the exercise of full freedoms and rights. Indian Nobel
Laureate Amartya Sen, in Development as Freedom, provides
theoretical underpinnings for this approach. As he describes it,
development is a process of expanding the real personal freedoms that people might enjoy.3 The expansion of freedoms, as
Sen notes, can be analyzed through recognition of the “instrumental” and “constitutive” roles of development (the means and
the ends). Second, on a practical level, it can be noted that in
2000, the Millennium Development Goals provided an important global set of targets, and that among 194 countries in the
world, only 38 countries are characterized as developed according to the Human Development Index; with the vast majority
Fall 2009

of the world’s population in 156 developing countries.4 Just in
terms of development, a great deal remains to be done.
One important critique of development holds that if all
human beings adopt the extraction, production, consumption,
and pollution patterns that are currently common among some
countries, humanity will quickly exceed the carrying capacity of the world’s resources, leading to collapse.5 In short, this
view argues, current models of economic development are
unsustainable. However, States hold sovereignty over their
own natural resources, and, if developed countries achieved
their present standard of living due to exploitation of resources,
it is scarcely just to seek to prevent developing countries from
adopting the same patterns, in spite of impacts on the environment or long-term global survival. The global objective of sustainable development emerged in the 1980s as a way to bridge
these deadlocked views of developed and developing countries
and to address concerns about the long-term sustainability of
development. In certain sectors of natural resource development,
where the common resource has a clear transboundary nature
and can be studied scientifically (such as fish stocks or perhaps
shared watercourses), common problems are clearer and create
very practical imperatives for States to negotiate rational common management regimes. In other areas, however, particularly
where impacts are diffuse, global, and cumulative over time
(such as depletion of the common atmosphere, loss of global
biological diversity, depletion of soil or seed resources), it is
much more difficult to find common starting points to develop
agreements. The concept of sustainable development emerged to
help countries find solutions to these dilemmas and has become
a key objective of many important international economic, environmental, and social agreements and regimes today.
International forums play important roles in advancing
sustainable development. This article focuses on three. First, it
argues that, through international “soft law” policy-making processes on sustainable development, States have worked to refine
* Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, MEM (Yale), BCL & LLB (McGill), BA Honors, is Director of the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law
(“CISDL”) in Montreal, Canada; Senior Director of Research for Sustainable
Prosperity; and a Fellow of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at
Cambridge University in the UK. This article shares thoughts with her earlier
works in Sustainable Development in International and National Law (Hans
Christian Bugge & Christina Voigt, eds. Europa 2008) and Routledge Handbook of International Law (David Armstrong, ed. Routledge 2009), and builds
on her previous work with Ashfaq Khalfan in Sustainable Development Law:
Principles, Practices and Prospects (Oxford University Press 2004). She gratefully thanks and acknowledges the insights and assistance of Alexandra Harrington, Senior Manager of CISDL and Doctor of Civil Law candidate at the
McGill University Faculty of Law.
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a common concept of sustainable development, identified priorities for sustainable development, and found certain elements of
consensus on how these priorities can and should be addressed
at different levels through policy and even law. Second, it argues
that through the negotiation and implementation of international
treaties on sustainable development, States seek to address
specific sustainability challenges related to economic, environmental, and also social aspects of development, partly through
the adoption of certain operational principles in the context of
treaty regimes. Finally, it argues that through the peaceful settlement of disputes related to sustainable development, States are
starting to gain valuable guidance from international courts and
tribunals on how it is possible to resolve particular transboundary problems that invoke a need to balance environmental, economic, and social development priorities.

The Role of International Forums in the
Advancement of Sustainable Development
The following sections analyze the role of international
forums in the advancement of sustainable development by discussing the progress of soft law
in the policy-making context,
progress in the treaty making
context, and progress in the
realm of treaty regimes as shown
by tribunal decisions.

Progress in “Soft Law”
Policy-Making Processes:
Framing the Debates

International
understanding of both
sustainability and
development has evolved
a great deal in recent
decades

The term sustainable development, which may have been
first coined in European forestry
laws of the 18th century,6 gained
recognition at the global level
in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1972, the United Nations called an
international Conference on the Human Environment, which
led to the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,7
the creation of the UN Environment Programme, and increased
impetus to agree on certain multilateral environmental agreements such as the 1973 Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species.8
In the 1980 World Conservation Strategy of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”), sustainable development is defined as “the modification of the
biosphere and the application of human, financial, living and
non-living resources to satisfy human needs and improve the
quality of human life.”9 In 1982, the World Charter for Nature
was adopted by the UN General Assembly, calling for “optimum
sustainable productivity,” and affirming that in “formulating
long-term plans for economic development, population growth
and the improvement of standards of living, due account shall be
taken of the long-term capacity of natural systems to ensure the
subsistence and settlement of the populations concerned, recognizing that this capacity may be enhanced through science and
technology.”10
5

In 1983, after a decade of increasingly heated debates
between developed and developing countries on environmental
limits to development, the UN General Assembly established
the World Commission on the Environment and Development
(“WCED”).11 The WCED, chaired by Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway, embarked on a global series of
consultations. In 1987, it delivered its Report to the General
Assembly, Our Common Future.12 The most generally accepted
definition of sustainable development is found in this “Brundtland Report” where it is defined as “…development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.”13 The Report was
accepted by the General Assembly in Resolution 42/187. The
Resolution differentiates between the objective of sustainable
development and the objective of environmental protection,
though it considers them linked. The Resolution tasks the UN
Economic and Social Council, other development institutions
of the UN, and economic ministries with reorientation toward
sustainable development, focusing on “needs,” especially the
essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority
should be given.
In 1992, in response to
the Brundtland Report, the
United Nations convened a
global conference in Rio de
Janeiro—the UN Conference
on Environment and Development (“UNCED,” or the “Rio
Earth Summit”).14 The UNCED
focused on development needs
and on how to integrate environmental considerations into
development planning and
economic decision-making. At
the time, developed country leaders were anxious to show their
political concern, and developing country leaders were increasingly frustrated with what was perceived as attempts to limit
their sovereign decisions concerning the use of natural resources
for development. Ultimately, the UNCED was broadly viewed
as a global success, with specific outcomes including the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which lays
out certain principles, and the 1992 Agenda 21, which serves
as a “blueprint” to halt and reverse the effects of environmental degradation and to promote sustainable development in all
countries.15 The text of Agenda 21 comprises a preamble and
four sections entitled: Social and Economic Dimensions,16 Conservation and Management of Resources for Development,17
Strengthening the Role of Major Groups,18 and Means of Implementation.19 Agenda 21 also noted in several places, as a means
of implementation of sustainable development, the need for
international action to codify and develop “international law on
sustainable development.”20 Indeed, the UNCED process led to
three international treaties: the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),21 the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity (“UNCBD”),22 and the 1994 UN
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Convention to Combat Desertification (“UNCCD”).23 After
the UNCED, a UN Commission on Sustainable Development
(“UNCSD”) was established under the UN’s Economic and
Social authority, to annually review progress in implementation
of Agenda 21.
In 1997, a special session of the UN General Assembly, the
“Earth Summit+5,” was held in New York to review progress
toward the objectives set in Rio. The resulting Declaration, the
Programme of Further Action to Implement Agenda 21, focused
on assessing progress since Rio and calling attention to areas
where implementation of Agenda 21 recommendations was faltering, highlighting the need to further strengthen and codify
international law on sustainable development.24 The UNCSD
continued to meet annually from 1997 to 2002. States also held
further global summits, adopting non-binding policy outcomes
identifying points of global consensus on sustainable development issues and undertaking a series of legally binding negotiations on specific sustainable development challenges.
The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development
(“WSSD”) in Johannesburg sought to reinvigorate global commitment to sustainable development,25 focusing on how best to
implement sustainable development in a context of globalization. The WSSD resulted in a 2002 Johannesburg Declaration
on Sustainable Development and a Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The Johannesburg Declaration, rather than laying out
principles like the Declarations from Stockholm and Rio, provides a political commitment to sustainable development from
heads of State.26 The 2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (“JPOI”) provides a framework for action to implement the
commitments originally agreed at UNCED and to address a few
additional challenges.27 New resources were committed to the
Global Environment Facility, and States agreed that efforts to
address desertification would be henceforth funded by the GEF
as a new focal area. A commitment was also made to negotiate a
new binding regime on access and benefit sharing for biodiversity, under the UNCBD. Specific attention was focused on certain important priorities identified by the UN Secretary General,
in the areas of water and sanitation, energy, health, agriculture
and biodiversity (the so-called “WEHAB” issues). By the end
of the WSSD, a number of the WEHAB commitments set out in
the JPOI had been linked to new “voluntary” partnerships and
financial commitments. Johannesburg witnessed the launch of
180 “Type II Outcomes.” These were specific sustainable development partnerships between governments, civil society, and
industry, agreed to under the auspices of the WSSD process and
supported by the UNCSD, to achieve a set of measurable objectives and results focused on the implementation of sustainable
development in specific areas. The WSSD process set in place a
broadened institutional architecture for sustainable development
to further implement Agenda 21 and the WSSD outcomes and
to meet emerging sustainable development challenges.28 JPOI
Chapter XI lays out a multi-tiered international architecture for
sustainable development governance.
In sum, therefore, over the past thirty years, there has
been an extensive policy-making process related to sustainable
Fall 2009

development, including the debates and outcomes of the 1992
Rio UNCED, the 1997 New York UN General Assembly
Special Session known as the Earth Summit +5, and the 2002
Johannesburg WSSD.29 The debates helped to refine a common
concept of sustainable development among States. For instance,
in the Johannesburg Declaration, States “assume[d] a collective
responsibility to advance and strengthen the interdependent and
mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development—economic development, social development and environmental
protection—at the local, national, regional and global levels.”30
Championed by the South African hosts and others, the social
agenda in sustainable development was deeply emphasized. By
the end of 2002, sustainable development was accepted as an
important objective not only for bringing economic and environmental authorities together, but also for those addressing health,
indigenous peoples’ rights, gender, and other social issues.31
In addition, the process identified certain priority areas of consensus in State policy-making and cooperation. For instance,
specific targets were agreed in the JPOI that built on the Millennium Development Goals themselves, and new partnerships were launched to work towards achieving the targets. The
global debates also identified areas where existing economic,
environmental, and social development treaties could be refined
to better address sustainable development objectives, or new
agreements negotiated. For instance, as noted above, in the Rio
process three important international accords addressing both
environmental and sustainable development objectives were
signed, with several others negotiated soon afterwards. Furthermore, as discussed below, in the Johannesburg process, certain
emerging principles of international law on sustainable development were openly debated, such as common but differentiated
responsibility, precaution, sustainable use of natural resources,
equity, integration, and openness, transparency, and public participation.32 Unlike international treaties, or clearly recognized
international customary law, the 1992 Rio Declaration and the
Agenda 21, along with the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration and
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation are not binding. Rather,
such consensus declarations by States are usually described as
“soft law.”33 UN General Assembly resolutions, while they can
be considered evidence of an emerging customary principle and
while they can reflect treaty law, are similarly not considered
legally binding as such. However, this does not mean that such
consensus declarations of States are without legal relevance.
Indeed, “soft law” declarations may give rise to legitimate
expectations, in that States, assumed to be acting in good faith
when they agree to such statements, might be precluded from
deliberately violating agreements or commitments assumed in
soft law without notice or a least assumed to be acting in accordance with such commitments.34 In a related manner, “soft law”
can provide evidence of emerging customary norms.35 Though
they may not provide a solid basis for robust legal analysis, the
global “soft law” debates on sustainable development do appear
to play a key role in building consensus around certain priorities
and principles, and in identifying and building alliances for new
areas of treaty-making on sustainable development.
6

Progress in Treaty Negotiation: Setting
Sustainable Development Objectives
Unlike in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the Johannesburg
Summit process did not produce new treaties. Instead, in the
JPOI, States specifically highlighted over 60 existing international economic, environmental, and social instruments that
play a role achieving sustainable development, and mentioned
more than 200 others.36 Essentially, sustainable development,
once almost marginalized as a second or third objective of a
few international environmental accords, came to be recognized
as a key purpose of many important treaties and instruments,
including specialized regimes for sustainable management of
resources such as seeds, fisheries, and forests. One of these
treaties even provides an agreed
definition of sustainable development.37 While the concept of
sustainable development, like
development (or world peace,
or human rights), may have
no single simple accepted universal definition, this does not
require that the meaning of sustainable development must also
remain unclear in international
treaty law. Different treaties,
established to address distinct
problems, usually specify what
States mean by sustainable
development in the accord itself,
either in the preamble or in the
operational principles, and this
informs the specific mechanisms adopted, the manner of
implementation, the resolution
of related disputes, and often the
further evolution of the regime.
One of the most significant of these treaties is the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).
This treaty recognizes that
the climate system is a shared resource whose stability can be
affected by industrial and other emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases, and sets an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to tackle the challenges posed by climate
change. In the UNFCCC, the promotion of sustainable development is framed as one of the “Principles” of the treaty, where it
is described as a “right.” The provision is also, however, framed
as a hortatory (“should” rather than “shall”) commitment to
“promote.”38 In this context, it can be noted that Principle 4 of
the UNFCCC is provided as a distinct norm from Principle 1,
which states in part “[t]he Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity . . . .” It is also distinct from Principle
5, which states that “. . . Parties should cooperate to promote a

supportive and open international economic system that would
lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all
Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling
them better to address the problems of climate change. . . .” As
such, it would appear that, while UNFCCC Principle 4 recognizes a right and (hortatory) duty of States to promote sustainable development, this does not imply either intergenerational
equity or a “new kind of economic growth,” as both of these are
recognized as separate principles. Rather, the right to promote
sustainable development appears to refer more directly to the
work of the Parties to integrate environmental protection with
development processes. Further, in spite of the Principles discussed above, an operational reference to sustainable development is also found in Article 2. As
such, while it could be argued
that the “right to promote sustainable development” is recognized as a Principle by States in
the context of the UNFCCC, it
also seems that stabilization of
greenhouse gas reduction levels
“should” be achieved within a
time-frame sufficient to “enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”—
essentially, an objective. At the
first Conference of the Parties
(1995), in the Berlin Mandate,
Parties launched intense negotiations that resulted in the Kyoto
Protocol39 on December 11,
1997. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol shares UNFCCC objectives,
principles, and institutions, but
commits Annex I Parties to individual, legally binding targets
to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto
Protocol mentions sustainable
development as an objective in
an extremely clear way. Indeed, it
provides quite a solid definition of the types of measures that
States can take “in order to promote sustainable development” in
the area of climate change.40
A second relevant treaty is the 1994 UN Convention to
Combat Desertification (“UNCCD”), especially in Africa, which
built on the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification from the
1977 UN Conference on Desertification to address land degradation in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas. In Article 3 on
Principles, the Parties commit to cooperate to work towards the
sustainable use of land and water resources. But in the UNCCD
States make over forty references to “sustainable” development,
use, management, exploitation, production, and practices and/or
unsustainable development and exploitation practices. As such,

It is possible that
international courts
and tribunals . . .
are becoming more
willing to go beyond
a simple “balance”
of environmental
and economic
concerns, towards
actual integration of
environmental, economic
and social considerations
in development
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while “sustainable use” is set as a Principle in Article 3, States
also clearly incorporated sustainable development as an “Objective” of the UNCCD, speaking both to their intention that an
integrated approach will “contribute to the achievement of sustainable development” in particular areas, and that the adoption
of integrated strategies will focus on “sustainable management
of land and water resources” leading to “improved living conditions.”41 In the UNCCD States essentially seek to specify how
this objective will be realized, through action plans and regional
annexes, each of which refers to sustainable development in
slightly different (regionally appropriate) lights.
In a third example, 190 countries have ratified the 1992
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (“UNCBD”), which
covers all ecosystems, species, and genetic resources, and recognizes that the conservation of biological diversity is “a common concern of humankind” while also noting that sustainable
use of biodiversity is an integral part of the development process. In essence, in the treaty States
link traditional conservation
efforts to the economic goal
of using biological resources
sustainably. The UNCBD contains principles for the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits
arising from the sustainable use
of genetic resources, including
genetic resources destined for
commercial use. The treaty also
covers the rapidly expanding
field of biotechnology, addressing technology development and
transfer, benefit-sharing, and
biosafety. The UNCBD regime
agrees on measures and incentives for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity; regulated access to genetic
resources; access to and transfer of technology (including biotechnology); technical and scientific cooperation; impact assessment; education and public awareness; provision of financial
resources; and national reporting on efforts to implement treaty
commitments. In the UNCBD, States recognize “that ecosystems, species and genes must be used for the benefit of humans.
However, this should be done in a way and at a rate that does not
lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity.” Indeed, in
Article 2, States define sustainable use as “the use of components
of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to
the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and
future generations.”42 As such, in the UNCBD, States appear not
only to clearly adopt sustainable use of biological diversity as a
treaty objective, but also to define fairly precisely what is meant
by sustainable use, and what types of measures and activities are
needed to ensure that use is, indeed, sustainable in the context of
biological resources. On January 29, 2000, the Conference of the
Parties of the UNCBD adopted a supplementary instrument, the

2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. In the Protocol, States
seek to protect biological diversity from the potential risks posed
by living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology. They establish an advance informed agreement (“AIA”)
procedure for ensuring that countries are provided with the
information necessary to make informed decisions before agreeing to the import of such organisms into their territory. They also
establish a Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate the exchange
of information on living modified organisms and to assist countries in the implementation of the Protocol. Overall, there are
more than twenty references to “sustainability” in this Protocol,
each specific to the actual resource being managed. “Sustainable
use” is seen as an objective of the Protocol, and is considered
relevant to social and economic (not just environmental) priorities such as the needs of indigenous and local communities.
This highlights the point raised earlier, that there are important
social and economic dimensions to sustainable development.
Sustainable development, as an
objective of international treaty
law, cannot simply be conflated
with environmental protection
in developing countries.
The commitment “to promote sustainable development”
has not just been made in multilateral environmental agreements. In the preparations for
the 2002 Johannesburg Summit,
after seven years of negotiations, the Food and Agriculture
Organization (“FAO”) Conference (through Resolution
3/2001) adopted the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture43 (“Seed Treaty”) in November 2001. The Seed Treaty
covers all plant genetic resources relevant for food and agriculture and is vital in ensuring the continued availability of the plant
genetic resources that countries will need to feed their people. In
the Seed Treaty, States seek to conserve for future generations
the genetic diversity that is essential for food and agriculture.
Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are defined as
“any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value
for food and agriculture.” The treaty objectives are the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food
and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits
derived from their use, in harmony with the UNCBD, for sustainable agriculture and food security. In the Seed Treaty, States
establish a Multilateral System for Access and Benefit-Sharing
that is meant to provide an efficient, effective and transparent
framework to facilitate access to plant genetic resources for food
and agriculture, and to share the benefits in a fair and equitable
way. This Multilateral System applies to over 64 major crops
and forages. The Governing Body of the treaty sets out the conditions for access and benefit-sharing in a “Material Transfer

The process of identifying
principles of international
law and policy related to
sustainable development
has been reasonably
complex
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Agreement.” Resources may be obtained from the Multilateral
System for utilization and conservation in research, breeding
and training. When a commercial product is developed using
these resources, the Treaty provides for payment of an equitable
share of the resulting monetary benefits, with the condition that
the use of the product may not be restricted and the seed may
be used for further research and breeding. If others may use it,
payment is voluntary. The Seed Treaty provides for sharing the
benefits of using plant genetic resources for food and agriculture through information exchange, access to and the transfer
of technology, and capacity-building. Under the Seed Treaty,
a funding strategy was also established to mobilize funds for
activities, plans, and programs to help small farmers in developing countries. This funding strategy also includes the share of
the monetary benefits paid under the Multilateral System. There
are twenty-four references to “sustainable” agricultural development, use, and systems in the FAO Seed Treaty. Sustainable use
of genetic resources is clearly recognized as an “Objective” of
the treaty. But in Article 6.1, the Contracting Parties also accept
a duty. States “shall develop and maintain appropriate policy and
legal measures that promote the sustainable use of plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture.” In Article 6.2, the Parties
identify seven specific such measures, including “(a) pursuing
fair agricultural policies that . . . enhance the sustainable use of
agricultural biological diversity and other natural resources; (b)
strengthening research which enhances and conserves biological diversity by maximizing intra- and inter-specific variation
for the benefit of farmers . . . (d) broadening the genetic base
of crops . . . (e) promoting, as appropriate, the expanded use
of local and locally adapted crops, varieties and underutilized
species; (f) supporting . . . sustainable use of crops and creating
strong links to plant breeding and agricultural development in
order to . . . promote increased world food production compatible with sustainable development . . . .” This is important for two
reasons. First, the Seed Treaty is a recent instrument, and therefore offers an insight into States’ most current conceptions of
sustainability as an economic, social and environmental objective that can be operationalized. Second, in the treaty, States
focus on “sustainable use” in one particular context, that of plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture. In this specific sector,
it appears possible to pinpoint fairly precisely the meaning of
sustainable use of the resource, and the type of measures that are
required to ensure that it takes place.
Furthermore, in several important trade and investment
treaties States have also underlined a commitment to sustainable
development, one that has been interpreted by decisions of the
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and
other economic tribunals.44 The negotiation of the Preamble of
the 1994 WTO Agreement was influenced by the outcomes of
the 1992 UNCED, as was made explicit in the Uruguay Round
Decision on Trade and Environment which noted the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (“GATT”) follow-up process.45 The Preamble of the
WTO Agreement states that:
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Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view
to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income
and effective demand, and expanding the production
of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for
the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent
with their respective needs and concerns at different
levels of economic development . . .
Recognizing further that there is need for positive
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries,
and especially the least developed among them, secure
a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.46
While Preambular statements are not formally legally binding in the same way that operational provisions can be, they can
play a role in interpretation of a treaty, particularly in identification of the treaty’s object and purpose.47 Nearly eight years after
the WTO Agreement was adopted in Punta del Este in 1994, the
importance of a sustainable development objective to the WTO
was underscored, after debates, in the 2001 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration at paragraph 6 which states:
We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective
of sustainable development, as stated in the Preamble
to the Marrakesh Agreement. We are convinced that
the aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and
non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and
acting for the protection of the environment and the
promotion of sustainable development can and must
be mutually supportive . . . . We encourage efforts to
promote cooperation between the WTO and relevant
international environmental and developmental organizations, especially in the lead-up to the World Summit
on Sustainable Development to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2002.48
It can be argued that in Doha, Ministers recognized sustainable development as an objective of the WTO, and placed it into
a strengthened context, referring to practical measures such as
the need for cooperation in other international environment and
development organizations. References to this objective in the
Doha Ministerial Declaration clearly recognize environmental
protection and social development as elements that need to be
integrated into the mandate of a mainly economic organization,
the WTO. The Ministerial Declaration also contains, in particular, several substantive provisions showing that a commitment
to sustainable development provided real guidance for the Ministers’ decisions. Indeed, after 2001, the WTO, as an institution,
moved more quickly to recognize sustainable development and
its normative nature. As noted by WTO Director General Pascal
Lamy, the objective of sustainable development mandates WTO
members “to no longer compartmentalize [their] work; discussing environmental and developmental issues in isolation of the
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rest of what [they] do. These are issues that permeate all areas
of the WTO.”49 Similarly, the 1994 North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”), and most international trade agreements signed by Canada, the United States, or the European
Union since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, contain assurances that
States, in signing these regional trade and investment accords,
seek to promote sustainable development (North American bilateral trade and investment treaties), or plan to carry out their
treaty commitments in accordance with a principle of sustainable development (European economic association agreements
and trade accords).50

Progress in Treaty Regimes: Operationalizing
Sustainable Development Principles
These last three decades of policy-making and treaty negotiations have reinforced international recognition of certain key
principles related to sustainable development, including the
principles of integration, sustainable use of natural resources,
and equity, as well as principles of common but differentiated
responsibility, precaution, good governance, and openness,
transparency, and public participation.51 They also highlighted
the emergence and refinement of international instruments and
techniques to put these principles into practice. As was predicted
in the Annex on Legal Principles to the Brundtland Report,52 a
body of rules of international law related to sustainable development is emerging, mainly through the adoption of “hard law”
treaty regimes. When States set sustainable development as a
policy objective of an international treaty, they also adopt certain
norms to realize their joint purpose. For example, the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities governs the way
that burdens to reduce greenhouse gases are apportioned among
States, serving the sustainable economic development objective
of the 1992 UNFCCC.53 Such principles which aim to contribute to and achieve sustainable development may even come to
be used so often, and to be accepted so generally, that they do,
indeed, gain recognition as customary international rules themselves, binding on all States that have not persistently objected.
Existing universal adoption of these principles to address specific international issues, moreover, might support a contention
that in these contexts (climate change, biodiversity, desertification, law of the sea), certain principles have already reached
such a status. The practical implications of such a contention,
in some nearly universal membership treaties, which explicitly
commit to these principles, might be minimal, but it does not
discount the value of examining the principles themselves.
The process of identifying principles of international law
and policy related to sustainable development has been reasonably complex. The most important undertakings ran parallel to
the global policy-making events outlined above, and included
the process of elaborating the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the
1987 Brundtland Commission’s Legal Experts Group on Principles of International Law for the Protection of the Environment
and Sustainable Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration, the
2002 New Delhi Declaration of the International Law Association, and other efforts. The 1992 Rio Declaration echoes many
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of the Principles recommended by the Brundtland Report, and
was clearly directly influenced by its findings. Widely accepted
as “soft law,”54 the central concept of the 1992 Rio Declaration is sustainable development, as defined by the Brundtland
Report. The Rio Declaration was followed by the Report of the
Expert Group Meeting on Identification of Principles of International Law for Sustainable Development, which was commissioned by the UN Division for Sustainable Development
in accordance with a request by States at the second session of
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development in 1994, and
released in September 1995.55 This early Report identifies nineteen principles and concepts of international law for sustainable
development but did not resolve international debates on these
questions.
In 1997, States noted in the Programme of Action for Further
Implementation of Agenda 21 that “[p]rogress has been made in
incorporating the principles contained in the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development . . . including the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities . . . [and] the precautionary principle . . . in a variety of international and national
legal instruments . . . much remains to be done to embody the
Rio principles more firmly in law and practice.”56 As a Resolution of the 70th Conference of the International Law Association
(“ILA”) in New Delhi India, April 2-6, 2002, the Committee
on the Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development released its
New Delhi ILA Declaration on Principles of International Law
relating to Sustainable Development.57 It outlines seven principles of international law on sustainable development. These
principles are central principles of most international treaties
related to sustainable development, and are recognized and reaffirmed throughout the 2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. Detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this article and can
be found elsewhere.58 However, given the decade of study and
analysis conducted by the Committee and the relative normative
clarity of their findings, the 2002 New Delhi Declaration provides a current benchmark of the important principles of international law on sustainable development.59 As such, a short survey
is provided below.
The New Delhi Declaration starts by recognizing the need
to further develop international law in the field of sustainable
development, with a view to according due weight to both the
developmental and environmental concerns, in order to achieve
a balanced and comprehensive international law on sustainable
development, as called for in Principle 27 of the Rio Declaration
and Chapter 39 of Agenda 21 of the UNCED. Then, seven “principles” are highlighted.
The first evokes a duty of states to ensure sustainable use of
natural resources. States have sovereign rights over their natural
resources, and a duty not to cause (or allow) undue damage to
the environment of other States in the use of these resources.
As discussed above, this principle was recognized in Stockholm
Declaration Principle 21 and the Rio Declaration Principle 2.60
Though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this
article, it should be noted that this principle has been reflected
and strongly reaffirmed in several international treaties on
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sustainable development with extremely broad membership in
the past two decades. In the UNFCCC, at the Preamble, Parties
recognize the rights of sovereignty over natural resources and
related responsibilities to protect the world’s climate system.
Similar recognition is found in the Preamble of the UNCBD,
and is highlighted as a principle of sustainable use of biological
resources in Article 3 and Article 10.61 Similarly, in the UNCCD,
at Article 3(c), Parties agree on a principle to work toward sustainable use of scarce water and land resources, and, in Article
10.4 on national action plans, Article 11 on regional and subregional actions, Article 17.1(a) on research and development,
and Art 19.1(c) and (e) on capacity-building, the principle is
reaffirmed.62 The WTO Agreement also recognizes, in its Preamble, the need to ensure optimal
use of the world’s resources in
accordance with the objective of
sustainable development.63 The
FAO Seed Treaty, at Article 1.1,
sets the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture,
making the commitment operational in Article 6 which lays out
a series of specific law and policy
measures that States should adopt
to ensure sustainable use of plant
genetic resources.64
The second principle of
equity and poverty eradication
refers to both inter-generational
equity (a right of future generations to enjoy a fair level of the
common patrimony) and intragenerational equity (a right of all
peoples within the current generation of fair access to the current generation’s entitlement to
the Earth’s natural resources).65
According to the New Delhi Declaration, the principle of equity
includes a duty to cooperate to secure development opportunities of developed and developing countries, and a duty to cooperate for the eradication of poverty, as noted in Chapter IX on
International Economic and Social Co-operation of the Charter
of the United Nations.66 This principle is also reflected in international treaty law on sustainable development. In the UNCBD,
the principle is reflected in Article 15.7 on access to the benefits of biological resources and related obligations to ensure that
the benefits are equitably shared.67 In the Preamble of the 1992
UNFCCC, Parties commit to take into full account the legitimate
priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of
sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty, while
also noting their determination to protect the climate system for
present and future generations. Indeed, one of the treaty principles in Article 3 states an intention to “protect the climate system

for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind,
on the basis of equity” and commits that accordingly, “developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate
change.”68 In the UNCCD, Parties included provisions on poverty eradication and intra-generational equity at Article 16(g) on
the sharing of traditional knowledge sharing, at Article 17.1(c)
on research and development related to traditional knowledge, and in Article 18.2(b) on technology transfer.69 Further,
a responsibility for inter-generational and intra-generational
equity in sharing the benefits of plant genetic resources is recognized in the Preamble of the FAO Seed Treaty, as well as at
Article 1.1 as an objective of access and benefit-sharing provisions, and Articles 10, 11, 12,
and 13 which operationalize
the principle by establishing a
multilateral system of access
and benefit sharing for plant
genetic resources.70
The third principle concerned the common but differentiated obligations of States in
securing sustainable development. According to the New
Delhi Declaration, this principle holds that the common
responsibility of states for the
protection of the environment
at the national, regional, and
global levels shall be balanced
by the need to take account of
different circumstances, particularly in relation to each
state’s historical contribution
to the creation of a particular
problem, as well as its ability
to prevent, reduce, and control
the threat.71 This principle is
reflected in the UNFCCC at its
Preamble, as well as in Article
3 on Principles and Article 4 on commitments, which establishes the differentiated obligations of Annex 1 and non-Annex
1 Parties.72 Parties also affirm and operationalize the principle
in the Kyoto Protocol at Article 10, which recognizes common
but differentiated responsibilities to establish inventories and
programmes to abate greenhouse gas emissions, and Article
12, which operationalizes the principle by establishing a Clean
Development Mechanism to help cover the costs of low emission technologies and energy systems.73 The principle is also
prominent in the UNCCD, where Parties reaffirm, in Article 3
on principles, the need to respect the common but differentiated
responsibilities of States, in Articles 4 through 6, which lay out
the obligations for affected and developed country Parties, and
in Article 7, which includes specific provisions for Africa.74 The
principle is reaffirmed and made operational in the FAO Seed
Treaty at Article 7.2(a), which provides for developing country’s

As a general principle,
international forums
have contributed to the
growth and expansion of
sustainable development
by providing a space
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non-state actors may
come together for a
collective discussion
of their sustainabilityrelated challenges
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different capabilities, at Article 8 which commits to technical
assistance, at Article 15.1(b)(iii) which grants special benefits
to least developed countries and to centers of diversity, and in
Article 18.4(d) on financing implementation of the treaty.75
The fourth was the principle of the precautionary approach
to human health, natural resources, and ecosystems, in that
where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent degradation.76 This
principle is reflected in UNCBD in its Preamble, and made operational through Article 14.1(b), which addresses likely adverse
impacts and Article 8(g) on transboundary movement of living
modified organisms (“LMOs”).77 It is also central to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, both through explicit reaffirmation
of the principle in its Preamble, at Article 1 that lays out the
precautionary objective of the Protocol, and in the way that it
is operationalized at Article 7 on advanced informed agreement
requirements that must be fulfilled prior to the first transboundary movement of an LMO, at Article 10.6 with regards the decision-making procedures that will be followed in implementation
of the Protocol, at Article 11.8 which establishes simplified procedures for LMOs destined for food, feed, and processing uses,
at Article 15 on risk assessment which references Annex III.4, in
which precautionary decision-making is explicitly permitted.78
Precaution also appears in the UNFCCC at Article 3 as a Principle of the treaty.79 The precautionary principle is reflected in
the design of 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, which requires exporters of certain hazardous substances to obtain the prior informed consent
of importers before proceeding, and accepts precautionary
measures by Parties in Article 14(3) and the Annex V on information exchange.80 The 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants also acknowledges, at its Preamble,
that “precaution underlies the concerns of all the Parties and is
embedded within this Convention.” At Article 1, Parties note
that they are mindful of the precautionary approach as set forth
in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration in setting their objective
to protect human health and the environment from persistent
organic pollutants. Article 8 makes precaution an operative priority; Parties agree to use “a precautionary manner” when deciding which chemicals to list in the Annexes of the Convention,
where lack of full scientific certainty shall not prevent a proposal
to list from proceeding. Further, Part V(B) of Annex C specifies that “precaution and prevention” should be considered when
determining the best available techniques. In the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982, relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks at Article 6, Parties agree that
“[s]tates shall apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks… States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate.
The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used
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as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and
management measures.” And according to the WTO Appellate
Body, the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
PhytoSanitary Measures, enshrines the precautionary principle
in Article 5.7 which permits provisional measures to be taken to
restrict trade where scientific data is uncertain, though this does
not exhaust its relevance in WTO law.81
The fifth is a principle of public participation and access
to information and justice. According to this principle, States
have a duty to ensure that individuals have appropriate access to
“appropriate, comprehensible and timely” information concerning sustainable development that is held by public authorities,
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes,
as well as effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy.82 The 1998 Aarhus
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters83 is an example of an international legal instrument based
on this principle. Many international human rights instruments
also provide specifically for public participation, access to information, and access to justice, including through the UN Human
Rights Council itself, which has public participation procedures
similar to those of the UNCSD.84 Provisions to ensure public
participation in the international treaty-making processes are
also reflected in UNCBD at Article 13 on public education and
awareness, and Article 14.1(a) on participation in impact assessment.85 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety contains similar
provisions at Article 23 on public awareness and participation;86
and the UNCCD reaffirms the principle in Article 3(a), and in
Article 10.2(f), which recommends public participation in the
development of national action plans.87 The North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which runs parallel
to NAFTA, allows citizens to make claims under Article 14 and
15 processes to prompt the investigation of non-enforcement
of environmental laws.88 Furthermore, the FAO Seed Treaty,
at Article 9.2(c), has specific provisions to recognize farmers’
rights to participate in decision-making concerning the sustainable use of plant genetic resources.89
The sixth is a principle of good governance. According to
the New Delhi Declaration, this principle commits States and
international organizations inter alia to adopt democratic and
transparent decision-making procedures and financial accountability; to take effective measures to combat official or other
corruption; to respect the principle of due process in their procedures; and to observe the rule of law and human rights. The
Declaration also notes that non-state actors should be subject
to internal democratic governance and to effective accountability, and encourages corporate social responsibility and socially
responsible investment among private actors. Good governance
is specifically noted as a priority in the Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation, and the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/72 on the Role of Good Governance in the Promotion of Human Rights has also underlined the importance of this
principle.90 While an international organization or government
that did not meet any of the ‘good governance’ criteria described
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above would certainly be subject to critique, international treaties are only just beginning to incorporate such obligations.
The main treaty in this area is the UN Convention against Corruption,91 which is founded on international support for good
governance. This Convention notes in its Preamble that corruption threatens the political stability and sustainable development of States, and at Article 5.1 obliges all State Parties to,
in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated
anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society
and reflect the principles of the rule
of law, proper management of
public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency, and
accountability.92 Further, Article 62.1 commits that in regard
to economic development and
technical assistance, States will
take measures to implement the
Convention in their international
cooperation, taking into account
“the negative effects of corruption on society in general, in
particular on sustainable development.” 93 A commitment to
good governance is also prominent in UNCCD at Article 3(c)
which lays out the principles of
the treaty, and Article 10.2(e)
on establishing institutional
frameworks for national action
plans, as well as in Article 11 on
sub-regional and regional action
plans, and Article 12 on international cooperation.94
The seventh is a principle
of integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to
human rights and social, economic, and environmental objectives. Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration states that, “[i]n order
to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and
cannot be considered in isolation from it.”95 If a customary international rule named “sustainable development” were to emerge,
this principle is the most likely candidate. However, as the New
Delhi Declaration itself recommends, such a norm could just as
easily be characterized as the “integration principle.”96 One corollary of this principle that is recognized in the Preambles of both
the UNFCCC and the UNCBD, involves the recognition that
“[s]tates should enact effective environmental legislation, that
environmental standards, management objectives and priorities
should reflect the environmental and developmental context to
which they apply, and that standards applied by some countries
may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social
cost to other countries, in particular developing countries.” This

recognition, like the right to promote sustainable economic
development that is enshrined as a principle of the UNFCCC
is important to understand the implications of integrating environmental protection with social and economic development—
while there is a commitment to take priorities into account in
decision-making, and seek mutually supportive, balanced solutions, this principle is not a trump card for the environment. It
is a commitment to compromise in good faith. The principle
is core to international treaties on sustainable development.
It is reflected in the Preamble of the UNCBD and at Article 6
on integrating conservation and
use objectives in policies and
plans; 97 and in the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety at the Preamble where trade and environment regimes are referred to as
mutually supportive, and set
in practice by Articles 2.4 and
2.5 on the relationship of the
Protocol to other international
instruments. The principle also
governs the FAO Seed Treaty,
in the Preamble of which Parties note the need for synergies between environment and
development objectives, and in
Article 5.1 they commit to promote an integrated approach to
the use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.98
Arguably, the GATT at Article
XX provides exceptions for
health, environment, and the
conservation of natural resources in order to take social and
environmental objectives into
account,99 as does the NAFTA
through Articles 103, 104 and
104.1, which govern the relationships with other accords, as
well as Article 1114 on not lowering environmental standards
to attract investment, and Article 2101 on general exceptions
also seeks to take environmental protection into account in the
development process related to trade.100
In sum, through the negotiation and implementation of
international treaties on sustainable development, States seek to
address specific sustainability challenges related to economic,
environmental, and also social aspects of development. Sustainable development objectives are recognized by states not just
in multilateral environmental agreements, but also in treaties
governing sustainable management of certain resources, such as
food and agriculture, and in trade and investment agreements.
The collections of principles identified by the Legal Annex to
the WCED Report, the UNCSD, and the ILA, among others, are
not exhaustive. In the most part these principles are not yet recognized as binding rules of customary international law. And in
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some cases, they may never be. Though States can and do refer
to broad objectives and principles of sustainable development
in these treaties, such general commitments are increasingly
being operationalized in the more detailed provisions of certain
accords, including through the recommendation of specific legal
and policy measures to ensure that a particular globally important resources can last over the long term. Further, States are
starting to apply functional principles, which, in the context of
each specific treaty regime, take on particular meanings to guide
the cooperation of the Parties in the advancement of sustainable
development.

Progress in International Tribunals
Since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, as noted above, international tribunals and courts have also begun to pronounce on
sustainable development, mainly in order to resolve disputes
that require a balance between environmental and development
concerns in a transboundary context. In decisions of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), important references to the
need to manage resources in a sustainable manner, and to balance between environment and development interests, are found
in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case,101 the Nuclear Tests Advisory Opinion (especially Judge Weeramantry’s Dissent),102 the
Kasikili / Sedudu Case (especially Judge Weeramantry’s Dissent),103 and the Order of Provisional Measures in the Pulp Mills
on the River Uruguay Case,104 as well as in the recent findings of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Tribunal Award of the
Iron Rhine Arbitration.105 Such decisions appear to be slowly
taking into account some of the principles mentioned above, as
an aid to judicial reasoning. Certain selected examples below
focus mainly on recent international courts and tribunals’ consideration of the “integration principle” mentioned above, which
may occasionally be characterized, in less than elucidatory legal
shorthand, as a “sustainable development principle.”
It is possible that international courts and tribunals, in the
years since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, are becoming more
willing to go beyond a simple “balance” of environmental and
economic concerns, towards actual integration of environmental, economic, and social considerations in development. A key
example of the way the dilemma of balancing environment and
development is found in the often-quoted early GabcikovoNagymaros Case,106 where pursuant to a treaty, one Party sought
to build a dam on a transboundary river over the objections of
the other. The majority stated that:
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and
other reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the
past, this was often done without consideration of the
effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks
for mankind—for present and future generations—of
pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and
unabated pace, new norms and standards have been
developed, set forth in a great number of instruments
during the last two decades. Such new norms have to
be taken into consideration, and such new standards
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given proper weight, not only when States contemplate
new activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic
development with protection of the environment is aptly
expressed in the concept of sustainable development.
For the purposes of the present case, this means that the
Parties together should look afresh at the effects on the
environment of the operation of the Gabcíkovo power
plant. In particular they must find a satisfactory solution for the volume of water to be released into the old
bed of the Danube and into the side-arms on both sides
of the river.107
Due to the specific facts of this case, it appears at first
glance that only procedural requirements were imposed on the
Parties in connection with a “concept” of sustainable development. However the Court did, essentially, order the Parties
to balance environmental protection with their development
interests by ordering them to “look afresh at the effects on the
environment . . .” and “find a satisfactory solution.” The majority described this as a ‘need’ to reconcile economic development with the protection of the environment. H.E. Judge C.G.
Weeramantry, as Vice-President of the ICJ, further argued that
sustainable development is a principle of international law in his
Separate Opinion in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case. In particular, he stated that he considers sustainable development to be
“more than a mere concept, but as a principle with normative
value which is crucial to the determination of this case.”108
If there were, indeed, a normative function for such a principle, it might involve the requirement to integrate environment
and development considerations. More recently, the 2005 Iron
Rhine (Belgium v. Netherlands) Award109 of the Arbitral Tribunal struck under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration addressed the issue of balance between environment and
development considerations. The case concerned a Party seeking
to reactivate a railway across the territory of another pursuant to
a venerable treaty, where it was unclear which State should bear
the burden of environmental impact assessment and mitigation
measures. In its decision, the Tribunal first recognized that:
There is considerable debate as to what, within the field
of environmental law, constitutes ‘rules’ or ‘principles’;
what is ‘soft law’; and which environmental treaty law
or principles have contributed to the development of
customary international law. Without entering further
into those controversies, the Tribunal notes that in all
of these categories ‘environment’ is broadly referred to
as including air, water, land, flora and fauna, natural
ecosystems and sites, human health and safety, and climate. The emerging principles, whatever their current
status, make reference to conservation, management,
notions of prevention and of sustainable development,
and protection for future generations.
The Tribunal then explained:

14

Since the Stockholm Conference on the Environment
in 1972 there has been a marked development of international law relating to the protection of the environment. Today, both international and EC law require the
integration of appropriate environmental measures in
the design and implementation of economic development activities. Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, adopted in 1992 which
reflects this trend, provides that ‘environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development
process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.’
Importantly, these emerging principles now integrate
environmental protection into the development process. Environmental law and the law on development
stand not as alternatives but as mutually reinforcing,
integral concepts, which require that where development may cause significant harm to the environment
there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, such
harm . . . . This duty, in the opinion of the Tribunal, has
now become a principle of general international law.
This principle applies not only in autonomous activities
but also in activities undertaken in implementation of
specific treaties between the Parties.110
The Tribunal recalled the observation of the ICJ in the
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case that “[t]his need to reconcile
economic development with protection of the environment is
aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development”111
and cited with approval the ICJ’s recognition that “new
norms have to be taken into consideration, and . . . new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate
new activities but also when continuing with activities begun in
the past . . . .”112 It held that “this dictum applies equally to the
Iron Rhine railway.”113
This determination was directly relevant for the decision in
this case:
As the Tribunal has already observed above . . . economic development is to be reconciled with the protection of the environment, and, in so doing, new norms
have to be taken into consideration, including when
activities begun in the past are now expanded and
upgraded.
...
Applying the principles of international environmental law, the Tribunal . . . is of the view that, by analogy, where a state exercises a right under international
law within the territory of another state, considerations
of environmental protection also apply. The exercise
of Belgium’s right of transit, as it has formulated its
request, thus may well necessitate measures by the
Netherlands to protect the environment to which Belgium will have to contribute as an integral element of
its request. The reactivation of the Iron Rhine railway
cannot be viewed in isolation from the environmental
protection measures necessitated by the intended use
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of the railway line. These measures are to be fully integrated into the project and its costs.114
In the Iron Rhine award, the Tribunal found that where
development may cause significant harm to the environment
there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, such harm, and
stated that this is now an accepted principle of international law.
But the Tribunal also mentions various other potential principles
of law such as “sustainable development,” and makes a further
finding that environmental measures must be “fully integrated
into the project and its costs,” linking this to the exhortation
found in Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development which provides that “in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.” One interpretation is that the Arbitral
Panel was applying an “integration principle” in conjunction
with the directly recognized “no environmental harm” principle,
in order to find that the costs of impact assessments and mitigation measures should be borne by the Party carrying out the
development (as an integral part of the reactivation of the Iron
Rhine Railway), rather than by the Party through whose territory
the railway would pass. In the future, this recognition might be
extended by States to include situations where the “development
process” consists of undertaking new trade and investment disciplines, or initiating development projects that will significantly
affect the global commons. Were such a principle eventually
recognized, it would likely still have real limits—“constituting
an integral part” is not the same as “becoming a trump card.”
Indeed, such a principle might also press States to, a l’envers,115
ensure that environmental protection activities (such as the
development of new environmental laws) not be undertaken “in
isolation” without ensuring that social and economic development priorities and norms are taken into account.
A recent decision in the ICJ does suggest such an outer
boundary to such a norm. Positive claims based on a States’
“sovereign right to implement sustainable economic development projects” were used by States in the 2006 Pulp Mills on
the River Uruguay Case. In its findings of Provisional Measures of July 2006, the ICJ notes that Uruguay “maintained that
the provisional measures sought by Argentina would therefore
irreparably prejudice Uruguay’s sovereign right to implement
sustainable economic development projects in its own territory.”
As Alan Boyle, Counsel for Uruguay before the ICJ in the public sitting for provisional measures in the aforementioned Pulp
Mills on the River Uruguay Case, argued:
This is not a dispute in which the Court has to choose
between one party seeking to preserve an unspoiled
environment and another party recklessly pursuing unsustainable development, without regard to the
environment, or to the rights and interests of neighboring States. It is a case about balancing the legitimate
interests of both parties. It is a case in which Uruguay has sought—without much co-operation from
its neighbor— to pursue sustainable economic development while doing everything possible to protect
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

the environment of the river for the benefit of present
and future generations of Uruguayans and Argentines
alike.116
It is possible that a concern for such a right of a State was
a principal element in the ICJ’s reasoning in its first Order with
regards to Provisional Measures in the Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay case,117 where it found:
. . . the present case highlights the importance of the
need to ensure environmental protection of shared
natural resources while allowing for sustainable economic development; . . . it is in particular necessary to
bear in mind the reliance of the Parties on the quality
of the water of the River Uruguay for their livelihood
and economic development; . . . from this point of view
account must be taken of the need to safeguard the
continued conservation of the river environment and
the rights of economic development of the riparian
States; . . .118
Should an “integration” or “sustainable development” principle be recognized in international law, it seems that the norm
would not forbid sustainable economic development as such.
Rather, it would require States not to prevent or frustrate each
other from promoting sustainable development, and further,
“where development may cause significant harm to the environment” or to social development, it would require States to take
steps to address “a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate” such
harm by ensuring that environmental (and social) measures are
“fully integrated into the project and its costs.” Bounded on one
side by the Iron Rhine Railway award, and on the other by the
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay order, such an “integration”
principle might become recognised as an emerging principle of
customary law, and could be useful to guide States in resolving
differences that require a balance between environmental, economic, and social development priorities.
Another international tribunal has also had occasion to
examine, between the Rio and Johannesburg Summits, the need
to balance between environmental protection and international
economic development priorities, taking a different approach.119
The Retrospective Analysis of the 1994 Canadian Environmental Review of the WTO, carried out by Canada’s Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (“DFAIT”) after five
years of GATT implementation, focused on GATT Article XX
as an important safeguard for a State’s ability to secure sustainable development.120 In 1998, in the United States—Shrimp
Case, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism considered the
meaning of these exceptions, in light of the WTO Agreement’s
Preambular commitment to sustainable development. By the
time the dispute was resolved, four Panel and Appellate Body
Reports had evaluated the same measures, providing the clearest expression, to date, of the meaning of State commitments
to sustainable development in the WTO Agreements. The
United States – Shrimp Dispute concerned a regulation under
the 1973 U.S. Endangered Species Act to protect five different
species of endangered sea turtles. A U.S. law requires that U.S.
shrimp trawlers use “turtle excluder devices” in their nets. A
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different law then prohibits shrimp imports from States that harvest shrimp in areas where these endangered turtles are found,
unless the States in question are certified users of the technologies that protect the sea turtles. India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and
Thailand, as shrimp exporters, complained that the prohibition
was inconsistent with U.S. GATT obligations. The complainants
argued that the embargo on shrimp violated the most-favoured
nation rule of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 because products
from different countries were treated differently based solely
on the method of harvest (i.e. whether a turtle excluder device
had been used).121 The complainants also argued a violation of
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because contrary to their obligations to generally eliminate quantitative restrictions on imports
and exports, the United States had implemented an embargo
which restricted trade. The complainants also alleged a violation of Article XIII:1 of GATT 1994 because the United States
restricted the importation of shrimp and shrimp products from
countries which had not been certified, while “like products”
from other countries which in turn meant a differential treatment
of “like products.” (This would imply that the United States was
discriminating between like products on the basis of how they
are made, their production processes, and methods (“PPMs”),
rather than due to distinct physical characteristics and other
permissible grounds). The Panel found that the United States
had violated Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.122 It then exercised judicial restraint, and did not express itself on the possible
violation of Article I or XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 because one
violation had been found. From that point onward, most of the
Panel’s analysis centered on interpretations of the scope and
nature of Article XX of the GATT 1994, on general exceptions.
Article XX (g) GATT 1994, which provides for a general exception to GATT obligations:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . .
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption . . .123
In the case, the US proposed that Art. XX GATT should be
interpreted in the light of the Preamble of the WTO Agreement;
“[a]n environmental purpose is fundamental to the application
of Article XX, and such a purpose cannot be ignored, especially
since the preamble to the WTO Agreement acknowledges that
the rules of trade should be in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development, and should seek to protect and preserve the environment.124 (In its arguments, the United States
omitted the reference to the world’s resources and the statement concerning the “respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development”). The United States, at the
Panel stage of the dispute, specifically argued that sustainable
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development is a principle of international law, in particular of
WTO law:
The United States noted that the World Trade Organization Agreement, which was the first multilateral
trade agreement concluded after the UN Conference on
Environment and Development, provided that the rules
of trade must not only promote expansion of trade and
production, but must do so in a manner that respects
the principle of sustainable development and protects
and preserves the environment. Yet, the complainants claimed that in becoming a Member of the World
Trade Organization, the United States had agreed to
accept imports of shrimp whose harvest and sale in the
US market might mean the extinction from the world of
sea turtles for all time.”125
The interpretation that the Panel and Appellate Body
adopted was a change from the findings of a much earlier GATT
Panel in the Tuna – Dolphin Case I.126 In that earlier un-adopted
GATT report,127 the Panel had found that references to domestic production and consumption meant that a GATT Contracting
Party could only adopt restrictions within their own jurisdiction,
rather than for the protection of resources in other countries
and suggested that furthermore, such a measure could only be
adopted for the resource in question (in that case tuna), not for
other species (such as dolphins). In the United States—Shrimp
Case, the Panel found that the new preambular language of the
WTO Agreement could have an influence on the interpretation
of Article XX GATT. The Panel further clarified that, thus “the
Preamble endorses the fact that environmental policies must
be designed taking into account the situation of each Member,
both in terms of its actual needs and in terms of its economic
means.”128 In its reasoning, the Panel highlighted a quote from
the 1992 Rio Declaration, recognizing that all countries could
design their own environmental policy and that international
cooperation rather than unilateral measures are needed for sustainable development.129
The WTO Appellate Body further clarified the findings
of the Panel. It found in favor (contrary to the Tuna – Dolphin
cases) of the United States that Article XX (g) could be applied
to protect turtles. However it did not completely follow the US
argument regarding a principle of international law:
The words of Article XX(g), ‘exhaustible natural
resources,’ were actually crafted more than 50 years
ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the
light of contemporary concerns of the community of
nations about the protection and conservation of the
environment. While Article XX was not modified
in the Uruguay Round, the preamble attached to the
WTO Agreement shows that the signatories to that
Agreement were, in 1994, fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of environmental protection as a
goal of national and international policy. The preamble of the WTO Agreement—which informs not only
the GATT 1994, but also the other covered agree-
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ments— explicitly acknowledges ‘the objective of sustainable development.’130
The enclosed legal note,131 as part of the Appellate Body’s
decision, deserves particular attention. The Appellate Body
refers to the objective of sustainable development and then
provides in the footnote a simple definition for the concept. In
particular, the Appellate Body explained that “[t]his concept
has been generally accepted as integrating economic and social
development and environmental protection.”132 This is remarkable for two reasons. First, the WTO Appellate Body expresses
itself about the nature of sustainable development, agreeing
that it is considered to be an objective of the WTO. Second,
the WTO recognises (in line with the findings of the 1997 UN
General Assembly Special Session, the Earth Summit +5) the
need to integrate all three elements or “pillars” of sustainable
development—social development, economic development and
environmental protection. This highlights the important social
dimension of the concept, as was later also recognised in the
2002 WSSD.
In cases before the European Court of Human Rights, States
have similarly been allowed a wide margin of appreciation to
pursue economic objectives provided they regulate environmental nuisances and enforce their own law,133 and otherwise maintain a fair balance between the benefits for the community as
a whole and the protection of the individual’s right to private
and family life or protection of possessions and property.134 In
the latter context economic development may be seen as unsustainable if it fails adequately to respect human rights, but the
case will have to be a fairly extreme one. Similar considerations
have been made by the Inter-American Commission and Court
of Human Rights,135 the African Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights,136 and the UN Human Rights Committee.137

Conclusions
This article highlights how the objective of sustainable
development, and its principles, have been enhanced and furthered by international forums. As a general principle, international forums have contributed to the growth and expansion
of sustainable development by providing a space within which
State and non-state actors may come together for a collective
discussion of their sustainability-related challenges. Both in
terms of “soft law” (in this area, a process of global summits
and declarations), and “hard law” (in this field, mainly treaties),
the global objective of sustainable development is advanced by
international forums. This article has focused on three ways that
this advancement takes place. First, it has shown that through
international “soft law” policy making processes on sustainable
development, States are defining and refining a deeper understanding of what sustainable development means in specific
instances, identifying the most important priorities for sustainable development, and seeking certain elements of consensus
on how these priorities can and should be addressed at different levels through policy and even law. The Agenda 21 and the
JPOI, in particular, demonstrate this process of evolving definitions, priority setting, and action plans, supported by informal
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partnerships. Second, it argues that through the negotiation and
implementation of international treaties on sustainable development, States and others are using international venues to find
cooperative solutions for specific sustainability challenges
related to economic, environmental, and also social aspects of
development. This includes, where appropriate, the adoption in
treaty regimes of certain operational principles such as a duty to
ensure sustainable use of natural resources, precaution, equity,
openness and public participation, common but differentiated
responsibility, or integration. And third, it has suggested that
through the peaceful settlement of disputes related to sustainable development, States are gaining valuable guidance from
international courts and tribunals on how it is possible to resolve
certain particular transboundary problems that invoke a need to
balance environmental, economic, and social development priorities. There even appears to be certain willingness on the part
of international courts and tribunals to refer to principles such as
‘integration’ in their attempts to resolve such disputes.
International forums are not just useful to sustainable
development as a matter of history, however. International treaty
law in the field of sustainable development is a vital, and indeed

vibrant, area of study that has seen a dramatic growth throughout its relatively short history. Given the inevitable differences
involved in coordinating social, environmental economic development policy between 194 countries with distinct cultures, priorities, and challenges, and given the short timelines of the last
three decades, a great deal of progress is actually being made for
sustainable development in many areas. However, this space is
very much “still developing,” with many of the most interesting
and difficult details still to be worked out.
It seems probable that the future of sustainable development law will be advanced and enhanced over the coming decades through the interaction of international treaty regimes with
domestic regulatory regimes, as well as through a dialogue of
international courts and tribunals. Indeed, the scope of international forums, which have and will affect sustainable development and its legal underpinnings, has expanded to include
international arbitral bodies, including those associated primarily with trade such as the WTO. This article only paints a brief,
broad-brush picture of certain emerging trends. Further legal
scholarship and practice is needed to realize the promise of sustainable development in international law.
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The Importance of Regulating Transboundary
Groundwater Aquifers
by Emily Brophy*

If the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari in a
case between Mississippi and Tennessee,1 the Court will have its
first opportunity to determine if and how transboundary aquifers
should be regulated. The applications of this case are far from
surface level. Regulated groundwater allocation would protect
environmental and economic
sustainability by restricting overpumping, thereby tempering the
harmful effects of groundwater depletion, and protecting
all parties to a transboundary
aquifer from losing a freshwater
source due to another’s careless
usage.2 Over-pumping of aquifers results in significant harm,
including increased water pollution, changes in stream flow,
and increased costs.3 If groundwater continues to be managed
at the state level,4 then the lack
of standardized data and regulation across multi-state aquifers
may prolong the problem of
over-pumping, turning our nation’s
groundwater sources into a tragedy of the commons.5
In Hood v. City of Memphis, Mississippi seeks damages
from the City of Memphis for the theft of billions of gallons
of water that the city sold to the public through the city’s water
utility.6 By pumping water from a transboundary aquifer over
the course of several decades, the utility has effectively changed
the aquifer’s flow.7 As a result, water that would naturally be
located below Mississippi now flows towards Memphis where
it accounts for about one-third of all water supplied through the
public utility.8
This case illustrates the detrimental effects that a lack of
regulation can have on groundwater sources. In the United
States, fresh groundwater use is rising steadily, increasing fivepercent between 1990 and 2000, compared to no change in total
freshwater use and only a one-percent increase in fresh surfacewater use.9 In a city such as Memphis that pumps water from
a transboundary aquifer, the absence of regulatory groundwater allocation magnifies the detrimental effects of the increased
pumping on all users of the aquifer. Water experts already
expect groundwater shortages in at least forty-one states in the
next twenty years due to social and environmental pressures.10

Furthermore, climate change threatens to increase the pressure
on fresh groundwater supplied by possibly affecting drought
cycles, aquifer recharge and discharge, and human reliance on
groundwater resources.11
The transboundary implications of unregulated groundwater pumping extend beyond
changes in aquifer flows as
experienced between Mississippi and Tennessee. Declining water levels may lead to
the diminished water quality of
the aquifer, affecting the water
supply of all who draw from the
system.12 Because of the interconnectedness of the hydrologic
system, a decrease in groundwater levels due to over-pumping
may result in a drop in surface
water levels, affecting rivers,
lakes, wetlands, and similar
features.13 These and additional
consequences of over-pumping illuminate the importance
of implementing regulation over
transboundary aquifers.

Over-pumping of aquifers
results in significant
harm, including increased
water pollution, changes
in stream flow, and
increased costs
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Not at All:
Environmental Sustainability in the Supreme Court
by James R. May*

T

Introduction

he principle of “sustainability” is soon to mark its 40th
anniversary. It is a concept that has experienced both
evolution and stasis. It has shaken the legal foundation, often engaged, recited, and even revered by policymakers, lawmakers, and academics worldwide. This essay assesses
the extent to which sustainability registers on the scales of the
United States Supreme Court, particularly during the tenure of
Chief Justice John Roberts.
Sustainability entered the general public conscience in 1972
with the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.1
In 1987 it secured center stage when the World Commission on
Environment and Development released its pioneering study,
Our Common Future,2 which defines “sustainable development”
as “development . . . that . . . meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs.”3 In 1992 the Earth Summit’s Rio Declaration
declared that sustainable development must “respect the interests of all and protect the integrity of the global environmental
and developmental system.”4 The Rio Declaration’s blueprint
document, Agenda 21, provides that sustainable development
must coincidently raise living standards while preserving the
environment: “[I]ntegration of environment and development
concerns . . . will lead to the fulfillment of basic needs, improved
living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future.”5 The unmistakable
thread that runs through threshold definitions of sustainability is
the interconnectedness of living things, opportunity, and hope.
Recognition of the importance of sustainability has grown
exponentially since the Earth Summit.6 Since then, the concept
of sustainability has been regularly recognized in international
accords,7 by nations in constitutional, legislative and regulatory
reform,8 by States, municipalities and localities in everything
from policy statements to building codes,9 and in corporate mission statements and practices worldwide.10 Sustainability principles are shape-shifters, adaptive to most environmental decision
making, including water and air quality, species conservation,
and national environmental policy in the U.S. and around the
globe.11 Furthermore, it has entered the bloodstream of courts
around the globe as a guiding principle of judicial discretion in
environmental cases.12
There remains one notable bastion still indifferent about if
not immune to sustainability. A situs where the word “sustainability” is never uttered, nor written, nor argued, nor acknowledged: the United States Supreme Court. Forty years on, it
seems reasonable to expect that at least one member of the most
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influential juridical body on the planet would have found a case
or a cause or a controversy befitting a mention of what many
behold as the common denominator in environmental law and
policy, a field well represented before the Court. 13 Yet, this
hasn’t happened. In the roughly 4,000 or so cases the court has
decided during the era of modern environmental law, it has seen
fit to decide about 300 “environmental” cases (those involving
pollution control, natural resources and property management,
and energy).14 More than one-half of these cases involve either
State’s or individual property rights, or disposition of the West’s
mineral, land, and water resources, or both. This is a testament to the southwest-tinged and Barry Goldwater influenced
ideals of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, both of whom were raised in Arizona, and who
together served the court for nearly sixty years. When Rehnquist
and O’Connor left the court in 2005 to their successor urban
brethren from the Northeast, Chief Justice John G. Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito, fair money was that the court’s interest
in environmental cases would wane, diminishing opportunity to
have the Supreme Court engage sustainability.15
Yet the Roberts’ Court has shown more than a passing interest in environmental cases. Chief Justice Roberts’ Court-issued
opinions had something to rejoice or revile for nearly every sustainability enthusiast. The Court decided cases across the environmental spectrum: endangered species, cost recovery, climate
change, air and water pollution, the intersection between two of
environmental law’s most venerated statutes, and the overlap
between local solid waste control efforts and the U.S. Constitution. The Court ruled on the profound, such as whether the Clean
Air Act gives the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
authority to regulate new vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases
that alter the Earth’s climate (yes), and the practical, including
whether it is appropriate to issue a preliminary injunction under
the National Environmental Policy Act to ameliorate the impact
of the Navy’s use of submarine detecting sonar (no), whether
EPA may use cost-benefit analyses when deciding how to protect aquatic life from intake structures (yes), whether an Army
Corps of Engineers’ permit obviates the need to comply with
EPA’s technology based standards under the Clean Water Act (it
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does), whether intent is a qualifying condition for liability as an
“arranger” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (it is), and whether plaintiffs
have standing to challenge a national regulation that authorizes
salvage timber sales (they don’t). Each environmental case saw
a different justice write the majority (and in one case, plurality)
opinion, with opinions by Justice John Paul Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Anthony Kennedy ascendant. Yet, at no
time does anyone mention sustainability.
None of the environmental cases decided thus far during the
tenure of Chief Justice Roberts engage sustainability. The word
“sustainability” does not appear to exist before the Court. It does
not appear in any majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion.
While the Court seems to be agnostic about the idea of sustainability as a governing norm, strong astringent reveals that with
some counterexamples the extent to which decisions before the
Roberts’ Court regarding biodiversity, land use, air pollutant
emissions, and cleanup standards implicate sustainability, they
do so negatively, as discussed below. I conclude that factors
having little or nothing to do with sustainability per se are at
the heart of these results. Yet unless and until parties amass the
courage of their conviction and infuse “sustainability” into litigative lexicon and strategy, sustainability will continue to matter
to the U.S. Supreme Court not at all.

Promoting Biodiversity
If at all, sustainability most likely should influence jurisprudence involving biodiversity, which often engenders related
notions of sustainable and optimum yields, minimizing adverse
environmental effects, species conservation, and even costbenefit analysis. Yet the Supreme Court has yet to consider
sustainability per se in reaching decision in a dispute involving biodiversity. To be sure, decisions issued during the tenure
of Chief Justice Roberts involving biodiversity seem contrary
to sustainability principles. By way of example, the Court has
been unconcerned about sustainability in evaluating impacts on
marine mammals, fish stocks, aquatic habitat, and forest management, discussed below.

Marine Mammals
In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council
(“NRDC”),16 the Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and ruled 5-4 that the U.S. Navy’s interests in
security and military preparedness outweighs the respondent’s
interest in protecting whales and other marine mammals from
acoustic harm caused by submarine seeking sonar devices.
In Winter, the Court voted to lift a “narrowly tailored” preliminary injunction to enjoin the U.S. Navy’s use of mid-frequency active sonar off of the southern California coast, known
as the “SOCAL exercise.”17 The Navy regards mid-frequency
active sonar as the sole effective means for detecting and tracking enemy diesel-electric submarines. The Navy’s sonar, however, also disrupts marine mammals that rely upon their own
sonar.
The NRDC challenged the Navy’s failure to perform
an environmental impact statement under the National
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Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and attached other claims
under the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”) and the
Endangered Species Act.
Finding the “possibility” of causing irreparable environmental harm, the district court issued a preliminary injunction
requiring, inter alia, the Navy to “power down” (1) completely
if marine mammals were spotted within 2,200 yards of Navy
vessels or (2) by seventy-five percent in the presence of other
significant “surface ducting” conditions.
Following the initial grant of preliminary injunction, the
Bush administration then identified the SOCAL exercise to be of
“paramount interest to the United States” and granted the Navy
a waiver from the CZMA. Correspondingly, the White House
Council on Environmental Quality granted the Navy’s request
for “alternative arrangements for compliance with” NEPA due
to a national “emergency.”
Thereafter, the Navy appealed the lower court’s injunction
to the Ninth Circuit. Rather than lift the injunction, the Ninth
Circuit remanded to have the district court weigh the exemption’s impacts on the injunction.
On remand the lower court threw out the “emergency”
premise behind the Council on Environmental Quality’s “alternative arrangements” decision. While finding it “constitutionally suspicious,” the lower court did not rule on the legality of
the waiver of CZMA requirements. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
finding the lower court had not abused its discretion in issuing
the limited preliminary injunction.18 The Ninth Circuit stayed
the injunction’s “power down” provisions, however, allowing
the Navy to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. The Navy still
would be subject to the injunction’s four less restrictive conditions that the Navy did not appeal, including a twelve nauticalmile no-sonar zone along the California coast and enhanced
monitoring requirements.
Writing for the majority, Roberts reversed the Ninth Circuit
5-4 and vacated the injunction and its “power down” requirements on two grounds. First, the majority held that the lower
courts’ preliminary injunction analysis applied an incorrect standard that did not require a sufficient showing of harm. It held
that the lower court should have asked whether the SOCAL
exercise would result in the “likelihood” rather than the “possibility” of irreparable harm, because the “possibility” standard is
“too lenient.”19 Second, it determined the lower courts had given
short shrift to the Navy’s interests in security and preparedness.
Turning to the merits, the Court held first that respondents
had not met their burden of showing irreparable harm. The
Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the Navy’s own
countervailing data, which while both lower courts found to be
“cursory, unsupported by evidence [and] unconvincing,” still
revealed that sonar training had resulted in 564 physical injuries and 170,000 behavioral disturbances of marine mammals.20
The environmental respondents also argued that countless other
reported and undetected mass strandings of marine animals had
been “associated” with sonar training.21 Instead, the Court concluded that the Navy had been conducting sonar training for
forty years without documented cases of irreparable harm.22
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Next, the majority concluded that, properly balanced, the
Navy’s military interests far outweighed respondents’ interest in
protecting and observing marine mammals. It reasoned that balancing the public interest supporting the Navy’s national security and military preparedness against NRDC’s public interest
in protecting marine mammals for observation and education
“does not strike us as a close question.”23 Disagreeing with the
lower courts, the majority found the equities tipped strongly in
the Navy’s favor: “To be prepared for war is one of the most
effectual means of preserving peace.”24 The majority noted
that the president deemed active sonar as “essential to national
security” because adversaries possess 300 submarines. Midfrequency active sonar, the Navy argued, is “the most effective technology” for “antisubmarine warfare, a top war-fighting
priority for the Pacific Fleet.”25 Citing senior naval officers, the
majority observed the importance
of training ship crews with all
possible war stressors occurring simultaneously, thus making mid-frequency active sonar
“mission critical” for training.26
The imposition of the mitigating
regulations would require the
Navy “to deploy an inadequately
trained submarine force,” which
would in turn jeopardize the
safety of the fleet.27 Imposition
of other mitigating factors, the
majority held, could decrease
the overall effectiveness of sonar
training generally. 28 On the
other hand, “[f]or the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury
would be harm to an unknown number of the marine mammals
that they study and observe…” in contrast, forcing the Navy to
deploy an inadequately trained antisubmarine force jeopardizes
the safety of the fleet.”29 The majority concluded that the “public
interest in conducting training exercises with active sonar under
realistic conditions plainly outweighs the interests advanced by
the plaintiffs.”30
Thus the majority found the district court had applied
the incorrect standard and abused its discretion on the merits.
Finding in favor of the Navy, the Court reversed the decisions
below and did not impose the lower court’s “power down”
requirements.31
While the majority did not engage sustainability principles
at all, the dissent concerned itself with just how the SOCAL
exercise affected marine mammals. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented: “In light of the
likely, substantial harm to the environment, NRDC’s almost
inevitable success on the merits of its claim that NEPA required
the Navy to prepare an EIS, the history of this litigation, and the
public interest, I cannot agree that the mitigation measures the
district court imposed signal an abuse of discretion.”32
In particular, Ginsburg had no trouble finding irreparable
harm, and thus, diminution of sustainability. She was dismayed

about how the Court could overlook “170,000 behavioral disturbances, including 8,000 instances of temporary hearing loss; and
564 Level A harms, including 436 injuries to a beaked whale
population numbering only 1,121.” She also observed that,
“sonar is linked to mass strandings of marine mammals, hemorrhaging around the brain and ears, acute spongiotic changes in
the central nervous system, and lesions in vital organs.”33 On
balancing the competing interests of the parties, Ginsburg concluded that these injuries “cannot be lightly dismissed, even in
the face of an alleged risk to the effectiveness of the [Navy’s
training exercises].”34
Charting a more solicitous course, Justice John Paul Stevens, joining Justice Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and
dissented in part. They would have found that neither court
below adequately explained why the balance of equities favored
the two specific mitigation measures being challenged over the
Navy’s assertions that it could
not effectively conduct its exercises subject to the conditions.
They would have remanded for
a more narrowly tailored injunction, but continued the Ninth
Circuit’s stay conditions as the
status quo until the completion of the SOCAL exercise,
thus promoting sustainability to
some extent.35
The postscript is that the
Navy concluded its SOCAL
exercise and completed its
NEPA environmental impact statement for the SOCAL exercise
in January 2009.

None of the environmental
cases decided thus far
during the tenure of Chief
Justice Roberts engage
sustainability.
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Fish Stocks
In Entergy v. Riverkeeper,36 the Supreme Court reversed the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and ruled 5-1-3
that the EPA may conduct a cost-benefit analysis in regulating
the substantial adverse impacts of “cooling water intake structures” under Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act.37 Section
316(b) of the act requires that any standards established for
existing discharge sources ensure that the “design, location, construction and capacity” of any such intake structures “reflect the
best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact.”38
Some thirty years after the enactment of the Clean Water
Act, EPA issued rules applying Section 316(b) to existing
dischargers. The rules allow, but do not require, the use of a
cost-benefit analysis before setting performance-based best technology available standards and in deciding whether to grant sitespecific variances. Cost-benefit analysis is invariably at odds
with sustainability, as it is skewed heavily in favor of industrial
and power producing interests over those in providing access to
sustainable fisheries for future generations.
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The Second Circuit, in an opinion by then judge and now
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, ruled that the language, structure, and
history of Section 316(b) do not permit cost-benefit analysis. It
then remanded the case to EPA to explain the role, if any, costbenefit analysis played in EPA’s regulations for existing intake
structures.
Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia reversed,
reasoning that Section 316(b), when read together with other
performance-based provisions of the act, gives EPA discretion
to base BTA on a cost-benefit analysis. Scalia relied upon a traditional Chevron two-part analysis. First, he held that Section
316(b) does not contain a plain meaning with regard to costbenefit analysis. To be sure, he held that the word “best” invites
many meanings, including that which “most efficiently produces
some good,” even if the “good” is of a lower quality than other
options.39 He also wrote that “minimize” has many meanings,
and “is a term that necessarily admits of degree [but] is not necessarily used to refer exclusively to the greatest possible reduction.”40 Scalia then found that EPA’s interpretation of Section
316(b) was reasonable because while the provision “does not
expressly authorize cost-benefit analysis,” it does not show “an
intent to forbid its use.”41 Thus,
he wrote, it is “eminently reasonable” to conclude that Congress’
silence on the use of cost-benefit
analysis in cooling tower regulatory cases “is meant to convey
nothing more than a refusal to tie
the agency’s hands as to whether
cost-benefit analysis should be
used, and if so to what degree.”42
Justice Stevens dissented,
joined by Souter and Ginsburg,
advocating a result more consistent with principles of sustainability. Stevens asserted that the
court had “misinterpreted” Section 316(b)’s plain language, and
that the majority “unsettles the
scheme Congress established.”43
According to this view, either the
absence of plain language authorizing cost-benefit analysis, or
congressional silence on the matter, is conclusive, especially in
light of the fact that Congress expressly authorized the use of
cost-benefit analysis with powerplant regulations in other contexts.44 This, Stevens argued, is “powerful evidence” of Congress’ decision not to authorize cost-benefit analysis in Section
316(b).45 In Stevens’ view, the Court “should not treat a provision’s silence as an implicit source of cost-benefit authority.”46
Indeed, quoting Justice Scalia verbatim from another case, he
noted that Congress does not draft fundamental regulatory plans
in “vague terms or ancillary provisions,” and “hide elephants in
mouseholes.”47
Stevens viewed EPA’s interpretation as unreasonable and
outcome determinative: “[I]n the environmental context, in

which a regulation’s financial costs are often more obvious and
easier to quantify than its environmental benefits . . . cost-benefit
analysis often, if not always, yields a result that does not maximize environmental protection.”48
Breyer concurred and presented a middle ground for sustainability, observing that “those who sponsored the legislation
intended the law’s text to be read as restricting, though not forbidding, the use of cost-benefit comparisons.”49 He would have
found that the Clean Water Act’s extensive history demonstrates
Congress’ intent to limit cost-benefit analysis. Quoting the act’s
principal sponsor, Senator Edmund Muskie, Breyer wrote that,
“while cost should be a factor in the Administrator’s judgment,
no balancing test will be required.”50 Formal cost-benefit analysis, he feared, would induce extensive delays and a distorted
emphasis on easily quantifiable factors, running in contrast to the
goal of promoting cheaper, more effective cleanup technology.51

Threatened and Endangered Species
In a case that both pits two of the nation’s more venerated environmental statutes crosswise, and runs counter to
sustainability, the Court decided by a 5-4 majority that EPA’s
delegation to a State of an environmental permitting program
under the Clean Water Act
does not trigger “consultation”
under the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”). In National Ass’n
of Home Builders v. Defenders
of Wildlife,52 an environmental
organization challenged EPA’s
decision that it is not authorized to conduct “consultation”
with federal wildlife agencies to
“insure” conservation of threatened and endangered species
before delegating Clean Water
Act permit authority to a State.
Section 402(b) of the Clean
Water Act lists criteria that if
satisfied dictate that EPA “shall
approve” the State’s authority
to issue permits under the Act.53 These criteria do not include
effects on threatened and endangered species. On the other hand
the ESA impels that federal agencies “shall” “consult” with federal wildlife agencies prior to conducting any “agency action”
“authorized, funded or carried out” by the agency.
Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito upheld
EPA’s “expert interpretation” (and one it changed from an earlier interpretation) that the ESA must yield to the CWA’s permitting authority: “the transfer of permitting authority to state
authorities—who will exercise that authority under continuing
federal oversight to ensure compliance with relevant mandates
of the Endangered Species Act and other federal environmental
protection statutes—was proper.”54 Curiously, the Court held
that Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act only applies to

Two cases decided by
the Roberts’ Court
look to future and past
application of the Clean
Air Act and reach
results that promote
sustainability to some
degree.
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agency actions that are “discretionary.” Because Section 402(b)
is nondiscretionary, Section 7 does not apply, thus diminishing
sustainability.
In so doing, the Court rejected the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions (1) that the ESA, as an independent source of legal authority, trumps the CWA, (2) applying
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,55 in concluding
that EPA’s approval of Arizona’s National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permitting program was the
legally relevant cause of impacts to threatened and endangered
species resulting from future private land-use activities, and (3)
EPA’s application of the act is arbitrary and capricious.
Stevens, writing for himself and Justices David Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer dissented, advocating
a position consistent with sustainability. For that conclusion, the
dissenters relied principally on ESA Section 7’s express application to “all federal agencies” for all “actions authorized, funded
or carried out by them,” and the broad reading of the statute dating back to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.56

Habitat
In Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council,57 the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
held 5-1-3 that when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issues a
Section 404 permit under the Clean Water Act it displaces otherwise applicable new source performance standards that EPA
applies to pollutant discharges subject to a Section 402 permit.58
This has the effect of eliminating freshwater lake habitat, and
diminishing sustainability.
Coeur Alaska, Inc. sought to open a new gold mine about
forty-five miles north of Juneau, dubbed the “Kensington Gold
Mine,” adjacent to Lower Slate Lake, a “water of the U.S.” in
the Tongass National Forest. The Kensington Mine would use
the froth flotation process, producing over the life of the project
about one million ounces of gold and 4.5 million tons of waste
tailings in the form of waste mill slurry. Coeur Alaska hoped to
discharge the slurry into Lower Slate Lake, the most economically advantageous option. The slurry would consist of about 45
percent water and 55 percent froth flotation mill tailings. Eventually the mine would produce enough slurry to fill the more
than 50-foot depth of Lower Slate Lake, thus converting the 23
acre lake into a 60 acre impoundment. It was undisputed that this
would “destroy the lake’s small population of common fish …”
and other plant and animal life.59
Upholding the Corps’ and petitioner’s less environmentally
protective interpretation, the Court ruled that pollutants that
have the effect of changing the bottom elevation of a body of
water may be regulated as “fill material” instead of “pollutant
discharges” subject to new source performance standards. Consequently, the Court held that EPA has jurisdiction to issue Section 402 permits for discharges into waters except to the extent
that the Corps regulates the permits to constitute a disposal of
“dredge or fill material” under Section 404.
Coeur Alaska pits the Clean Water Act’s two principal permitting provisions against one another. On the one hand, the act
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prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant” except in compliance
with a permit issued under Section 402, including new source
performance standards for categories and classes of pollutant
discharges such as “froth flotation mills” here. Froth flotation
is a process in which raw ore material is ground into fine gravel
and mixed in slurry with chemicals whereby pebbles of desired
metal float to the surface for capture and processing. The polluted “waste mill tailings,” laden with mercury, lead, and other
hazardous heavy metals, however, sink to the bottom, destined
for disposal on land, or as in this case, in a nearby body of water.
EPA’s new source performance standards prohibit discharges
from froth flotation mills.
On the other hand, the Clean Water Act also prohibits the
“discharge of dredge or fill material” except in compliance
with a permit issued under Section 404. The Corps administers
and issues permits under Section 404 in most States, including
Alaska. In 2002, EPA and the Corps issued joint regulations
defining “fill material” as that which “has the effect of changing
the bottom elevation” of a water of the U.S., including mining
slurry.60 “Fill material” includes “slurry, or tailings, or similar
mining-related materials.”61 Thus, the requirements of the act’s
two permitting schemes potentially converge if discharge of a
pollutant, such as waste slurry mill tailings, also has the effect of
raising the bottom elevation of an affected water body.
Because the slurry would have the “effect of raising the
bottom elevation” of Lower Slate Lake, Coeur Alaska sought a
Section 404 permit from the Corps. The Corps accepted jurisdiction, finding that the slurry would be “fill material” instead of a
prohibited “pollutant discharge” from froth flotation mills under
EPA’s New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) rules. It
then issued the Section 404 permit, determining that discharging
the tailings into Lower Slate Lake and eventually converting it
into an impoundment, was the least environmentally damaging
disposal option and was a preferable environmental alternative
to filling adjacent wetlands. Contending that all this constituted
an end run around Section 402 and the applicable zero discharge
NSPS, Southeast Alaska Conservation Council sued to enjoin
the Corps from issuing the Section 404 permit.
The Federal District Court in Alaska rejected the Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council’s position. It held that unlike with
Section 402 permits, new source performance standards do not
explicitly apply to Section 404 permits. Therefore, EPA’s rule
barring froth flotation discharges did not apply once the Corps
assumed jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “§ 404’s silence
regarding the explicit and detailed requirements [that apply to
§ 402] cannot create an exception to those sections’ strongly
worded blanket prohibitions.”62
Notwithstanding the United States’ opposition, the Supreme
Court granted Coeur Alaska’s writ of certiorari. The United
States then joined as a petitioner.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 5-1-3. Kennedy, writing for the Court, upheld the Corps’ interpretation of
the Clean Water Act. First, instead of reviewing the Corps’ interpretation under Chevron,63 Kennedy applied the more searching
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Mead64 standard of review because, he found, the Corps’ interpretation was not intended to be formal. Nonetheless, Kennedy
upheld the Corps’ interpretation of the Clean Water Act, finding
persuasive the argument that it does not unambiguously apply
NSPS to permits issued under Section 404.
Second, Justice Kennedy held that the Corps properly issued
the Section 404 permit. He observed that “if the tailings did not
go into the lake, they would be placed on nearby wetlands [and]
. . . would destroy dozens of acres of wetlands.”65 Moreover, the
Section 404 permit required Coeur Alaska to cover what used to
be Lower Slate Lake with about four inches of “native material,”
thereby in his view improving the local environment for wildlife
habitat and repopulation.66
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Stevens and Souter,
reasoning that the majority’s reading of the statute “strained
credulity” and creates a “loophole” to NSPS: “A discharge of
a pollutant, otherwise prohibited by firm statutory command,
becomes lawful if it contains sufficient solid matter to raise the
bottom of a water body, transformed into a waste disposal facility. Whole categories of regulated industries can thereby gain
immunity from a variety of pollution-control standards.”67
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent conjured principles of sustainability, observing that it was undisputed that the Section 404
permit, if granted, would “kill all the fish and wildlife” of the
lake, possibly permanently as repopulation was “uncertain.”68
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, believing that too
literal an application of NSPS or too narrow an interpretation of
“fill” or “dredge material” would undermine the purpose of the
statute, and with it, some degree of sustainability.69

National Forests
In Summers v. Earth Island Institute,70 the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held 5-4 that plaintiffs must
establish, with affidavits, knowledge of future injuries to use of
specific tracks of soon to be harvested national forest land to
demonstrate sufficient “concrete and particularized” injury so as
to satisfy constitutional standing under Article III,71 thus having
the effect of diminishing sustainability.
The Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act requires the
U.S. Forest Service to provide advance notice and an opportunity for comment and appeals processes regarding land and timber management decisions for national forests under the Forest
and Rangeland Renewable Resource Planning Act.72 The Forest Service issued rules that provide a “categorical exclusion”
for activities that in the aggregate do not significantly affect the
quality of the human environment and do not trigger the need for
either an environmental assessment or an environmental impact
statement under NEPA.73
The Forest Service subsequently determined that “fire
rehabilitation” timber efforts involving less than 4,200 acres,
or “timber salvage” involving less than 250 acres, fall within
this categorical exclusion, including a timber salvage sale of 238
acres in the Burnt River Project, an area affected by large fires
that swept through the Sequoia National Forest in California in
2002.74
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Earth Island challenged both the timber salvage sale for the
Burnt Ridge Project in particular and the Forest Service’s categorical exemption rule in general. The parties subsequently settled the action challenging the Burnt Ridge Project, but pressed
ahead on the legality of the underlying rule as applied nationwide to “many thousands of small parcels.”75 Siding with Earth
Island, the district court blocked the application of the rule.76
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the Forest Service
must allow the public to contest internal administrative decisions on small timber-clearing projects such as the Burnt Ridge
timber sale.77
Without reaching the merits, the Supreme Court held by
another bare majority that Earth Island lacked standing to challenge the application of the rule nationwide, and dismissed the
case.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that Earth Island
did not possess any injury in fact because it had voluntarily settled the portion of the lawsuit pertaining to its only member who
suffered any injury that was “concrete and particularized.”78 The
settlement agreement already fully addressed the procedural
injury alleged by one member who had visited the project site
with plans to return: “[W]e know of no precedent for the proposition that when a plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness
of certain action or threatened action but has settled that suit,
he retains standing to challenge the basis for that action.”79 The
majority explained that Earth Island “identified no other application of the invalidated regulations that threatens imminent and
concrete harm” to any of its members who planned to visit sites
where the rules were to be applied.80
Justice Scalia also rejected standing for another affiant who
stated that he had been a long time visitor of Forest Service
sites and would continue to visit sites, some of which would be
subject to the rule. He wrote that the “vague desire to return is
insufficient to satisfy the requirement of imminent injury: Such
someday intentions—without any description of concrete plans,
or indeed any specification of when the someday will be—do
not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury that our
cases require.”81
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, arguing in favor of a position more consistent with
sustainability. He noted that the majority’s conclusion is “counterintuitive” because a programmatic failure to provide notice,
opportunity for comment, and appeal would eventually and
inevitably cause members to suffer concrete injury.82 “To know,
virtually for certain, that snow will fall in New England this winter is not to know the name of each particular town where it is
bound to arrive,” Justice Breyer wrote.83 “The law of standing
does not require the latter kind of specificity. How could it?”84
In particular, he noted that a “threat of future harm may be realistic even where the plaintiff cannot specify precise times, dates
and GPS coordinates.”85
Justice Breyer also questioned whether the result is consistent with precedent respecting standing for future harm in the
global warming context: “[W]e recently held that Massachusetts
has standing to complain of a procedural failing, namely, EPA’s
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failure properly to determine whether to restrict carbon dioxide
emissions, even though that failing would create Massachusettsbased harm which (though likely to occur) might not occur for
several decades.”86

Cleaning Up Toxic Sites
In Burlington Northern v. United States,87 the Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held 8-1 that liability as an
“arranger” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) requires more
than knowledge of chemical spillage; one must intend or plan to
arrange for the disposal at issue. In addition, it held that CERCLA does not impose joint and
several liability when there is a
“reasonable basis” to apportion
liability.88 Neither result promotes sustainability.
In Burlington Northern, a
now defunct company called
Brown & Bryant (“B&B”) once
owned and operated a plant that
stored and distributed agricultural chemicals on land owned
in part by predecessors to petitioners Burlington Northern and
Union Pacific Railroad (“railroads”). B&B obtained some of its
chemicals, including D-D pesticide, from the Shell Oil Company
(“Shell”). Shell would deliver the chemicals by truck for transfer
into large storage tanks onsite. Spills sometimes occurred during
delivery, and the tanks leaked, leading to substantial soil and
groundwater contamination.
Eventually EPA and the State of California investigated,
responded, and then filed suit under CERCLA Section 107(a)
against B&B, Shell, and the railroads as “potentially responsible
parties” for the costs of feasibility studies and response action.
The district court found the railroads liable as owners “at the
time of disposal,” and Shell liable as a “person who . . . arranged
for disposal.” The Court, however, declined to hold the parties
subject to joint and several liability. Instead, it found liability
to be subject to equitable apportionment and set the railroads’
and Shell’s liability at nine and six percent, respectively, which
had the effect of limiting the government’s recovery by about
eighty-five percent.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on liability but reversed on
apportionment. First, it held that although Shell did not qualify
as a “traditional arranger,” it could still be held liable under a
“broader category” if the disposal was a known or foreseeable
by-product of the transaction.89 Second, it reversed the lower
court’s apportionment of liability. The Ninth Circuit instead
held that CERCLA intends for the government to recover full
response costs against targeted parties, envisioning subsequent
civil actions by them against additional potentially responsible
parties for contribution.90
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 8-1 at both
turns, finding Shell had not “arranged for disposal,” and that

joint and several liability is not required when it is practicable
to apportion liability. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens
maintained that “it is . . . clear that an entity could not be held
liable as an arranger merely for selling a new and useful product
if the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst to the
seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination.”91 In other words, “arrange” implies action directed to a
specific purpose. Thus, under the statute, “an entity may qualify
as an arranger . . . when it takes intentional steps to dispose of
a hazardous substance.”92 Arranging for disposal must involve
the purpose of discarding a “used and no longer useful hazardous substance.”93 Stevens acknowledged that determining the
arranger’s purpose could involve
a “fact-intensive inquiry.” 94
Rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis, the Court found Shell
had not arranged for disposal:
“ . . . Shell must have entered
into the sale of D-D with the
intention that at least a portion
of the product to be disposed
of during the transfer process
by one or more of the methods described.”95 Thus, Justice
Stevens concluded, Shell was
not liable as an arranger under CERCLA because it did not
“intend” for its chemicals to be released into the environment,
even though it knew it was delivering its product to a sloppy
operator.96
The Court also held that joint and several liability does not
apply when reasonable apportionment is practicable and upheld
the district court’s initial allocation of liability.97
Justice Ginsburg again urged a position more consistent
with sustainability. She argued in dissent that Shell had arranged
for disposal because it exercised “the control rein” over delivery of the D-D pesticide, specifying transportation and storage
features that resulted in “inevitable” spills and leaks.98 Indeed,
Justice Ginsburg observed, “[t]he deliveries, Shell was well
aware, directly and routinely resulted in disposals of hazardous substances through spills and leaks for more than [twenty
years].”99 Shell arranged to have its chemicals shipped by bulk
tank truckload stored in bulk storage facilities instead of shipping drums.100 Shell knew that spills occurred during every
delivery.101 It also knew about “numerous tank failures and
spills as the chemical rusted tanks and eroded valves.”102
Justice Ginsburg was troubled by the blind eye arrangers
may now turn to chemical transport and storage, emboldened
by the court’s decision: “The sales of useful substances [does
not] exonerate Shell from liability, for the sales necessarily and
immediately resulted in the leakage of hazardous substances.”103
She questioned the Court’s dismissal of joint and several liability, noting that the lower court “undertook an heroic labor” by
apportioning costs without the benefit of briefing—indeed, without even a request to apportion—by the parties.104

In some ways,
sustainability seems
consigned to the elected
branches.
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On the other hand, the Court has issued recent opinions in
this context that seem more consistent with sustainability. In
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,105 the Court unanimously ruled that under CERCLA Section 107(a) private parties not subject to an enforcement action who incurred “other
necessary response costs” may seek cost recovery claims against
“any other person,” including the Federal Government. At issue
in Atlantic Research was whether such a Potentially Responsible
Party (“PRP”) may recover costs from other PRPs under CERCLA Section 107(a) instead of 113(f).106 Likewise, in Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., the Court held CERCLA
does not allow private parties who have voluntarily cleaned up
contaminated property but who have not been the subject of an
EPA enforcement action to recover “contribution” costs from
other responsible parties under CERCLA Section 113(f).107

Waste Flow Control
The Court recently revisited
its dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence in a way that is
more consistent with sustainability. It upheld a county flow
control ordinance that requires
all solid waste generated within
the county to be delivered to a
publicly owned county waste
processing facility. In United
Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 108 the Court
decided that a county’s flow control ordinance does not violate
the dormant commerce clause.
Chief Justice Roberts, for a plurality, applied the Pike balancing test and determined that the ordinance does not violate the
dormant commerce clause because it creates at least “minimal”
local benefits that outweigh whatever “insubstantial” differential burden it may place on interstate commerce: “[W]e uphold
these ordinances because any incidental burden they may have
on interstate commerce does not outweigh the benefits they confer on the citizens of Oneida and Herkimer counties.”109 The
Court rejected the interstate waste hauling companies’ argument
that the ordinance is per se invalid as economically protectionist under Philadelphia v. New Jersey.110 The companies argued
that under C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,111 government instrumentalities may not “hoard wastes” regardless of
whether the “preferred processing facility” is owned by a public entity arguably within the “market participant exception” to
the dormant commerce clause. The plurality disagreed, finding
the public/private distinction is “constitutionally significant.”
Breathing judicial restraint the Court observed: “there is no reason to step in and hand local businesses a victory they could not
obtain through the political process.”112

Pollution Emissions
Two cases decided by the Roberts’ Court look to future and
past application of the Clean Air Act and reach results that promote sustainability to some degree.

Climate Change
In the Court’s initial foray into the global climate change
imbroglio, the Court decided in Massachusetts v. EPA,113 that
Title II of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles that “endanger”
public health or welfare, thereby promoting sustainable air emissions and energy policy. In this case, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and a litany of mostly downwind “blue” States
and environmental organizations contended that EPA improperly exercised its discretion in denying petition by several States
calling for rulemaking to regulate carbon dioxide and three other
greenhouse gas emissions—
methane, nitrous oxide, and
hydrofluorocarbons—from new
motor vehicles under Title II
of the Clean Air Act. Section
202(a)(1) of the Act directs
EPA to regulate tailpipe emissions that (1) “in his judgment”
(2) “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.” Massachusetts et
al. maintained both prongs had
been met. EPA argued that the
Clean Air Act does not authorize it to regulate emissions to
address global climate change
and that it has discretion not to
regulate based on policy considerations, including foreign policy.114
The Court decided three issues. First, that petitioners
(namely, Massachusetts) demonstrated standing under Article
III of the U.S. Constitution to challenge EPA’s inaction. The
Court held that States enjoy “special solicitude” in demonstrating standing. Second, the Court held that greenhouse gas emissions constituted an “air pollutant” under the Clean Air Act’s
“capacious definition of air pollutant.” Last, it held that EPA
“offered no reasoned explanation” and that it was arbitrary and
capricious for the agency to refuse to decide whether these emissions “endanger public health and welfare” due to policy considerations not listed in the Clean Air Act, mainly foreign policy.115
In dissent, Roberts questioned Stevens’ “state solicitude”
standard as an “implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing on traditional terms.” Scalia thought the Court
should have deferred to EPA in what he says is a “straightforward administrative-law case,” and that it had “ . . . no business
substituting its own desired outcome for the reasoned judgment
of the [EPA].”116

So perhaps the reason
sustainability doesn’t
exist in the U.S. Supreme
Court is the simplest: it
has yet to be presented to
the Court.
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New Source Review
In the other Clean Air Act case decided the same day,
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.,117 the Court
unanimously held that EPA by regulation could define the word
“modification” differently for different parts of the Clean Air
Act, thereby potentially reducing pollutant emissions and promoting sustainability. The case asks whether the term as applied
to an existing Major Emitting Facility under the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) aspect of the Clean Air Act
refers to “increases” in emission annual quantity or hourly rates.
For the Court, Souter wrote that EPA does not need to harmonize the two regulatory interpretations of the same term. He said
it was reasonable for EPA to interpret the term “modification”
differently in different parts of the statute.118
EPA initially had interpreted the term “modification”
to require New Source Review for any operational or facility changes that result in “increases” in net annual emissions.
Duke Energy contended instead that “modification” under the
PSD program requires an “increase” in hourly emission rates—
as EPA interprets the term under the New Source Performance
Standards aspect of the Act—but does not reach increased hours
of operation and increased annual emissions, and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed. Along the way, EPA
aligned with Duke Energy’s interpretation.
Interestingly, only intervenor Environmental Defense
sought review. Ironically, EPA initially opposed review, only to
rejoin Environmental Defense after the Court granted certiorari,
then joining Duke Energy’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act
as applied to future rulemaking. Environmental Defense agreed
with EPA’s initial interpretation of the Clean Air Act. Duke
Energy is notable insofar as it marks the first time since Sierra
Club v. Morton119 that the Court granted review over the Federal
Government’s opposition, at the exclusive request of an environmental organization who does not enjoy support from a State, as
in Massachusetts v. EPA. In the vast majority of environmental
cases the Court grants review at the behest of State or industrial
petitioners who argue for more constrained application or interpretation of an environmental law. Moreover, past experience
demonstrates that when the Court grants certiorari in a case with
an environmental group, it nearly always rules against the group.
Duke Energy also is perhaps the only case where EPA opposed
a parties’ petition for review only to rejoin it after the Court
granted certiorari, but then only to stake a legal position opposing its original legal position (“increase” in amount, not rate)
and that of co-plaintiff (Environmental Defense), the petitioner.

Discussion
The Court’s environmental cases do not engage sustainability. If anything, they reveal more about its jurisprudential
ideologies than any environmental jurisprudence and invite five
observations. First, the surfeit of sustainability tinged cases does
not necessarily reveal anything about judicial receptiveness to
the concept of sustainability. Rather, these cases are a surrogate
for the jurisprudential ideologies of the Court’s conservative
wing to curtail federal power, promote State’s rights, and protect
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private property rights. If anything, Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas seem to reject principles of
sustainability, except when it becomes a matter of State’s rights.
Yet curiously when the State’s interest is to protect rather than
develop land and environment, such as shoreline loss due to
global climate change, these same justices wonder aloud how it
can be that the State has a sufficient interest to protect. All this
seems counterintuitive because sustainability is a quintessentially “conservative” position insofar as it counsels conservation
and careful consideration of externalized social costs.
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens seem to be much more receptive to notions of sustainability. They argue in favor of greater
consideration of the environmental consequences. Justice Sotomayor may be cut from the same cloth, having written the opinion while sitting on the Second Circuit that the Supreme Court
later reversed in Entergy.
Nonetheless, as Justice Kennedy’s decisions go in cases
implicating sustainability, so goes the Court. Justice Kennedy
voted with the majority—or perhaps more accurately the majority voted with him—in each case that implicates sustainability.
Justice Kennedy almost always votes in a manner that does not
promote sustainability.
Second, the Court may just consider the concept of sustainability to be unworkable. The United States lacks “sustainability
law” per se, so it is not surprising that the Court has failed to
engage sustainability law per se. “Sustainability” does not invite
facile definition or judicially cognizable guidelines. In some
ways, sustainability seems consigned to the elected branches.
Indeed, most of the environmental cases that arguably invoke
sustainability place a premium on arguments cloaked in statutory “plain meaning.” In Atlantic Research, the Court unanimously found that CERCLA Section 107’s reference to “any
other person,” allows cost recovery, indeed, by other PRPs. This
is likely to allow courts to turn to the merits in myriad CERCLA private cost recovery actions working their way through
the federal system. The same plain meaning thread weaves its
way through Duke Energy, in which the Court gave EPA wide
latitude to interpret “modification.” Duke Energy’s ripple effect
looms large, as it potentially subjects more than 100 of the
nation’s largest and eldest coal-fired power plants, and hundreds
of other existing major emitting facilities, including cement kiln
plants, coke ovens, minerals and metals processors, and petrochemical processors, located in Prevention of Significant Deterioration areas, to New Source Review.
Likewise, plain meaning ruled, although only by the slimmest of margin, in both Massachusetts v. EPA and National
Ass’n of Home Builders. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court
promoted the plain meaning of “air pollutant” to include climate
changing gases and that EPA does not have discretion to refuse
to regulate pollutants that “may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.”
In National Ass’n of Home Builders, the Court used plain
meaning in support of elevating the Clean Water Act’s meaning over that of the Endangered Species Act. Section 402(b) of
the Clean Water Act provides “[EPA] shall approve a [state’s
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NPDES program] unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist.” The Court was divided 5-4, however, about
whether the language at issue in these cases is in fact “plain.”
Indeed, Justice Alito’s opinion in National Ass’n of Home Builders arguably ignores the “plain meaning” of a provision of a
more specific and subsequently enacted statutory provision.
Section 7(b) of the ESA provides that: “[e]ach Federal agency
shall, in consultation with [federal wildlife agencies] insure
that any [agency action] authorized, funded or carried out by
such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species [or their
habitat].”
Fourth, the Court’s judicial capacity does not invite consideration of sustainability. Article III of the U.S. Constitution
grants federal courts authority to resolve “cases” and “controversies” involving the Constitution, laws of the United States, or
treaties. Sustainability falls into none of these categories. Sustainability is a guiding principle, not a constitutionally enshrined
doctrine. No U.S. law requires or even recognizes sustainability.
And, the United States has not ratified an international treaty
that does so either. Moreover, no member of the Court studied
environmental law. None of them have much if any practical
experience with environmental law in general, and sustainability
in particular. And while some members have regulatory experience, none of the current members have held elected political
office, often the crucible for implementing sustainability. So to
the members of the Court, sustainability is unnoticed.
Finally, and surprisingly, sustainability—even as a governing principle—isn’t the subject of advocacy before the Court.
Supreme Court litigants of every persuasion—government, private, public interest, whomever—ignore sustainability too. As
far as I can tell, no party in any environmental (or any other
case for that matter) has bothered to invoke “sustainability” in
a pleading, brief, or argument.120 Even amici, with much wider
latitude to advocate policy positions not at issue in any claim,
defense or “Question Presented,” have yet to argue that the
Court consider sustainability.121 So perhaps the reason sustainability doesn’t exist in the U.S. Supreme Court is the simplest: it
has yet to be presented to the Court.
Thus, sustainability remains a concept in search of law
subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Without a plain

meaning foothold, therefore, sustainability does not seem to
exist.

Conclusion
Early returns suggest that environmental cases hold interest for the Roberts Court. It already has decided about a dozen
core environmental cases in three years, almost three times the
rate during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Yet, sustainability seems to matter not at all. The Court accepted the business/
industry position in Entergy, Coeur Alaska, and Burlington
Northern, and the government’s less environmentally protective
position in Summers and Winter. In Home Builders, it held that
EPA’s delegation to a State of an environmental permitting program under the Clean Water Act does not trigger “consultation”
under the Endangered Species Act.
The Court seems to be especially interested in reversing
sustainability reinforcing decisions out of the Ninth Circuit.
Indeed, it reversed each of the four cases from that circuit for
which it granted review, cases where the Ninth Circuit arguably
agreed with the pro-sustainable result. It also reversed a Second
Circuit opinion that arguably produced an outcome more consistent with sustainability.
There are some counterexamples. In Massachusetts v. EPA,
the Court held that Title II of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
that “endanger” public health or welfare. In Duke Energy, it held
that EPA by regulation could define the word “modification” differently, and more stringently, in different parts of the Clean Air
Act. In Oneida, a plurality concluded that a county’s flow control ordinance—requiring that all solid waste generated within
the county to be delivered to the county’s publicly owned solid
waste processing facility—does not violate the dormant commerce clause. In Atlantic, it found that under CERCLA Section
107(a) private parties not subject to an enforcement action who
incur “other necessary response costs” may seek cost recovery
claims against “any other person,” including the Federal Government. Each result arguably promotes sustainability.
In sum, the Court seems at worst hostile to, at best agnostic
about, and most likely ignorant of sustainability as a governing
principle.
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Environmental Litigation Standing After
Massachusetts v. EPA: Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA
by Andy Hosaido*

A

s a consequence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark
2007 decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, reduced standing requirements have
enabled litigators to pursue environmental claims and compel
U.S. Federal agencies to enforce existing statutes. Center for
Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency is
predicated upon these reduced standing requirements. On May
14, 2009, the Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”) filed a
complaint in the Western District of Washington against the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) based on EPA’s failure to list and regulate damage caused to Washington’s coastal
waters by ocean acidification.1 In the suit, the CBD alleged that
the EPA’s approval of Washington’s list of impaired waters,
which only included inland waters and did not include the
adversely affected coastal ocean areas, harmed the right of its
members to enjoy the marine animals in the area.2 As a result of
the EPA’s action, CBD also claimed that its members suffered
procedural and informational injury.3 Pursuant to the holding in
Massachusetts, where the Court found that the EPA violated its
statutory obligation when it declined to regulate CO2 and greenhouse gasses (“GHG”), the CBD is seeking to compel similar
EPA action by requesting declaratory relief against the EPA
for its procedurally improper approval of Washington’s list of
impaired waters.4
Prior to Massachusetts, environmental litigants had difficulty meeting requirements for substantive and procedural
standing, because comprehensive regulations such as the Clean
Air Act (“CAA”) preempted claims that fell under its mandate.5 Massachusetts was significant because the Court found
substantive standing despite the difficulty of proving injury,
traceability, and redressability, and it also vested environmental
litigants with the right to enforce procedural violations by federal agencies such as the EPA.6 Massachusetts held that a plaintiff can claim procedural standing when the alleged harm can be
redressed by the government agency reconsidering the administrative decision that caused the harm.7 This procedural standing
forms the basis of much of the current litigation against government agencies for not enforcing statutory regulations according
to provisions of the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, National
Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, and other
federal and state environmental protection laws.
As a result of the decision in Massachusetts, courts have
found standing in several recent cases of environmental litigation.8 Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency follows in the footsteps of these prior cases.
At issue in Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental
Protection Agency is the listing provision of the Clean Water Act
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(“CWA”), which requires states to establish water quality standards and prepare lists of water bodies where pollution controls
are insufficient (known as the “impaired waters list”).9 After the
list is prepared, it is submitted to the EPA and approved, disapproved, or partially disapproved.10 On August 15, 2007 the CBD
submitted data to Washington Department of Ecology (“WDE”)
to notify them that Washington’s coastal ocean waters should
be included on the impaired waters list because the pH level
was outside the range proscribed by state law, and was causing damage to ocean fauna.11 Subsequently, CBD petitioned the
WDE to include the ocean waters on the CWA impaired waters
list.12 However on June 23, 2008 when WDE submitted the list
to the EPA for approval, the acidified ocean waters were not
included.13 As a result, the CBD submitted letters to the EPA
with scientific documentation contending that Washington’s
coastal ocean waters were impaired due to substantial changes
in pH level that were beyond statutory limits, and requested that
the EPA include the acidified waters on the list.14 Despite the
evidence submitted by CBD that demonstrated that the waters
were impaired due to ocean acidification, the EPA approved
Washington’s list on January 29, 2009.15
CBD brought suit against the EPA because of its approval
of Washington’s list of impaired waters without the acidified
ocean waters allegedly violated CWA section 303(d).16 CBD
also contends that the EPA’s approval of the list violated the
Administrative Procedure Act, which allows judicial review of
agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance
with the law.17 CBD seeks declaratory relief from the court
that the EPA violated its duties under the CWA and an order to
require that the EPA add the impaired ocean waters to the list.18
If CBD’s complaint is successful, the EPA would be compelled
to address the effect of CO2 emissions on ocean acidification.
The decisions in Massachusetts and its successors have had
a significant impact on environmental litigation in the United
States. Although some provisions of the various environmental
laws discussed above may be rendered obsolete for the purpose
of climate-related litigation because of their absorption into a
new climate and energy regulatory regime under consideration
in Congress, Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental
Protection Agency demonstrates that the reduced requirement
for substantive and procedural standing established in Massachusetts will continue to stimulate environmental litigation
against agencies’ lack of regulatory enforcement.19
Endnotes: Environmental Litigation Standing After Massachusetts v.
EPA: Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA continued on page 82
* Andy Hosaido is a J.D. Candidate, May 2011, at American University
Washington College of Law.
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Courts as Champions of Sustainable
Development: Lessons from East Africa
by Patricia Kameri-Mbote and Collins Odote*

C

Introduction

ourts function as an arm of government that is critical
in the separation of powers doctrine, and they play a
crucial role in giving effect to legislative and executive
intentions and pronouncements. Judicial power enables sovereign states to decide controversies between itself and its subjects and between the subjects inter se (between themselves).1
Judiciaries the world over balance the interests of society with
economic development, environmental sustainability, and the
competing interests of persons and entities. Sustainable development is defined as development “that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.”2 Sustainable development requires
mediation between the interests of current generations and those
of future generations as well as between competing interests
of current generations. Not surprisingly, the judiciary has been
called upon in the quest for enforcing sustainable development
policies owing to its traditional role in dispute resolution and
interpretation of laws. As D. Kaniaru, L. Kurukulasuriya, and
C. Okidi state:
The judiciary plays a critical role in the enhancement
and interpretation of environmental law and the vindication of the public interest in a healthy and secure
environment. Judiciaries have, and will most certainly
continue to play a pivotal role both in the development
and implementation of legislative and institutional
regimes for sustainable development. A judiciary, well
informed on the contemporary developments in the
field of international and national imperatives of environmentally friendly development will be a major force
in strengthening national efforts to realise the goals
of environmentally friendly development and, in particular, in vindicating the rights of individuals substantively and in accessing the judicial process.3
The role of the judiciary is particularly important in developing countries, such as those in Africa, where the bulk of the
population is poor and relies on natural resources for livelihood
and sustenance, and where the countries’ economies have those
same resources as the bedrock of the gross domestic product.
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development4 in Johannesburg in 2002, chief justices and senior judges from around
the world presented the Johannesburg Principles on the Role of
Law and Sustainable Development.5 The Principles had been
adopted at the Global Judges Symposium on the Role of Law
and Sustainable Development.6 The Principles underscored the
critical role that judiciaries around the world can and should

31

play in efforts to promote sustainable development.7 The judges
underscored the fact that:
an independent Judiciary and judicial process is vital
for the implementation, development and enforcement of environmental law, and that members of the
Judiciary, as well as those contributing to the judicial
process at the national, regional and global levels, are
crucial partners for promoting compliance with, and
the implementation and enforcement of, international
and national environmental law . . . .8
The assembled judges then made a commitment to
“contribut[e] towards the realization of the goals of sustainable development through the judicial mandate to implement,
develop and enforce the law, and to uphold the Rule of Law and
the democratic process.”9
It is against this background that this paper assesses the role
that judiciaries in East Africa have played in the quest for sustainable development. It focuses on Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, the original members of the East African Community. These
three countries also have legal systems drawing on the common
law tradition. The paper first summarizes the key environmental issues in the region as a prelude to the discussion on the
legal framework for environmental management and the court
structure in the three countries in the following section. It then
analyzes several trends in judgments and the emerging jurisprudence on environmental law matters from the courts in East
Africa.10 Finally, it proposes ways of improving the role of the
judiciaries in fostering sustainable development in East Africa.

Major Environmental Issues and Challenges
for Sustainable Development in East Africa
As a region, East Africa is largely poor: two of the three
countries reviewed in this paper are classified as Least Developed11 and only Kenya as Developing. The region is, however,
endowed with numerous natural resources including forests,
wildlife, fisheries, minerals, land, rivers, and Lake Victoria, the
second largest freshwater lake in the world. The major environmental resources in East Africa may be categorized broadly into
either transboundary or national ecosystems.12
The key challenges to the environment in the region are
driven and controlled by three factors: (i) high populations and
the attendant pressure from the interaction between the population and their surroundings; (ii) the ineffectiveness of the legal
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framework put in place to regulate these pressures; and (iii) the
weak institutional arrangements in place for monitoring compliance leading to widespread non-compliance with the law by all
concerned.13 The resulting environmental challenges include
land degradation, poor land use and land management, overexploitation of fisheries, water pollution, poor waste disposal
management, water scarcity, biodiversity loss, wetlands destruction, deforestation, and climate change.14
A synoptic review of the regional environment shows that
natural resources are not being managed in a sustainable and
rational manner.15 The rate of degradation and exploitation of
resources threatens the region’s quest for sustainable development and thus brings great challenges for the judiciaries in East
Africa. With the region’s high levels of poverty, food insecurity,
underdevelopment, low levels of awareness, barriers to access to
information, and institutional challenges, the judiciaries have an
increasingly critical role to play.

The Legal Framework for Environmental
Management
Regional
Within East Africa, the totality of law is derived from both
regional legal instruments and national legislation.16 In addition,
however, recourse must be had to continental environmental
laws17 and international environmental laws, since East African countries are members of the international community. The
principal legal instrument at the regional level is the Treaty for
the Establishment of the East African Community (“Treaty”).18
The Treaty was signed on November 30, 1999 and entered into
force on July 7, 2000, heralding the rebirth of the East Africa
Community (“Community”) as a regional integration bloc.19
The broad objective of the Community is stipulated in the Treaty
to be “the development of policies and programmes aimed at
widening and deepening co-operation among the partner states
in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and
technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs.”20
Broadly speaking, therefore, the Treaty envisages development
of programs and policies in a diverse range of areas, including
the environmental field. Article 5(3) stipulates that:
For purposes set out in paragraph 1 of this Article and
as subsequently provided in particular provisions of
this Treaty, the community shall ensure:
(a) The attainment of sustainable growth and development of the Partner States by the promotion of a
more balanced and harmonious development of
the Partner states.
...
(c) The promotion of sustainable utilization of natural resources of the partner states and the taking
of measures that would in turn, raise the standard
of living and improve the quality of life of their
populations.21
Further, Chapters 19 and 20 of the Treaty22 contain substantive provisions addressing environment and natural resource
management and tourism and wildlife management. In addition
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to these expansive provisions, the East African Community
has also developed two protocols relevant to environmental
management: the Protocol for the Sustainable Development of
Lake Victoria23 and the Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources.24 Taken together with international instruments
to which the East Africa Partner States are parties, these provide the legal framework for environmental management at the
regional level.

National
Environmental management in the three East African countries derives from the states’ constitutions, parliamentary laws,
and regulations made pursuant to such laws. Additionally, the
customs and traditional practices of local communities continue
to provide important rules and provisions for the management
of the environment in all three countries. The framework environmental laws recognize the importance of such customary
laws, providing that in determining environmental matters and
upholding sustainable development, courts should be guided by,
amongst other things, the cultural and social principles traditionally applied by communities for the management of the environment. The only caveat to this provision is that such principles
and practices should not be repugnant to justice and morality.25
The principal source of all laws in each of the three countries is each country’s respective constitution. The constitutions
of Uganda,26 Tanzania,27 and Kenya28 treat the issue of environment differently.29 Of the three, Uganda has the most comprehensive provisions on the environment.
In Uganda, the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy of the Constitution contains a directive on
protection of natural resources, which provides that “The State
shall protect important natural resources, including land, water,
wetlands, minerals, oil, fauna and flora on behalf of the people
of Uganda.”30 There is also a directive on environmental management, requiring the State to promote sustainable development and public awareness of the need to manage land, air, and
water resources in a balanced and sustainable manner for present
and future generations;31 promote and implement energy policies that will ensure that people’s basic needs and those of the
environment are met;32 create and develop parks, reserves, and
recreation areas; ensure conservation of natural resources; and
promote rational use of natural resources so as to safeguard and
protect biodiversity of Uganda.33 Although these provisions are
only hortatory, they demonstrate the premium that the Constitution places on environment and natural resource management.
Additionally, the substantive part of the Constitution on fundamental rights and freedoms guarantees every Ugandan the right
to a clean and healthy environment,34 and gives every Ugandan
the right to apply to a court for redress if that right is violated.35
The Tanzanian and Kenyan constitutions, on the other
hand, do not contain an enumerated right to a clean and healthy
environment. Instead, both guarantee the right to life, which,
following the expansive jurisprudence and interpretation of
other courts such as those in Asia,36 has been held by courts
in both countries to include the right to a clean and healthy
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environment.37 Additionally, the Tanzanian Constitution, in
the part on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles
of State Policy,38 urges the Tanzanian Government and all its
agencies to direct their policies and programs towards ensuring
“that public affairs are conducted in such a way as to ensure
that the national resources and heritage are harnessed, preserved
and applied toward the common good and the prevention of the
exploitation of one man by another.”39
The Kenyan Constitution40 has no part dealing with directive policies. Since 2001, with the establishment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, the country has been going
through a structured process to review and rewrite its constitution.41 As part of that process and following the National Constitutional Conference in 2004, it produced a draft constitution,
which included provisions guaranteeing the right to a clean and
healthy environment as a constitutional right.42 The review process has not ended and has been dogged with controversy, the
result of which is that the environmental provisions remain aspirations awaiting the adoption of a new constitutional order in
Kenya.43
In addition to constitutional provisions, the East African
countries also have statutes dealing with the environment. The
principal laws are those referred to as framework environmental statutes, a concept that emerged in the 1990s to describe a
statute dedicated to environmental management and “encompassing regimes of planning, management, fiscal incentives and
penal sanctions.”44 Uganda was the first country to adopt its
National Environmental Act45 in 1995, followed by Kenya, with
its Environmental Management and Coordination Act in 1999.46
Tanzania closed the circuit when it adopted the Environmental
Management Act in 2004.47 The Acts provide the framework for
sustainable environmental management and create the institutional mechanisms for environmental management.48 They contain legal provisions reiterating the right to a clean and healthy
environment,49 establish a central environmental authority,50 and
have detailed provisions requiring environmental impact assessments.51 To complement the framework laws, each of the countries has additional legislation governing specific sectors of the
environment including fisheries, forestry, wildlife, and water.52

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Environmental
Matters
Within the traditional structure of government, the arm of
government responsible for dispute resolution is the judiciary.
In all the three countries under study, the judiciary serves this
dispute resolution function. The constitutions of Uganda,53
Kenya,54 and Tanzania55 describe the structure of the judiciary.
In Uganda, in addition to the Constitution, the Judicature Act56
and the Magistrates’ Courts Act57 provide for the structure and
functions of the Ugandan judiciary. At the apex of the court
structure in Uganda is the Supreme Court,58 which is the court of
last resort with appellate powers for decisions emanating from
the Court of Appeal.59 Below the Supreme Court are the Court
of Appeal,60 which also serves as the first instance constitutional
court in Uganda,61 then the High Court,62 which has unlimited
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original jurisdiction in all matters and such appellate jurisdiction as conferred on it by the Constitution.63 The Constitution
stipulates that the country, through parliament, shall establish
such subordinate courts as it shall desire.64 Pursuant to this constitutional stipulation, Parliament has provided for magistrates’
courts to hear limited criminal and civil cases as “reasonably
practicable.”65 It has also established local county courts to hear
simple civil cases falling within their jurisdiction,66 as well as a
military court system.67
Tanzania’s court system comprises of a Court of Appeal as
the final court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions from
the High Court.68 The High Court has jurisdiction as specified
by the Constitution or any other law.69 Below these courts are
the Resident’s Magistrate’s Courts, District Courts, and Primary
Courts.70
The Kenyan Constitution provides for the court structure at
Chapter IV.71 This is augmented by the provisions of the Judicature Act,72 the Magistrates’ Courts Act,73 and the Appellate
Jurisdiction Act.74 The Constitution stipulates that the highest
court shall be the Court of Appeal,75 with powers to hear appeals
from the High Court. The High Court has original unlimited
jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil and criminal cases.76
It also has powers to hear appeals from subordinate courts.77 In
2007, the Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya administratively created a Division of the High Court charged with handling land and environmental cases.78 The Constitution also
empowers Parliament to establish subordinate courts.79 Under
this provision, Parliament has created the resident magistrate’s
courts, which have jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters.80
Unlike the High Court, which has unlimited jurisdiction, the resident magistrates’ courts’ jurisdiction is limited both geographically and monetarily.81
At the regional level, the Treaty for the East African Community creates the East African Court of Justice,82 consisting
of the First Instance Division and the Appellate Division.83 The
Court’s jurisdiction is limited to interpretation and application of
the Treaty,84 until such time as the Partner States, on recommendation of the Council of Ministers shall, by protocol, extend the
jurisdiction to other areas and issues.85 So far, no environmental
matters have been brought before this court.
In addition to the national- and regional-level courts, there
are two other mechanisms for resolving environmental disputes.
The first utilizes informal traditional community-level mechanisms, principally the institution of the elders. Although such
traditional institutions may vary from place to place, most communities in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have some mechanism to resolve disputes at a local level.86 Secondly, there
exist quasi-judicial mechanisms and institutions for resolving
environmental disputes in Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, the
Environmental Management and Coordination Act creates two
bodies with limited powers. The first is the Public Complaints
Committee87 with powers to investigate, either on its motion
or on the basis of a report by any person,88 any action of the
National Environmental Management Authority or any case of
environmental degradation in Kenya and subsequently prepare
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a report. The Committee is essentially Kenya’s environmental
ombudsman.89 The second is the National Environment Tribunal,90 established to “offer specialized, expeditious and cheaper
justice than ordinary courts of law.”91 Its mandate is to hear
appeals arising from administrative decisions of the National
Environmental Management Authority.92
Similarly, the Tanzanian Environmental Management Act
establishes an Environmental Appeals Tribunal93 to hear appeals
arising from the decision or omission of the minister responsible for environment matters, “restriction or failure to impose
any condition, limitation or restriction issued under the Act and
approval or disapproval of an environmental impact statement
by the Minister.”94 The Tribunal, however, has yet to be actually
established.95 Uganda has not made any provisions for such an
institution.

Analysis of Significant Environmental
Judgments
This section reviews the performance of the East African
courts as a dispute resolution mechanism for environmental
matters. The enactment of the constitutional provisions on environment in Uganda in 1995 followed by the adoption of framework environmental statutes in the three countries heralded a
new era in environmental management. With more expansive
provisions, recognition of the rights and obligations of citizens
to ensure a clean and healthy environment, and more relaxed
rules on access to environmental justice in conformity with the
requirements of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration,96 one would
expect more robust action from the judiciary in East Africa than
has been seen.
Except for the East African Court of Justice, which has not
had occasion to determine a case of an environmental nature
since its establishment,97 the national courts of East Africa have
demonstrated their contribution and approach to sustainable
development generally and sound environmental management
in particular. This section reviews the landmark decisions that
have come out of the courts in East Africa so as to determine
the emerging trend from such cases. It does not, however, analyze decisions of the subordinate courts in any of the three countries owing principally to the absence of law reporting at these
levels.98

Right to Life and a Healthy Environment
As discussed earlier, of the three countries, only Uganda has
constitutional provisions on the right to a clean and healthy environment. The other two enumerate those rights in environmental
statutes. However, courts in the countries have been supportive
of protecting the right to a clean and healthy environment.
The High Court of Uganda had occasion to address environmental harm as a breach of the right to privacy and the home in
Dr. Bwogi Richard Kanyerezi v. The Management Committee
Rubaga Girls School.99 The plaintiff complained that the defendants’ toilets emitted odiferous gases that reached the plaintiff’s
home thus unreasonably interfering with and diminishing the
plaintiff’s ordinary use and enjoyment of his home.100 In spite
of the fact that the defendant’s school benefited society, the
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court held that the defendants should cease using the toilets.101
Although this case was argued from the traditional common law
principle of nuisance, it illustrates the use of privacy and home
rights to protect the environment.102
Kenya and Tanzanian courts have had to grapple with what
the right to life really means in the context of the environment.
The question has been whether the scope should be extended to
include a right to the means necessary for supporting life. For
example, because air and water are necessary to sustain life,
does the right to life necessarily imply a right to clean air and
water?103 The courts of Kenya and Tanzania, which only have a
“right to life” standard with which to anchor environmental protection via their constitutions, have both returned a “yes” verdict
to the above question.104
Tanzania appears to be the first African nation whose courts
have addressed the scope of the constitutional right to life in
provisions in the context of environmental protection.105 In
the case of Joseph D. Kessy v. Dar es Salaam City Council,106
the residents of Tabata, a suburb of Dar es Salaam, sought an
injunction to stop the Dar es Salaam City Council from continuing to dump and burn waste in the area. The City Council in
turn sought an extension to continue with the said activities. The
Court of Appeals of Tanzania,107 in denying the City Council
its requested extension, held that their actions endangered the
health and lives of the applicants and thus violated the constitutional right to life. In the words of Justice Lugakingira:
I have never heard it anywhere before for a public
authority, or even an individual to go to court and confidently seek for permission to pollute the environment
and endanger people’s lives, regardless of their number.
Such wonders appear to be peculiarly Tanzanian, but I
regret to say that it is not given to any court to grant
such a prayer. Article 14 of our constitution provides
that every person has a right to live and to protection
of his life by the society. It is therefore, a contradiction
in terms and a denial of this basic right deliberately to
expose anybody’s life to danger or, what is eminently
monstrous, to enlist the assistance of the court in this
infringement.108
Nearly ten years later the High Court of Kenya reached a
similar verdict regarding the constitutional right to life. In the
case of Waweru v. Republic,109 the applicants, property owners in the small Kenyan town of Kiserian, had been charged
with the offence of discharging raw sewage into a public water
source contrary to provisions of the Public Health Act.110 The
applicants filed a constitutional reference against the charge,111
arguing that they had been discriminated against since not all
land owners had been charged, although the actions complained
against were carried out by all land owners in Kiserian.112
Although the Court agreed with the applicants it went on sua
sponte (without any of the parties raising the issue) to discuss
the implications of the applicants’ action for sustainable development and environmental management.113 The Court held that
the constitutional right to life as enshrined in section 71 of the
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Kenyan Constitution includes the right to a clean and healthy
environment. In the Court’s words:
Under section 71 of the Constitution all persons are
entitled to the right to life – In our view the right to life
is not just a matter of keeping body and soul together
because in this modern age that right could be threatened by many things including the environment.114
Then it went on to hold that:
It is quite evident from perusing the most important
international instruments on the environment that the
word life and the environment are inseparable and the
word life means much more than keeping body and
soul together.115

Locus Standi and Public Interest Litigation
The effectiveness of substantive legal provisions to
protect the environment hinges upon accompanying procedural
provisions to facilitate enforcement. One key aspect relates to
provisions guaranteeing access to justice. Traditionally, under
common law, in environmental matters, access was granted
to individuals who had locus standi (standing to sue).116 The
normal rule for locus standi is that one should have a direct
personal and proprietary relationship with the subject matter
of litigation.117 This followed from the fact that litigation was
about private rights and interests, and the “common law legal
systems . . . always . . . ready to come to the aid of individuals
suffering damage, whether of a personal or proprietary nature,
where the activities of others may have caused damage or
loss.”118
This private nature of rights, remedies, and litigation tends
to restrict against protecting environmental rights, which are
essentially public rights.119 To remedy this situation, there has
arisen public interest environmental litigation, where public
spirited individuals and groups seek remedies in court on behalf
of the larger public to enforce protection of the environment.
The success of Public Interest Litigation requires courts to have
a relaxed view on the rule of locus standi.120
Traditionally, courts in East Africa took a restrictive view
on locus standi, following the traditional view at common law,
espoused in the famous English case of Gouriet vs. Union of
Post Office Workers,121 where it was held that unless a litigant
could demonstrate personal injury and loss, the matter was one
within the realm of public law, where only the Attorney General
had locus standi to institute the action. The only exceptions to
this rule were representative suits or a relator action.122 However, especially with the enactment of broad provisions in the
framework environmental laws, courts have started interpreting
the rules of locus standi liberally, generally holding that in environmental cases, individuals have standing notwithstanding the
lack of a personal and proprietary interest in the matter. The most
celebrated case on this point is a case from the Tanzanian High
Court, Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. The Attorney General,123 in
which Justice Lugakingira departed from the traditional view on
locus standi, arguing that in the circumstances of Tanzania, if a
public spirited individual seeks the Courts’ intervention against
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legislation or actions that pervert the Constitution, the Court,
as a guardian and trustee of the Constitution, must grant him
standing.124
In Festo Balegele and 749 others v. Dar es Salaam City
125
Council, a Tanzanian case, the plaintiffs were residents of
Kunduchi Mtongani. The defendant City Council used this site
to dump the city’s waste in execution of their statutory duty of
waste disposal.126 The dumped refuse endangered the residents’
lives.127 They went to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania seeking
restraining orders.128 On the issue of locus standi, the plaintiffs
were held to have standing to apply for the orders based on several factors.129 First, they were residents of the site at issue. Second, the site fell within the area of jurisdiction of the defendant
City Council. Third, this site was zoned as a residential area, as
opposed to a dumping site. Fourth, the dumped refuse and waste
turned the area into a health hazard and a nuisance to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the plaintiffs were aggrieved by the action of
the defendant.130 The Court echoed the sentiments of its earlier
decision in Abdi Athumani and 9 others v. The District Com131
missioner of Tunduru District and others. In that case, Judge
Rubana, writing for the Court, said that every citizen has a right
to seek redress in courts of law when the citizen feels that the
Government has not functioned within the orbit or limits dic132
tated by justice that the Government had set for itself.
The courts in Uganda have been the most liberal in granting
standing to plaintiffs in environmental cases.133 Great reliance
has been placed of the provisions of Article 50 of the Ugandan
Constitution, which provides that “[a]ny person or organization
may bring an action against the violation of another person’s or
group’s human rights.”134 Courts have interpreted this to give
every person locus standi.135
In Environmental Action Network Ltd. v. The Attorney General and National Environmental Management Authority,136
a public interest litigation group brought an application, complaining about the dangers of second-hand smoke on its behalf
and on behalf of the non-smoking members of the public under
Article 50(2) of the Constitution, to protect their right to a clean
and healthy environment and their right to life, and for the general good of public health in Uganda.137 The applicants stated
that non-smoking Ugandans have a constitutional right to life
under Article 22 and a constitutional right to a clean and healthy
environment under Article 39 of the Ugandan Constitution,138
and that these rights were being threatened by the unrestricted
practice of persons smoking in public places. The respondents
raised several preliminary objections to the application, one of
them being that the applicants could not claim to represent the
public, in essence challenging their locus standi.139 The High
Court of Uganda, in dismissing the preliminary objection and
holding that the applicants had standing, relied on “cases which
decided that an organization can bring a public interest action
on behalf of groups or individual members of the public even
though the applying organization has no direct individual interest in the infringing acts it seeks to have redressed.”140
Kenyan courts, though initially taking a restrictive view on
locus standi,141 have in the last few years caught up with their
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counterparts in Uganda and Tanzania, liberally granting locus
standi and promoting public interest litigation. The new view
is captured by the words of the High Court in the case of Albert
Ruturi & Another v. Minister for Finance and Others,142 subsequently quoted with approval in the case of El Busaidy v. Commissioner of Lands & 2 Others:143
We state with firm conviction that as part of the reasonable, fair and just procedure to uphold constitutional
guarantees, the right of access to justice entails a liberal approach to the question of locus standi. Accordingly, in constitutional questions, human rights cases,
and public interest litigation and class actions, the ordinary rule of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, that action can
be brought only by a person to whom legal injury is
caused, must be departed from. In these types of cases,
any person or social groups, acting in good faith, can
approach the Court seeking judicial redress for a legal
injury caused or threatened to be caused to a defined
class of persons represented 144

Regulation of Property Rights
A critical issue in environmental management that is normally subject to litigation regards the regulation of property
rights. Developments in law have led to the evolution of the
concept of public rights in private property145 so as to ensure
that use of property does not affect the rights and interests of
the larger public. Two particularly critical tools available for
the state in regulating property rights are eminent domain and
the police power.146 How both powers are used in practice and
courts’ attitudes towards these powers demonstrate an emerging
approach to sustainable development and environmental protection. In East Africa, courts have started to recognize the state’s
regulatory powers and the existence of public rights in private
property.
In the Kenyan case of Park View Shopping Arcade Limited v. Charles M. Kangethe and 2 Others,147 the Court had to
resolve an issue regarding the use of a wetland. The plaintiff
corporation, the registered owner a piece of land in Nairobi,
applied for an injunction seeking to evict the respondents, who
were occupying his land.148 He argued that their occupation was
infringing on his constitutional rights to private property.149 The
respondents on the other hand argued that the land at issue was a
sensitive wetlands area along one of the tributaries of the Nairobi
River and that, contrary to the applicant’s assertion, they were
not trespassers, but rather persons enhancing the environmental
quality of the land with a permit from the relevant authorities.150
While the applicant wanted to undertake construction on the
land, the respondents were operating a flower business.151 The
respondents argued that the proposed construction was contrary
to the general right to a clean and healthy environment guaranteed in law.152 The Court held that, although the law allows
for regulation of property rights in the interest of the public,
such regulation must be undertaken in a lawful manner. Justice
Ojwang wrote:
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If, therefore the defendants/respondents had genuinely
wished to pursue the cause of environmental protection . . . the logical and correct cause of action for them
would have been to approach the Ministry of environment and plead for compulsory acquisition of the suit
land . . . . [I]t is not acceptable that they should forcibly
occupy the suit land and then plead public interest in
environmental conservation, to keep out the registered
owner.153
The Court further ordered the Minister for Environment to
assess the status of the land and take appropriate action thereafter, in essence recognizing the fact that property rights can be
regulated for environmental protection.154
The High Court of Uganda has also confirmed the government’s right to regulate property rights for environmental
protection in the case of Sheer Property Limited v. National
Environmental Management Authority.155 The case involved
an application by Sheer Property Limited seeking to quash the
refusal of the National Environmental Management Authority (“NEMA”) to grant an Environmental Impact Assessment
license for the respondent’s proposed development on its land, a
wetlands area near the shores of Lake Victoria.156 In the May 29,
2009 judgment, Justice Mugamba reached the conclusion that
NEMA had the right to regulate land use, the private property
owner’s rights notwithstanding.157

Environmental Impact Assessments
Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”) enable the
examination, analysis, and assessment of proposed projects,
policies, or programs for their environmental impact, thus integrating environmental issues into development planning and
increasing the potential for environmentally sound and sustainable development. The EIA process, as argued by Hunter and
others, “should ensure that before granting approval (1) the
appropriate government authorities have fully identified and
considered the environmental effects of proposed activities
under their jurisdiction and control and (2) affected citizens have
an opportunity to understand the proposed project or policy and
to express their views to decision-makers.”158 The EIA is also a
means for the democratization of decision-making on environmental issues and the allocation of natural resources—however,
this hinges upon the nature and the extent of public participation
in the process.
East African countries provide for EIAs in their framework
environmental statutes. In Kenya, a change in philosophy came
about before the framework law was enacted due to the clamor
159
by civil society to enact the Physical Planning Act, 1996.
This Act sought, inter alia, to use planning as a specific method
of preventing environmental degradation, and provides for the
160
use of environmental impact assessments. For EIA purposes,
the Physical Planning Act obligates developers to seek and
obtain plan information from the relevant local authorities.161
Local authorities are further empowered to demolish buildings
built without their permission. In the Kenyan case of Momanyi
v. Bosire,162 these planning requirements received judicial
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recognition. In this case, Momanyi was a resident of Imara
Daima Estate in Nairobi. Bosire obtained plan information to
put up a kiosk at the entrance of the Estate. Rather than a kiosk,
however, he constructed a resort for selling liquor and other
related products. The plaintiff and others instituted a suit against
Bosire and the Nairobi City Council. The court held that Bosire
was in breach of the Physical Planning Act requirements relating
to plan information. Similarly, the City Council was in breach
of its statutory obligation for failing to demolish the building as
it was built without plan information.163 Accordingly, the resort
was pulled down.164
Similarly, the High Court of Uganda in National Association
of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE) v. Nile Power Lim165
ited held that activities of economic benefit to the community
must be lawfully authorized. In this case, the applicants sought
an injunction to restrain the respondent company from concluding a power project agreement with the government of Uganda
until the EIA on the project had been approved. Although the
Court declined to grant the injunction sought, it declared that
the Lead Agency and the National Environment Authority must
approve the EIA study on the project.166 It observed that the
signing of the protested agreements was subject to the law and
167
any contravention of the law would be challenged.

Harnessing the Role of Courts as Champions
for Sustainable Development
The environmental challenges facing East Africa and the
rest of Africa are many and growing. Increasing poverty, land
degradation, and the huge threats posed by climate change,
against a background of corruption and other governance challenges,168 require the concerted efforts of all actors. The judiciary, more than any other institution, is uniquely placed to
help society implement appropriate strategies for confronting
these challenges and to thus deliver on sustainable development
because the judiciaries, by their nature, are expected to mediate between different interests in society and they are removed
from the daily political pressures and interests that confront
the executive and legislature in most African countries. In any
case, the laws on environmental management require an arbiter
who will ensjure that they are adhered to and transgression dealt
with. Courts in East Africa are slowly waking up to the reality
that they have this critical role. They are starting to be assertive, innovative, and inspirational in their judgments. However,
they are still faced with numerous obstacles requiring attention if they are to be fully effective as champions of sustainable
development. Moving into the future requires increased capacity
building, the development of robust jurisprudence, and a judiciary that realizes that its task is not just to react and adjudicate,
but also to inform and provide leadership. Above all, judiciaries
must help society to adhere to the rule of law and inculcate environmental ethos and values.
Klaus Toepfer, former United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) Executive Director wrote in the preface to
the book Making Law Work, (Volumes I and II) - Environmental
Compliance & Sustainable Development169 the following:
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The future of the Earth may well turn on how quickly we
can improve the legal framework for sustainable
development . . . . Sustainable development cannot be
achieved unless laws governing society, the economy, and our relationship with the Earth connect
with our deepest values and are put into practice internationally and domesticaly Law must be enforced
and complied with by all of society, and all of society must share this obligation.170
The judiciary should be at the forefront in ensuring that East
Africa realizes the goal of sustainable development. For, as Justice Ojwang’ has written:
In the case of the environment . . . the state of the law
may well be relatively obscure; yet a decision must be
pronounced. From my understanding of the law, and
from my own experience of judicial decision-making,
where the question before the Court relates to the environment, and the legislature’s guidance is by no means
comprehensive, the Court, once it ascertains the facts,
must appreciate the relevant principles which ought to
be reflected in the law . . . . So, whenever the Court has
an opportunity to declare the law on an environmental
question, the shape of that law should be conservatory
of the environment and the natural resources; and the
Court should apply this principle to determine, where
possible, such rights or duties as may appear to be more
immediately linked to economic, social, cultural, or
political situations.171
The cases reviewed above demonstrate the great strides
that courts in East Africa are making in promoting sustainable
development in East Africa. The initial seeds have been sown,
but more work still lies ahead to ensure that courts become true
bastions of justice and champions for sustainable development.
Among the steps that need to be taken are enhanced training and capacity building for the judiciary. Environmental law
is a fairly recent branch of law. It was only introduced in law
schools after a good number of the judges currently working in
East Africa had already graduated. Even after the subject was
introduced, it was an elective rather than a required subject.
Consequently, not many judges have academic knowledge and
experience in environmental law. It is therefore critical that, as
called for by the Global Judges’ Symposium on the Rule of Law
and Sustainable Development,172 capacity building programs on
environmental law be mounted for members of the judiciary. In
Uganda and Kenya, commendable efforts have been made both
by UNEP under the Partnership for Development of Environmental Law in Africa program and by local civil society organizations173 to organize colloquia for judges on environmental
law. The efforts in Tanzania on this front are still minimal.174
With the establishment of judicial training institutes in East
Africa,175 training on environmental law should be entering
the mainstream and made continuous so as to ensure that judicial officers keep abreast of the latest developments in the field
of environmental law and thus are better able to make sound
decisions.
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The three East African countries follow the doctrine of
stare decisis and judicial precedent, where decisions of previous
superior courts are binding on inferior tribunals. To be effective, this process requires a functioning legal reporting system.
The status of law reporting in East Africa is, however, very
weak. Kenya leads with commendable efforts by the National
Council for Law Reporting.176 It has produced a volume of land
and environmental reports, containing landmark environmental
judgments in Kenya from 1909 to 2006.177 This program should
be emulated in all three countries to provide easy reference and
a dedicated law reporting process on environmental cases, and
to help develop a sound body of environmental jurisprudence in
East Africa.

There is also need to modernize courts generally to increase
their effectiveness. The information superhighway has yet to
reach the courts in East Africa. They are still traditional and
largely archaic institutions. To reap the benefits of information technology, modernization of judiciaries by introduction
of computers, stenographers to record court proceedings, and
internet connection would greatly enhance the performance of
these courts. The effectiveness of the judiciary will also depend
to a large degree on its independence and freedom from political
interference, especially by the executive branch, and its fidelity
to the rule of the law.
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States, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. For an in-depth discussion, see Korwa
G. Adar & Mutahi Ngunyi, The Politics of Integration in East Africa Since
Independence, in Politics and Administration in East Africa (Walter O.
Oyugi ed., 1992); see also Kibua, T. & Tostensen, A., Fast-tracking East
African Integration: Assessing the Feasibility of a Political Federation by
2010 (CMI 2005).
20 EAC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 5(1).
21 Id. art. 5(3).
22 Id. art. 111–16.
23 Protocol for the Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria, Kenya-Tanz.Uganda, Nov. 29, 2003, available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/shared/faolextrans.jsp?xp_ISIS_MFN=035651&xp_faoLexLang=E&xp_lang=en.
24 Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources, Kenya-Tanz.-Uganda,
Apr. 3, 2006, available at http://www.eac.int/advisory-opinions/doc_
download/5-east-african-community-protocol-on-environmental-and-naturalresources-management.html.
25 See Environmental Management and Coordination Act, No. 8 (1999) pt. II
§ 5(b) (Kenya) [hereinafter EMCA], available at http://www.reconcile-ea.org/
wkelc/env_mgt_act.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
26 Constitution (1995) (Uganda), available at http://www.ugandaonlinelawlibrary.com/files/constitution/constitution_1995.pdf.
27 Constitution (1997) (Tanz.), available at http://www.issafrica.org/cdct/
mainpages/pdf/Corruption/Legislation/Tanzania/Tanzania%20Constitution%20
in%20English.pdf.
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Is the International Court of Justice the
Right Forum for Transboundary Water
Pollution Disputes?
by Kate Halloran*

C

lean water is essential to human development and sustainability, yet fragmented management of transboundary waters puts this valuable resource at risk.1 A recent
controversy between the governments of Argentina and Uruguay over the construction of two pulp mills on the River Uruguay2 illustrates the tension in sustainable development between
promoting economic prosperity and protecting the environment.
On May 4, 2006, the Argentine government instituted proceedings with the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) against
the government of Uruguay for allegedly violating a 1975 treaty
that imposes obligations on the two nations to curb pollution in
the river that forms their border.3 Argentina contends the discharge of chemicals from the pulp mills will adversely affect the
river and communities settled along the river’s banks,4 an assertion which Uruguay denies.5 Argentine citizens protested by
blockading a bridge over the river, effectively disrupting tourist
and commercial activity in Uruguay,6 which Uruguay insists has
resulted in serious economic damage.7
The ICJ is currently deliberating Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay),8 but its actions thus far invite
doubts about the ICJ’s efficacy in adjudicating transboundary
water pollution disputes. One concern is the reluctance of the
ICJ to utilize provisional measures, a form of injunctive relief.
The ICJ denied requests from Argentina and Uruguay to suspend construction of the pulp mills and end blockading of the
bridge, respectively.9 Between 1946 and 1994, the ICJ employed
provisional measures in approximately half of the cases where
one or more parties requested such intervention.10 Pulp Mills on
the River Uruguay is the first case since 2003 to even request
provisional measures.11 The record indicates that the ICJ resists
wielding this powerful tool unless the requesting party can prove
imminent and irreparable harm to their interests, opting instead
to appeal to the good faith of the parties not to cause injury until
the case has been formally decided.12 Thus, even though the ICJ
could have issued provisional measures within six months of
Argentina filing its complaint, both Argentina’s environmental
interest and Uruguay’s economic interest in the River Uruguay
have gone unchecked for over three years.
Further, even if the ICJ exhibited willingness to issue provisional measures, its capacity to enforce such measures is
uncertain. While Article 94 of the United Nations Charter allows
recourse to the Security Council when a party ignores a final
judgment of the ICJ, no such similar proceedings exist for provisional measures.13 A party could decline to abide by provisional
measures asserted against it without penalty.
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The extensive transboundary water dispute history between
the United States and Canada provides an example of an alternative to the ICJ. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 190914 established the International Joint Commission (“Commission”) to
prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters.15 The
Commission is independent in nature and comprised of officials
and permanent employees from both countries.16 Its responsibilities include: “(1) quasi-judicial determinations; (2) investigative
and advisory assignments; and (3) arbitrations.”17 The Commission first encountered transboundary water pollution concerns in
1912, when it was asked to recommend a plan for preventing
and remedying pollution in shared U.S.-Canadian waters.18 The
Commission also played a central role in a contentious dispute
between the United States and Canada over transboundary air
pollution that spawned the famous Trail Smelter arbitration in
1941.19 More recently, in 1990, it adopted a policy of zero discharge and virtual elimination of toxic substances.20
The longevity and effectiveness of the Commission are
the result of a firm commitment to pollution abatement and an
inclusive approach to addressing transboundary water pollution
disputes, which encourages public participation and consensusdriven initiatives.21 A transboundary water pollution dispute
cannot be settled without the participation of officials from both
countries.22 Moreover, projects that may affect U.S.-Canada
boundary water require approval of the Commission, which is
tasked with balancing divergent interests fairly.23
The Commission, of course, is not flawless. However, if the
1975 River Uruguay treaty included a similar entity to address
transboundary water pollution disputes, the Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay case may never have progressed to the ICJ. The
Commission benefits from a strong framework, dedication of
the governments directly affected by transboundary water pollution disputes, and a system of regulation that is flexible yet
efficient.24 Where the ICJ attempts enforcement of practically
unenforceable international law, the Commission encourages
transparency and compliance. Regardless of the outcome of
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, the international community
must develop other methods of resolving transboundary water
pollution disputes before economic development and water
quality suffer irrevocably.
Endnotes: Is the International Court of Justice the Right Forum for
Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes? continued on page 85
* Kate Halloran is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University
Washington College of Law.
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The International Court of Justice’s
Treatment of “Sustainable Development”
and Implications for Argentina v. Uruguay
by Lauren Trevisan*

T

he International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) gave the concept
of “sustainable development” its first thorough airing in
1997 in its decision concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project.1 In this decision and all others to date, however,
the ICJ has stopped short of treating sustainable development
as a core adjudicatory norm.2 The pending Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay)3 case provides the court
an opportunity to refine and further develop its treatment of the
concept of sustainable development.
Though the ICJ included the concept of sustainable development in an Advisory Opinion in 1996,4 the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case was the ICJ’s first use of sustainable development in
its jurisprudence. At dispute in the case was the development of
a system of locks on the Danube River pursuant to a 1977 treaty
between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.5 The purposes of the
project, which began in 1978,6 were to produce hydroelectricity,
improve navigation, and protect against flooding.7 In 1989 Hungary decided to abandon the project, largely due to intense criticism from Hungarian scientists and environmentalists centering
on threats to groundwater and wetlands.8 In response, Slovakia
attempted to continue the project by unilaterally diverting the
river to serve a power station on its territory.9
The parties took their dispute to the ICJ and requested that
the court consider their rights and obligations under the 1977
treaty.10 In making its determination, the ICJ looked beyond the
parties’ treaty relationship and referred to other relevant conventions to which the States were a party, as well as to rules
of customary international law.11 It also considered sustainable
development as a concept central to the resolution of the dispute:
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and
other reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the
past, this was often done without consideration of the
effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks
for mankind . . . new norms and standards have been
developed, set forth in a great number of instruments
during the last two decades. Such new norms have to
be taken into consideration, and such new standards
given proper weight, not only when states contemplate
new activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic
development with protection of the environment is
aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development. For the purposes of the present case, this means
that the Parties together should look afresh at the effects
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on the environment of the operation of the [Slovakian]
power plant.12
While in this case the ICJ recommended use of the concept
of sustainable development in sovereign decision-making,13 it
“stopped short of declaring or referring to sustainable development as a norm of customary international law.”14
Currently pending is another case that will call on the panel
to consider issues of sustainable development, specifically giving
the court the opportunity to resolve the questions of international
environmental law and the legal implications of sustainable
development that it left open in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision.15 On October 2, 2009 the Court heard final oral arguments
in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.16 In 2003 and 2005 Uruguay authorized two pulp mills to be built on its portion of the
River Uruguay, which constitutes the border between Uruguay
and Argentina.17 Argentina alleged that the mills threatened the
health of the river and local residents and were in violation of
the Statute of the River Uruguay, a 1975 agreement between the
two nations to govern the river’s management.
Argentina claimed that the Statute of the River Uruguay
incorporated international environmental standards, and that its
right to protect the environment of the river is derived from both
the letter of the statute and the “principles and rules of international law.”18 Uruguay contends that its duty is not to prevent all
pollution, but rather to follow appropriate rules and measures to
prevent it in the context of development. 19 Uruguay claims it is
subject to an “obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result”
which is “consistent with the principles of general international
law.”20
Both parties in this case frame their rights and obligations to
protect the environment of the River Uruguay as complying with
“general international law.” This case, therefore, is an opportunity for the ICJ to delineate what it considers international
environmental standards to be.21 In its Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
decision, the ICJ “missed the opportunity to give further definition to the concept of sustainable development.”22 Over ten years
later, in a world where sustainable development is arguably an
even greater concern, the court should take this opportunity to
set a basis for the enforceability of international environmental
norms,23 including sustainable development.
Endnotes: The International Court of Justice’s . . . Implications
for Argentina v. Uruguay continued on page 85
*Lauren Trevisan is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University
Washington College of Law
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Towards a Jurisprudence of Sustainable
Development in South Asia:
Litigation in the Public Interest
by Shyami Fernando Puvimanasinghe*
This paper presents an updated version of part of a chapter
in “Foreign Investment, Human Rights and the Environment:
A Perspective from South Asia on the Role of Public International Law for Development,” published by Koninklijke Brill
NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, in 2007, which in turn consisted of
an adapted version of the author’s PhD thesis.

S

Introduction

outh Asia, according to the grouping of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, consists
of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Although Southern Asia is by
and large one of the economically poorest regions of the world,
it is rich in non-economic terms—ecological, historical, cultural,
ethical, philosophical, and spiritual. The Indian sub-continent is
home to a value system involving the spiritual, ethical, individual, and collective dimensions of human life, which are all interconnected and require mutual accommodation, as all phenomena
in nature are united in a physical and metaphysical relationship.
Religious traditions and philosophical thought in Southern Asia
find close links with justice, equity, and sustainable development; non-violence and compassion for all; reconciliation, harmony, equilibrium and the middle path; equitable distribution
of resources and moderation in consumption. Throughout the
colonial and post-colonial history of most of the countries in the
region, however, the traditional wisdom of holistic approaches
to development have been gradually replaced by globally dominant models of economic development and today the problems
of development versus the environment and human rights, poverty, pollution and overpopulation: indiscriminate liberalization
and urbanization are commonplace.
In a variety of issues ranging from a massive leakage of
methyl-isocyanate gas to phosphate mining, and from the noise
of a thermal power plant generator to Genetically Modified
Organisms, public interest litigation1 (“PIL”) has evolved as a
popular tool in the South Asian region2 since the mid-1980s. It
has taken diverse forms, like representative standing, where a
concerned person or organization comes forward to espouse the
cause of poor or otherwise underprivileged persons; and citizen
standing, which enables any person to bring a suit as a matter of
public interest, as a concerned member of the citizenry. Given
the various and numerous classifications that divide the social
fabric in this region, it is fair that poor, illiterate, legally-illiterate, minority, low caste, and other disadvantaged and underprivileged persons gain access to justice through distortions of
traditional doctrines of standing. The test for locus standi in
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these cases has, within limits, been liberalized from the need to
be an aggrieved person, to simply being a person with a genuine and sufficient concern. In addition, class actions allow one
suit in the case of multiple plaintiffs and/or defendants, and have
been useful in this area.
Before the Bhopal disaster, PIL emerged as a tool in cases of
social injustice, for instance bonded and child labor, and issues
of public accountability, like illegal payments to public officials.
In relation to challenges to development projects, Indian courts
had consistently been slow to interfere with projects beneficial
to development.3 In the case of the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project,
PIL was invoked by the Narmada Bachao Andolan, challenging
the failure to ensure rehabilitation for millions of persons displaced by the construction of over 300 dams across the Narmada
river. Protracted litigation ended years later in 2000.4 The main
catalyst for the evolution of PIL was the Bhopal disaster. In its
immediate aftermath, the victims of this catastrophic industrial
accident first brought action against Union Carbide in India. The
Indian government then passed legislation, assumed the role of
parens patriae, and filed suit against the parent company in the
US, on behalf of the victims. This course of action was largely
due to lack of legislation, enforcement capacity, and legal
resources in India at that time. The ensuing case of In re Union
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster5 concerned liability and compensation for thousands of deaths and personal injuries. However, the case was sent back to India on the basis of forum non
conveniens. Finally, it was settled out of court, and the settlement
was given judicial assent in the Supreme Court of India.6 Thus
the issue of liability was never adjudicated by a court of law.
Under the settlement, Union Carbide was to pay $470 million,
generally thought to be inadequate.7 Poor implementation means
that victims of Bhopal lacked redress for decades, as highlighted
on the 20th anniversary of the disaster, on December 3, 2004.8
The realization of the total incapacity of the host state legal
system to deal with such a disaster led to the passage of environment-related laws and litigation in India in the years immediately following the Bhopal accident. Most states in the region
have since invoked legislative, constitutional, and judicial
mechanisms to further environmental protection and sustainable
* Having served as a Senior Lecturer, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka, and
worked for human rights, health, HIV/AIDS, environment and development in
non-governmental organizations in Gaborone, Botswana, the author, a Senior
Research Fellow, Centre for Sustainable Development Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada is currently employed in the intergovernmental sector
in Geneva, Switzerland. This article represents the views of the author in her
personal capacity.
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development, and their experience can be informative for other
developing countries.9 Legislation for environmental protection
has now been passed in most countries in South Asia.10 This
includes provisions requiring environmental impact assessments
for development projects, statutory environmental pollution
control by administrative agencies,11 and environmental standards for discharge of emissions and effluents.12
Several constitutions in the region recognize an obligation
of the state as well as citizens, to protect the environment.13 In
addition, the right to life (and liberty) is enshrined in some constitutions14 and has been interpreted
by the judiciary to include the
right to a clean and healthy environment.15 In the Indian case of
Subash Kumar v. State of Bihar,
the petitioner filed a public interest litigation pleading infringement of the right to life arising
from the pollution of the Bokaro
River by the sludge discharged
from the Tata Iron and Steel Company, alleged to have made the
water unfit for drinking or irrigation. The court recognized that the
right to life includes the right to
enjoyment of pollution-free water
and air. It stated that if anything
endangers or impairs the quality of life, an affected person or
a genuinely interested person can
bring a public interest suit, which
envisages legal proceedings for
vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of a group or community unable to enforce its
rights on account of incapacity, poverty, or ignorance of law.16
In Pakistan, an adequate standard of living has been interpreted to include an environment adequate for the health and
well-being of the people.17 In the case of Shehla Zia and Others v. WAPDA,18 the right to life was upheld and interpreted
to include a healthy environment. The petitioners, who were
residents in the vicinity of a grid station being constructed by
the respondents, alleged that the electromagnetic field created
by high voltage transmission lines would pose a serious health
hazard. It was held that the word “life” cannot be restricted to
the vegetative or animal life or mere existence between conception and death. Life should be interpreted widely, to enable a
person not only to sustain life, but also to enjoy it. Where life
of citizens is degraded, the quality of life is adversely affected,
and health hazards are created affecting a large number of
people, the court may order the stoppage of activities that create pollution and environmental degradation. Since the scientific evidence was inconclusive in this case, the court applied
the precautionary principle. Noting that energy is essential for
life, commerce, and industry, the court held that a balance in
the form of a policy of sustainable development was necessary,

appointing a Commissioner to examine and study the scheme
and report back to it.
A body of jurisprudence on sustainable development and
its domestic implementation has evolved in India.19 Most other
countries in the region have followed in the same direction.
Their various efforts viewed collectively point to the evolution of a body of regional, or comparative, jurisprudence on
issues of development and environment with an overt human
rights dimension, largely through the agency of citizen involvement, legal representation in the public interest, and judicial
innovation. The contribution of
the judiciary—especially the
higher judiciary—is striking,
especially in the light of the
lesser commitment to sustainability on the part of most
third world politicians. The
case law should in principle
be applicable to both global
and local business, provided
that transnational corporations
can also be subject to domestic
law in host states. Most of the
cases concern local industries,
but some also deal with transnational business. Whatever
the factual context may be,
the legal issues are the same,
and the legal principles have
been applied to the balancing
of conflicting interests of environment, development, and
human rights. The case law is
therefore of basic relevance to this study and to foreign investment activities.

Heightened sensitivity
and concerted action
in the judiciary, legal
profession, and civil
society have helped to
create an expanded
notion of access to
justice and to foster the
phenomenon of [Public
Interest Litigation]
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Judicial Intervention in Sustainable
Development in the regional terrain
Heightened sensitivity and concerted action in the judiciary, legal profession, and civil society have helped to create
an expanded notion of access to justice20 and to foster the phenomenon of PIL.21 Related developments include a degree of
shift from adversarial to inquisitorial judicial methods22 suited
to environmental issues, a broad and purposive approach to statutory interpretation,23 and a measure of flexibility in procedure
adopted and redress granted.24 The Dhera Dun case25 involved
a public interest petition addressed to the Supreme Court of
India by the Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra. The court
directed that all fresh quarrying in the Himalayan region of the
Dhera Dun district be stopped and ultimately ordered the closure
of several mines. The lessees of the mines submitted a scheme
for limestone quarrying, which was rejected. On appeal, the
court emphasized that the environmental disturbance caused by
limestone mining had to be balanced against the need for limestone in industry. After careful consideration and study of the
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issues, mostly on its own initiative, the court upheld the closure
of the quarries. In view of the unemployment that would ensue,
the court ordered employment of the workers in the reforestation
and soil conservation program in the area. This type of strong
and proactive judicial action is evident in a variety of other
PIL cases. Aruna Rodrigues v. Union of India, for example, is
an ongoing litigation over Genetically Modified Organisms in
which the Supreme Court has placed tight restrictions on GMO
crop testing, like prescribing safe distances for test crops from
other farms and requiring testing to confirm that no crop contamination has occurred.26
Judicial intervention has served to scrutinize governmental
and private sector activities and abate administrative apathy.27
Significant measures include the creative usage of Directive
Principles of State Policy,28 judicial recognition of a right to
a healthy environment,29 and the interpretation of an adequate
standard of living to include an adequate quality of life and environment. In cases like Juan Antonio Oposa v. The Honourable
Fulgencio S. Factoran in the
Philippines, which recognized
intergenerational equity and the
right to a balanced and healthful
ecology,30 human rights provisions have been used for environmental protection.31 Judicial
measures have also liberalized
locus standi to include any person genuinely concerned for the
environment,32 placed a public
trust obligation on states over
natural resources, 33 imposed
absolute liability for accidents
arising from ultra-hazardous
activities,34 applied the polluterpays and precautionary principles,35
and promoted sustainable development and good governance.36
The Indian case of Municipal Council Ratlam v. Vardichand37 extended the frontiers of public nuisance through innovative interpretation in light of India’s constitutional embodiment
of social justice and human rights. The facts arose from what
the Supreme Court described as a “Third World Humanscape,”
where overpopulation, large-scale pollution, ill-planned urbanization, abject poverty, and dire need of basic amenities combined with official inaction and apathy to create a miserable
predicament for slum and shanty dwellers in a particular ward
in Ratlam, Madhya Pradesh. Justice Krishna Iyer confirmed the
finding of public nuisance by the lower courts.38 Fortifying judicial powers to enforce laws, the judge stated that the nature of
the judicial process is not merely adjudicatory nor is it that of an
umpire only. Affirmative action to make the remedy effective is
the essence of the right, which otherwise becomes sterile. Justice
Iyer also referred to the need for the judiciary to be informed
by the broader principle of access to justice necessitated by the
conditions of developing countries and obligated by the Indian

Constitution. This case adopts a holistic approach in terms of its
orders for local development and provision of basic needs.
Several recent cases of public interest litigation in South
Asia further elucidate the concept of sustainable development
and move its implementation forward. The superior courts of
India were the catalysts for judicial activism and innovation in
the region and public interest litigation is now also commonplace in the lower courts. Cases include Akhil v. Secretary A.P.
Pollution Control Board W.P.;39 A.P. Pollution Control Board
v. Appellate Authority Under Water Act W.P.;40 A.P. Gunnies
Merchants Association v. Government of Andhra Pradesh;41
Research Foundation for Science v. Union of India;42 Chinnappa v. Union of India43 and Beena Sarasan v. Kerala Zone
Management Authority et al.44 In Research Foundation for Science and Technology and Natural Resources Policy v. Union
of India et al.,45 a public interest suit led to the appointment by
the Supreme Court of a Committee to inquire into the issue of
hazardous wastes.
In Pakistan, recent cases
include Bokhari v. Federation of Pakistan46 and Irfan v.
Lahore Development Authority (“Lahore Air Pollution
Case”).47 The first case concerned the grounding and collapse of a ship in the port of
Karachi in 2003, leading to a
major oil-spill, which caused
far-reaching environmental
damage. The ability of the legal
system to respond was, in this
case before the Supreme Court,
found to be totally lacking due
to many reasons including lack
of preparedness and failure to ratify relevant international conventions. This case was held to be
suitable for public interest litigation. The Court went on to discuss public interest litigation as it had evolved in India and Pakistan, where it was said to be particularly useful because of the
realities of poverty, illiteracy, and institutional fragility. It was
found that in Pakistan, PIL had been used in a very wide range
of social issues, from environmental pollution to the prevention
of exploitation of children. The Lahore Air Pollution Case concerned air and noise pollution from rickshaws, mini buses, and
other vehicles and the non-performance of statutory duties by
the relevant authorities, charged with ensuring a pollution free
environment for the citizens. The court cited several Indian
judgments, including Ratlam Municipality v. Vardichand, where
Justice Krishna Iyer had touched on the need to be practical and
practicable and order only what can be performed.
In Nepal, Suray Prasad Sharma Dhungel v. Godavari
Marble Industries et al.48 was a landmark case, decided by a
full bench of the Supreme Court. The Court held that a clean
and healthy environment is part of the right to life under the
Constitution. It upheld the locus standi of NGOs or individuals

PIL has also become a
common feature in cases
concerning development,
environment, and human
rights, which have closely
linked jurisprudence in
Sri Lanka
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working for environmental protection, and directed that relevant
laws necessary for the protection of the environment be enacted.
In Sharma et al. v. Nepal Drinking Water Corporation et al.,49
the Supreme Court emphasized the significance of pure drinking
water to public health and, without explicitly saying that it is a
basic right, expressed that its provision was a responsibility of a
welfare state. The Court took account of several aspects of the
Nepali Constitution, including the main objectives of the state,
and the spirit of the Constitution. Without issuing a writ of mandamus to guarantee the right to pure drinking water, as requested
by the petitioner public interest lawyer, it alerted the Ministry of
Housing and Physical Development to hold the Drinking Water
Corporation accountable in complying with its legal obligations
under its governing statute. In Sharma et al. v. His Majesty’s
Government Cabinet Secretariat et al.,50 the Nepali Supreme
Court was petitioned to “quash a government decision allowing
unfettered import of diesel taxies and leaded petrol from India.”
It held that a healthy environment is a prerequisite to the protection of the right to personal freedom under the Constitution
and that the state has a primary obligation to protect the right
to personal liberty under Article 12 (1) by reducing environmental pollution as much as possible. Based on the concept of
sustainable development, the court stated that the environment
cannot be ignored for development. The court issued a directive
to enforce essential measures within a maximum of two years
in order to reduce vehicular pollution in the Kathmandu Valley, well known for its historical, cultural, and archaeological
significance.
In Bangladesh, the case of Bangladesh Environmental
Lawyers Association v. Secretary, Ministry of Environment and
Forests,51 concerned the neglect, misuse, and lack of coordination by governmental authorities in relation to Sonadia Island,
a precious forest area and rich ecosystem. Authorities were
instead alleged to be preparing the land for industrial purposes
destructive of the environment, like shrimp cultivation, thereby
destroying the habitat for fauna and flora, and weakening natural disaster prevention benefits. More recently, in Bangladesh
Environmental Lawyers Association v. Bangladesh et al., the
Supreme Court ordered the closing of ship breaking yards that
were operating without necessary environmental clearance and
a variety of actions to be taken by the government to prevent
future environmental harm, including establishing a committee
to ensure that regulations are created and followed.52
public interest litigation and sustainable
development landscape in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka’s modern domestic jurisprudence is linked
closely to relevant international law. The dynamic currents
of sustainable development law—especially in the context of
human rights, public interest litigation, and the environment—in
the domestic courts of the South Asian region have influenced
the ebb and flow of the waters of the island’s jurisprudence,
making fundamental changes in its course. The fabric of the
domestic law, therefore, acquires new motifs and designs, creating an interesting mosaic. For a just, equitable, and sustainable
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development in Sri Lanka it is necessary to identify where environmental degradation and resource depletion make it difficult
to meet basic needs, and to modify human activities to both
eliminate undesirable side-effects and satisfy these needs.53
Sri Lanka’s 1978 Constitution has some provisions on the
environment in its chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Duties. Article 27(2) says that the state is
pledged to establish in Sri Lanka a democratic socialist society,
the objectives of which include (e) the equitable distribution
among all citizens of the material resources of the community
and the social product, so as best to sub-serve the common good.
Article 27(14) asserts that the state shall protect, preserve and
improve the environment for the benefit of the community.
According to Article 28(f ), it is the duty of every person to protect nature and conserve its riches. Although Article 29 states
that the Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental
Duties are not justiciable,54 the Sri Lankan Courts have given
recognition to these principles, which they have read in the light
of principles of international law. In a dualist country such as Sri
Lanka, they have been an invaluable aid to the incorporation of
international law, and have facilitated the infiltration of international public and community values into the domestic legal system. The Sri Lankan Constitution does not provide for the right
to life, and its chapter on fundamental rights deals mainly with
civil and political rights, with limited protection of social, economic and cultural rights. Given these limitations, broad interpretations of the Directive Principles by the judiciary can truly
advance social justice. As pointed out by Savithri Goonesekere:
The jurisprudence being developed in the Indian
Supreme Court is important for Sri Lanka and South
Asia, since it provides insights into the manner in
which policy perspectives recognized in international
standards can be integrated into domestic law. This
process is important because international treaties in
India and Sri Lanka as well as some other countries do
not become locally enforceable as law unless they are
integrated into local law by courts and legislatures.55
Many public nuisance cases constitute the relevant jurisprudence in the pre-environmental era. The first such major case
in Sri Lanka after the enactment of the National Environmental
Act (“NEA”) was Keangnam Enterprises Ltd. v. Abeysinghe.56
It arose from a complaint by the inhabitants of a village in the
North-Western province to the Magistrate’s Court (“MC”) of
Kurunegala regarding public nuisance from blasting and metal
quarrying operations. The metal was used to develop a major
road. Excessive noise and vibration from blasting day and
night had led to severe damage to person and property, including insomnia, fear psychosis, loss of hearing and bursting of
ear-drums, the drying up of wells, failure of crops, and structural damage to property. The Magistrate granted an injunction
restraining the operation of the quarry and a conditional order
to remove the nuisance, upon which the company applied for
revision to the Court of Appeal (“CA”) under Article 138 of
the Constitution. The Keangnam company had obtained some
licenses, such as a site clearance, but not an Environmental
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Protection Licence (“EPL”) as required by the NEA. The CA
insisted on this requirement, which the company had applied for
but not yet obtained. The Court also did not accept the argument that the possession of an EPL would oust Magisterial jurisdiction for public nuisance, since the company did not have a
license.57 In a subsequent case, the MC stated that the blasting
of rocks and operation of a metal crusher amounted to a public nuisance, even though the company had an EPL, since the
terms of the EPL were being violated, causing severe damage,
including physical injury to persons, damage to over 100 houses,
and metal dust pollution.58 The quarry was required to comply
with the standards set by the Central Environmental Authority
(“CEA”) in the EPL. A conditional order for the removal of a
public nuisance was also granted in a case of pollution from
untreated chemical effluents discharged into public waterways
by a textile dying plant causing skin rashes; a lime kiln around
which there was an increased incidence of cancer and tuberculosis; a factory producing rubber gloves and boots which caused
groundwater pollution from toxic chemicals and wastes leading to respiratory problems; and a factory producing sulphuric
acid.59 In Hettiarachchige Premasiri et al. v. Dehiwala – Mount
Lavinia Municipal Council,60 public nuisance provisions were
used for the removal of a nuisance, in this case garbage, causing
a major threat to public health as well as danger to a bird sanctuary in the vicinity. Since the nuisance was not removed by the
Municipal Council in spite of having been given ample time, the
interim order was made absolute.
In all these cases, the environmental factor weighed heavily with the courts. While this is indeed a welcome position, it
is submitted that sustainable development rather than environmental protection per se should be the guide to both legislation
and case law in the developing country context. Public nuisance
being a criminal law remedy does not allow much leeway for
the balancing of conflicting interests, unlike its civil law counterpart, private nuisance. The facts of the above cases are such
that the decisions appear to be just and equitable. However, this
may not always be the case, and it is important that environmental protection does not become a counterproductive issue.
Nuisance remedies are ex post facto, and in this sense, Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”) provide a better source of
protection, as they are prospective and can adopt a preventive
approach.
PIL has also become a common feature in cases concerning development, environment, and human rights, which have
closely linked jurisprudence in Sri Lanka.61 These cases usually
involve executive or administrative action and, frequently, business activities. When major administrative decisions concern the
natural resources of the country and other important issues of
public interest, there is little room for the community at large
to question these decisions, to be informed about their implications, and to ensure accountable and good governance.62 Decisions are sometimes made behind closed doors and a culture of
disclosure is not common in public affairs.63 In this context, PIL
serves as a legal tool to raise issues of social accountability in
decision-making by the government and industry.
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In Sri Lanka, most environmental cases have been based
on remedies in administrative law, fundamental rights, public
nuisance, and the public trust doctrine. The question of locus
standi usually arises in writ applications, which are particularly
useful in invalidating unlawful action by governmental bodies
and compelling them to carry out their statutory duties, respectively.64 The first Sri Lankan case in the nature of PIL in the
environment/development context was Environmental Foundation Ltd. v. The Land Commissioner et al. (“The Kandalama
case”),65 which concerned the granting of a lease of state land
to a private company for the purpose of building a tourist hotel.
The hotel was to be built in close proximity to an ancient tank
and sacred Buddhist temple, upsetting the local environment,
both natural and cultural. In spite of the public interest suit questioning the irregularity of the lease, and in contravention of the
relevant statutory provisions, the project did go through. The
positive effect of the case was that the authorities were ordered
by the court to follow the correct procedure and were compelled
to do so by providing notice in the newspaper. This case was the
first in Sri Lanka to uphold the standing of an NGO dedicated to
the cause of environmental protection. It had important implications with respect to access to justice, the role of the judiciary,
access to information, public participation in decision-making,
and compliance with and implementation of the law. The Environmental Foundation (“EFL”) has since 1981 filed action in
environmental matters without its locus standi being challenged.
Environmental Foundation Limited et al. v. The Attorney
General (“The Nawimana case”)66 was a class action brought by
residents of two villages in the south of Sri Lanka and involved
a fundamental rights petition over serious damage to health and
property caused by quarry-blasting operations. The petitioners alleged the violation of several Constitutional provisions,
namely, that sovereignty is in the people and is inalienable and
includes fundamental rights; that no person shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; the freedom to engage in any lawful occupation; freedom of movement
and of choosing a residence;67 as well as the Directive Principles
of state policy.68 The case was settled through mediation of the
CEA, and the petitioners obtained relief. The court recognized
the possibility of invoking fundamental rights provisions in
environment-related cases, and the connection between environment, development, and human rights. It also accepted, by
a majority decision, the possibility of public interest litigation,
since the first petitioner was an environmental NGO.
In Environmental Foundation Ltd. v. Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, Minister of Public Administration et al.,69 there was
an unequivocal recognition of the possibility of bringing public
interest litigation in suitable cases. Until this judgment, cases in
the nature of public interest suits had been heard, but with no
pronouncements on their acceptability as a matter of principle.
The judgment is therefore significant because it disposes of the
issue as to whether public interest litigation is admissible in the
Sri Lankan legal system. In this certiorari application, Justice
Ranaraja expressly extended locus standi to a person who shows
a genuine interest in the subject matter, who comes before the
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court as a public-spirited person, concerned to see that the law
is obeyed in the interest of all. Unless any citizen has standing, therefore, there is no means of keeping public authorities
within the law except where the Attorney General will act, and
frequently he will not.70 In Deshan Harinda (a minor) et al.
v. Ceylon Electricity Board et al. (“The Kotte Kids case”),71 a
group of minor children filed a fundamental rights application
alleging that the noise from a thermal power plant generator
exceeded national noise standards and would cause hearing loss
and other injuries. Standing was granted for the case to proceed on the basis of a violation of the right to life. Although the
Sri Lankan Constitution does not
expressly provide for the right to
life, it was argued that all other
rights would be meaningless
and futile without its existence,
at least impliedly. The case was
settled, as the petitioners agreed
to accept an ex gratia payment
without prejudice to their civil
rights, so there is no adjudicatory decision.
In Gunarathne v. Homagama Pradeshiya Sabha et
al.,72 in what was the first express
reference to sustainable development by the Supreme Court, it
was noted that: “Publicity, transparency and fairness are essential if the goal of sustainable
development is to be achieved.”
Here, the court refers expressly
to the prime elements of good
governance, intrinsic to the concept of sustainable development.
The court stated that the CEA and
local authorities must notify the neighborhood and hear objections, as well as inform the industrialists and hear their views
in deciding whether to issue an EPL. The Court imported this
requirement in the licensing process even though the law was
silent on the matter. The Court also required that agencies give
reasons for their decisions and must inform the parties of such
reasons, thus introducing facets of natural justice. In Lalanath
de Silva v. The Minister of Forestry and Environment (“The Air
Pollution case”),73 the petitioner averred that the Minister’s failure to enact ambient air quality standards resulted in a violation
of his right to life. The Supreme Court ordered the enactment
of regulations to control air pollution from vehicle emissions in
the city of Colombo. Regulations were enacted pursuant to this
decision, which had the effect of ensuring steps for implementation of the law and compliance with it.74 Leave to proceed with
this case was granted on the basis of a violation of the right to
life, however, the case was decided through an order for making
regulations without dealing with the issue of the right to life.
This case is significant for the role of civil society with regard to

laws and their implementation because the petitioner, although
himself a lawyer, appeared in his capacity as a member of the
citizenry.
The case of Tikiri Banda Bulankulama v. Secretary, Ministry of Industrial Development75 is a significant example of
how consensus reached in New York, Geneva, or The Hague
can touch the lives, livelihoods, and environments of people
in a remote village on a distant island. This case concerned a
joint venture agreement between the Sri Lankan government and
the local subsidiary of a transnational corporation for the mining of phosphate in the North-Central Province. The terms of
the mineral investment agreement
were highly beneficial to the
company and showed little concern for human rights and the
environment; indigenous culture, history, religion and value
systems; and the requisites of
sustainable development as a
whole. It was the subject of a
public interest suit by the local
villagers (including rice and
dairy farmers, owners of coconut land, and the incumbent
of a Buddhist temple) in the
Supreme Court.
The proposed project was
to lead to the displacement of
over 2,600 families, consisting of around 12,000 persons.
The Supreme Court found that
at previous rates of extraction,
there would be enough deposits for perhaps 1,000 years, but
that the proposed agreement
would lead to complete exhaustion
of phosphate in around 30 years. According to Justice A.R.B.
Amerasinghe, fairness to all, including the people of Sri Lanka,
was the basic yardstick in doing justice. The Court held that there
was an imminent infringement of the fundamental rights of the
petitioners, all local residents.76 The particular rights were those
of equality and equal protection of the law under Article 12(1);
freedom to engage in any lawful occupation, trade, business, or
enterprise under Article 14(1)(g); and freedom of movement and
of choosing a residence within Sri Lanka under Article 14(1)(h).
The judge, after referring to the concepts of sustainable development,77 intergenerational equity,78 and human development, as
well as analyzing the agreement with reference to several principles of international environmental law, including Principles
14 and 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principles 1, 2, and
4 of the Rio Declaration, stated as follows:
In my view, the proposed agreement must be considered in the light of the foregoing principles. Admittedly, the principles set out in the Stockholm and Rio
Declarations are not legally binding in the way in
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which an Act of our Parliament would be. It may be
regarded merely as “soft law.” Nevertheless, as a member of the United Nations, they could hardly be ignored
by Sri Lanka. Moreover, they would, in my view, be
binding if they have been either expressly enacted or
become a part of the domestic law by adoption by the
superior courts of record and by the Supreme Court in
particular, in their decisions.79
This pronouncement could have significant ramifications
for a dualist country like Sri Lanka, where international law
norms need to be embodied in enabling legislation to be binding on courts. This judgment extends the incorporation process
to the intermediary of the Superior Courts.80 Deepika Udagama
comments that it is doubtful that a petition could be grounded
directly on international law and that while international human
rights standards have been increasingly used as interpretive aids,
international law will probably still have to be pleaded to expand
the scope of existing domestic legal provisions.81
The court disallowed the project from proceeding unless and
until legal requirements of rational planning including an EIA
was done. It found that the proposed project would harm health,
safety, livelihoods, and cultural heritage, as it even interfered
with the Jaya Ganga, a wonder of the ancient world declared as a
site to be preserved under UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention. This cultural heritage, the court noted, was not renewable,
nor were the historical and archaeological value and the ancient
irrigation tanks that were to be destroyed. Having considered
the question as to whether economic growth is the sole criterion
for measuring human welfare, the court stated that ignorance
on vital facts of historical and cultural significance on the part
of persons in authority can lead to serious blunders in current
decision-making processes that relate to more than rupees and
cents. The judgment, requiring the cancellation of the project
unless proper procedures are followed, draws inspiration from
principles of international environmental law and sustainable
development (in particular the separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the ICJ case, Hungary v. Slovakia82), as well as the
ancient wisdom and local history of conservation, sustainability,
and human rights. The company’s exemption from submitting
its project to an EIA was held to be an imminent violation of
the equal protection clause. Although the constitution basically
provides only for civil and political rights to be justiciable, the
court allowed for a broader interpretation to include social and
economic rights.83 Natural resources of the country were said to
be held in guardianship by all three branches of the government
and the public trust doctrine was recognized. The judge in this
case has been lauded for having taken “the parameters of the
discourse on constitutional protection of human rights to new
heights.”84 Moreover:
While harking back to ancient practices does not generally provide grounds for a legal judgment, in this
instance, it did make a positive contribution by emphasizing the universal and timeless nature of concepts
such as sustainable development, which are at times
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perceived as ‘western’ or alien to non-Occidental
societies.85
Mundy v. Central Environmental Authority and others86
concerned several appeals relating to the building of the Southern Expressway linking Colombo city with the city of Matara on
the Southern coast, an important step in terms of infrastructure
development towards enhancing industry, trade, and investment.
Protracted litigation opposing the project and its different alternative routes involved allegations of potential damage to human
rights including large-scale displacement, and injury to the environment including sensitive ecosystems. The Court of Appeal
had upheld the developmental interest, holding that when balancing the competing interests, the conclusion necessarily has to
be made in favor of the larger interests of the community, which
would benefit immensely from the project. The Court gave highest priority to the public interest in development, then to the
environmental damage to wetland ecosystems, and lastly, to the
human interests of affected persons. Several persons appealed to
the Supreme Court with regard to particular sections of the route
which resulted in the taking of their lands with no arrangements
for compensation. The Supreme Court varied the order of the
CA and ordered compensation under the audi alteram principle
of natural justice and Constitutional Article 12(1) on equality
and equal protection. In an innovative, value-laden, and exemplary expression of equity, equality, and social justice, Justice
Mark Fernando stated:
If it is permissible in the exercise of a judicial discretion to require a humble villager to forego his right to
a fair procedure before he is compelled to sacrifice a
modest plot of land and a little hut because they are
of “extremely negligible” value in relation to a multibillion rupee national project, it is nevertheless not
equitable to disregard totally the infringement of his
rights: the smaller the value of his property the greater
his right to compensation.87
Weerasekera et al. v. Keangnam Enterprises Ltd. 88
involved a mining operation alleged to violate public nuisance
law by local citizens because of the noise level of its operation.
The lower court found that because the mining company had
acquired an EPL, they had no jurisdiction to hear the case. The
Court of Appeal overturned this, holding that acquiring a license
for the operation did not excuse the Keangnam mining company
from public nuisance claims over the way they run their operation. This holding is significant because it limits the ability of
a company to use their Environmental Protection License as a
shield to other legal claims over the impacts of their operation.
Still another significant case, Environmental Foundation
Ltd. v. Urban Development Authority et al., 89 concerned the
proposed leasing out of the Galle Face Green, a popular seaside promenade in Colombo city and a major public utility built
by a British governor in the 19th century. It has always been
a treasured public property for use by one and all, but was by
the terms of the proposed lease to be handed over by the Urban
Development Authority (“UDA”) to a private company to build
a “mega leisure complex.” The Supreme Court, in a fundamental
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rights application, upheld the argument of the petitioner NGO
to preserve the country’s national heritage for use of the public.
Very significantly, the court upheld the petitioner’s argument of
infringement of the right to information by reading the Constitutional Article 14(1), on the freedom of speech and expression,
as encompassing a right to information. This line of argument
was adopted because the Constitution does not expressly include
the right to information. In view of the clandestine nature of the
agreement between the UDA and the private companies, the
Court also held that the petitioner’s rights to equality under Article 12(1) had been infringed.
Environmental Foundation Limited has handled over three
hundred cases dealing with environmental matters and is currently engaged in litigation covering a wide variety of issues.
The Supreme Court has asked the organization to intervene in
a case dealing with the environmental impacts of sand mining.
Other ongoing cases have dealt with air pollution and included
court orders for mandatory vehicle emission testing as well as
a variety of actions against private parties for noise pollution
and other torts.90 Public interest applications filed by the Centre for Environmental Justice—another environmental NGO—
involve irregular and/or unregulated mechanized mining and
transport of sand from sand dunes in a wetland ecosystem in
the North-Western Province, without permits under the relevant
statutes;91 activities threatening the coastal zone and its habitats,
including destruction of mangroves; sand mining; coral extraction; destructive fishing methods; coastal pollution and improper
constructions—all needing urgent coastal pollution control and
management.
These cases are filed against relevant governmental authorities, pleading for writs of mandamus for carrying out of statutory
duties,92 as the government is the guardian of natural resources
on behalf of present and future generations of the people of Sri
Lanka. The most recent case now pending before the Court of
Appeal, and filed by the same NGO, concerns the protection of
a major national park, forming a wetland of international importance under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and alteration
of the boundaries of this park by the governmental authorities—
Centre for Environmental Justice v. Ministry of Agriculture,
Environment, Irrigation and Mahaweli Development et al. 93
This alteration would, it is argued, pose a further threat to the
ecosystem, already endangered by landfills, aquaculture farms,
fisheries, pollution, mining of minerals and the clearing of mangroves. The petition argues that the action of the authorities
is in breach of several international conventions including the
Wetlands, Cultural and Natural Heritage, Biodiversity Conventions and the Bonn Convention on Migratory Species of Wild
Animals, several declarations including the Johannesburg Declaration, and relevant articles of the Sri Lankan Constitution. It
requests writs of certiorari and mandamus.
Three decades of civil unrest in Sri Lanka have undoubtedly slowed the progress of PIL efforts to increase sustainable
development, and have retarded all development in the island. A
number of other states in South Asia have encountered political
turmoil that creates unique obstacles to sustainable development.
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In Sri Lanka, several NGOs demonstrated resilience and resolve
through difficult times and continued to file suits and push sustainable development forward through the court system, which
has by and large been receptive to their efforts. Now with the
end of the civil war and what one hopes will be the dawn of an
era of recovery, reconciliation and resurrection, there is renewed
scope for sustainable development in the context of justice and
peace; equity and solidarity in building the nation of post-conflict Sri Lanka.

Conclusion
In the South Asian region as a whole, public interest litigation has been useful in injecting an informed, participatory,
and transparent approach to the processes of development, and
to governmental and private sector actions involving public
resources. It has provided a voice to persons who would otherwise be unheard. Through PIL, multiple sectors and stakeholders become involved in the development process, as envisaged
in the idea of sustainable development. PIL has brought forth an
element of accountability, and created a space for the portrayal
of a human face in development. The tool of PIL has afforded a
viable mechanism for compliance with sustainable development
norms in a creative, innovative, and imaginative manner, and
also helped to make the development process more holistic. On
the other hand, however, it has also meant that courts become
directly involved in making policy decisions. This in turn has
both positive and negative ramifications, and is by no means
uncontroversial. It could create a system of decision-making
that is, in a sense, ex post facto and decentralized. If not kept
within certain limits, it could divert the development process
away from the policy-planning objectives of the state, leading
to inconsistency and incoherence. One safeguard here is that
most cases revolve around the central issue of the lawfulness of
a decision or action.
PIL could be abused, overused, and misused. There must
therefore be checks, balances, and limitations in order that the
development process is not interfered with unnecessarily. Principles of international law should be selectively adopted and
suitably adapted to domestic contexts. There is a tendency to use
these tools to oppose development projects, particularly because
of opposition in the political arena or other dynamics including religion, culture, or personal reasons. In order to maintain
its credibility, PIL should be steered towards the attainment of
sustainable development rather than the opposition to all development. What is important is to promote development that is
sustainable. In fact, the concept of sustainable development
stands for the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation rather
than conflict and confrontation, making environmental protection an integral component of development. Otherwise, it would
be counterproductive to the whole project of development, and
therefore to all persons, who should be at the center of development, and its true beneficiaries. Sustainable development integrates the right to development, and inter and intra-generational
equity. As stated in Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to
Development, “the right to development is an inalienable human
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right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples
are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic,
social, cultural and political development, in which all human
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”94
The content of much of the jurisprudence tends to concern
the negative aspects of large development projects, such as displacement, and of industrialization, such as pollution. This could
be related to the influence of norms of environmental protection
emerging from international law, and the comparative experience and jurisprudence of the “western” developed world. Environmental legislation in developing countries often emulates
that of developed countries, and is sometimes a virtual reproduction. This is not an ideal practice, as the context of each country is different. On some occasions, explicit reference has been
made to international law. At other times there is no reference
and the reasoning process is independent, but the arguments
and decisions come remarkably close to the law of sustainable
development. What is clear is that the domestic jurisprudence
is influenced by international law, and how this law has taken

shape in the domestic courts of several states in South Asia, as
judiciaries in the region have been influenced by developments
in neighboring states.
Many concerns have been raised about the enforcement of
decisions flowing from PIL, which often lags behind the decisions and orders. In fact, the experience of South Asia has been
that implementation and enforcement have tended to lag behind
the adjudication of cases and making of orders. If enforcement
does not keep pace with the jurisprudence, the whole process
will become futile and counterproductive. Therefore, an effort
must be made to ensure expedient enforcement of orders. Orders
frequently give remedies such as the installation of safeguards
in factories, rather than their closure, and this is in line with the
constructive spirit of sustainable development in its quest for a
balance. Equilibrium, the middle path and mutual accommodation interconnect with strands of the complex web of the South
Asian heritage - in all its diversity and yet the unity of all phenomena, its abject poverty and yet the abundance of its wealth.
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Tension Between Hydroelectric Energy’s
Benefits as a Renewable and its Detrimental
Effects on Endangered Species
by Janet M. Hager*
Renewable energy has come to the forefront politically as
one of the means of achieving energy independence, addressing the problem of climate change, and restoring the economy.1
Although renewable energy sources will be a crucial tool in
the fight against climate change, they often create other environmental problems.2 A recent
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision, National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, exemplifies how
one form of renewable energy,
hydroelectric power, has been
challenged by the environmental
community for its detrimental
effect on endangered fish species.3 The case demonstrates that,
as Congress moves to incentivize
hydroelectric power, there may
be a temptation for Congress to
exploit a judicial loophole to
make the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”) inapplicable to dam
operations.
Hydroelectric power is created by converting the kinetic
energy of flowing water into electricity, typically through the release of river water held in a reservoir behind a dam through a turbine.4 Although hydroelectric
power is the most prevalent form of renewable electricity production in the United States,5 currently only about three percent
of America’s dams have the capability to generate electricity.6
In 2007, hydroelectric power constituted 5.8% of the net generation of electric power,7 while all other forms of renewable
energy combined were only 2.5% of the net generation of electric power.8
Hydroelectric power has garnered increasing political support as the nation’s interest in clean energy has gained momentum. U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) recently announced
that it would dedicate up to thirty-two million dollars in funding
received from the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of
2009 to add new turbines and control technologies to existing
non-federal hydroelectric power projects.9 Additionally, the Act
extends eligibility for the renewable energy production tax credit
by three years.10 Hydroelectric energy is also included as one of
the qualified renewable energy sources that would count toward

an electric utility’s federal renewable electricity credit in federal
global warming legislation currently under consideration.11
Although hydroelectric power has gained support politically, hydroelectric projects raise significant environmental concerns, such as frustration of fish migration and reduced oxygen
levels in downstream water.12
As a recent article in the Los
Angeles Times dramatically
explained: “The emerging
boom in hydroelectric power
pits two competing ecological perils against each other:
widespread fish extinctions and
a warming planet.”13 Fish mortality resulting from passage
through turbines at hydroelectric facilities can be as much
as 30%, although the use of
the best existing turbines can
reduce that to 5-10%.14 Some
of the affected fish, such as
species of salmon and steelhead, are listed on the federal
list of endangered or threatened
species under the ESA.15
The ESA has provided a
mechanism for challenges to hydroelectric power projects in
the courts when an endangered or threatened species is put at
risk by dam development. The seminal opinion by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
demonstrates that the ESA has the power to defeat a major construction project if necessary to save an endangered species.16 In
Tennessee Valley Authority, the Court enjoined the operation of
the Tellico Dam, a project to which Congress had appropriated
over one hundred million dollars, because of the potential risk to
the survival of the endangered snail darter.17 The authority for
such a powerful result comes from the unequivocal language of
section 7 of the ESA, which requires that each federal agency
“insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species . . . .”18
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Similar to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tennessee
Valley Authority, the recent opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit in National Wildlife Federation
v. National Marine Fisheries Service shows the power of the
ESA to affect the development and operation of hydroelectric
facilities. The National Wildlife Federation (“NWF”) claimed
that the National Marine Fisheries Service failed to adequately
prepare a biological opinion (“BiOp”) for the operations of the
Federal Columbia River Power System dams.19 At issue in NWF
were various species of salmon and steelhead in the Columbia
River that must migrate downstream through a series of dams.20
The court determined that the 2004 BiOp issued by the National
Marine Fisheries Service “contained structural flaws that rendered it incompatible with the ESA.”21
One issue in NWF that will continue to be relevant in other
actions against dam projects is whether the Congressional mandate of flood control, irrigation, and power production created
a nondiscretionary duty.22 Nondiscretionary duties of agencies
need not meet the requirements of section 7 of the ESA.23 In
NWF the Ninth Circuit determined that, while the broad Congressional goals were mandatory, Congress did not mandate that
the goals be accomplished in any particular way; thus the agency
actions in implementing the goals were discretionary and subject to requirements of the ESA.24 Thus, Congress could exempt
the actions of an agency engaged in dam operations from the
ESA by specifically dictating by statute the manner in which
the agency is to carry out the construction and operation of the
dam.25
As a result of the recent growing political interest in hydroelectric power, there will likely be a substantial increase in the
nation’s hydroelectric energy capacity.26 Although Congress
could facilitate its goal of increasing hydroelectric power by
exempting the operation of hydroelectric facilities from the
ESA, the better solution would be to mitigate the effects of
hydroelectric facilities on fish populations with advanced technology.27 The DOE’s decision to incorporate the reduction of
environmental impacts into its plan for the modernization of the
nation’s hydropower infrastructure lends hope that the DOE will
make environmental mitigation a priority during the expansion
of hydroelectric projects.28
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Introduction

he French National Assembly adopted the Charter for
the Environment (“Charter”) in 2004 and integrated it
into the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic by the
amendment of March 1, 2005. On June 19, 2008, the French
constitutional council, Conseil constitutionnel, in a landmark
decision on the constitutionality of the statute on Genetically
Modified Organisms (“law on genetically modified organisms”),
reaffirmed the constitutional value of every right and duty
defined in the 2004 Charter for the Environment.1 On October
3, 2008, the Conseil d’Etat (“French Administrative Supreme
Court”), for the first time quashed a government regulation
on the grounds that it did not respect the Charter for the Environment. While constitutional control based on the Charter is
typical, judicial review on the grounds of the Constitution is
exceptional. In fact, the French Administrative Supreme Court
has always been opposed to considering the Constitution, treating it almost as taboo. However, this position is evolving. On
the one hand, the Constitution has changed to incorporate declarations of rights, and on the other the French Administrative
Supreme Court has always been enthusiastic about environmental protection. Therefore, the French Administrative Supreme
Court looked to the terms of the Charter, even though it had been
incorporated into the Constitution. The main problem in the reasoning of the French Administrative Supreme Court, even in
cases involving the issue of environmental protection, is that the
Conseil d’Etat articulated a “classic” judicial review of administrative acts. For instance, the French Administrative Supreme
Court applied judicial review to central and local government
regulations, but never to constitutional control. The 2008 French
Administrative Supreme Court ruling is therefore a major step
towards constitutional control and should be analyzed.
Since it is only recently that the Constitution has developed as a corpus of “higher” norms that consider directly or
indirectly environmental protection,2 it is interesting to look at
how the operation of the French Administrative Supreme Court
has changed and will, for environmental reasons, go against the
taboo of touching the Constitution. In this paper, I will start by
looking at the link between human rights and the environment
before considering the move from “transnational” and “international” rights to domestic ones through “constitutionalisation.”
I will then present the recent evolution of the jurisprudence of
the French Administrative Supreme Court and consider a recent
2008 case.
Fall 2009

a

Human Rights and the Environment,
“transnational” and “international” affair

This section will analyze the relationships between human
rights and the environment. In attempting to classify human
rights,3 first generation rights refer to traditional civil and political liberties of the western liberal democracies. Expressed in
constitutional texts,4 or in separate declarations,5 first generation
rights aim to protect rights such as the freedom of speech, of
religion, and of expression. Those rights presuppose a duty of
non-interference on the part of governments towards the individuals. Second generation rights have generally been considered as
“collective rights,” in that they influence the whole society. Second generation rights require affirmative government action for
their realization: the right to education, to work, to social security, to food, to self-determination, and to an adequate standard
of living.6 Third generation or “solidarity” rights are the most
recently recognized category of human rights and include the
right to health, to peace, and to a healthy environment, among
others. The right to health, which also falls under the right to
an adequate standard of living, is now linked with maintaining
environmental quality.
Until recently, the instruments of international human rights
have typically accorded minimal attention to environmental
issues. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights7 mentions
in article 25 (1), “the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family,” while
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mentions “public health.”8 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights9 recognizes in article 12,
“[t]he improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene” in relation to “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.” In fact, the three primary general international human
rights instruments barely mention the relationship between environment and human rights.
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration acted as one of the first
major international law instruments to link human rights and
environmental protection objectives. Specifically, Principle 1
states that:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality
and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and
* Lecturer in Public and Comparative Law, School of Law, University of Essex,
Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SW, UK. dmarrani@essex.ac.uk.
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he bears solemn responsibility to protect and improve
the environment, for present and future generations.10
This proto-declaration of environmental rights stated every
idea that is now topical in environmental law. But the Declaration does not stop there. In fact, Principle 15 refers more specifically to environmental protection, while indirectly referring to
the precautionary principle:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by states according
to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.11
The 1994 Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment expressly links human
rights and the environment,
particularly Principle 7, which
states that “[a]ll persons have
the right to the highest attainable standard of health free from
environmental harm.”12 Furthermore, Article 12 of the International Union for Conservation
of Nature Draft International
Covenant on Environment and
Development also articulates
states’ responsibility as facilitating agents by asserting that, “[p]
arties undertake to achieve progressively the full realization of
the right of everyone to an environment and a level of development adequate for their health,
well-being and dignity.”13
The third generation rights, as exemplified by the Charter
for the Environment, are those rights primarily connected to the
environment. Naturally, the first two categories of rights sometimes ensure the protection of third generation rights, as highlighted by state practice. In Europe, the precautionary principle
could be added to this trend, as part of the wave of new developments to protect the environment.14 Article 6 of the Treaty on
European Union expresses the necessity for the EU to respect the
rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECPHRFF” or
“Convention”).15 Within the rights protected by the Convention,
the European Court for Human Rights (“ECHR”) has considered
environmental protection, as well as threats that may impact
people’s right to life (Guerra & Others v. Italy),16 property
(Chasagnou & Others v. France),17 privacy (Guerra & Others
v. Italy),18 access to court (Athannossoplan & Others v. Switzerland),19 and freedom of expression (Guerra & Others v. Italy).20
The concerns for health and the welfare of the environment are
human rights that require protection and evaluation.
Even though there is no direct reference to the environment in the ECPHRFF, the Court aims to protect human rights
and fundamental liberties based on recent developments. The

Convention became a charter of rights in Europe, with human
dignity at its heart.21 In 1976 the commission in X v. Iceland22
held that Article 8 of the Convention did not extend so far as
to protect an individual’s relationship with his immediate surroundings so long as the relationship did not involve human
relationships. The Court of Strasbourg reminded us that no general right to protection of the environment exists in the Convention (Kyrtatos v. Greece).23 However, in today’s society there
has always been the necessity for a certain level of protection
(Fredin v. Sweden [No. 1]).24 The Court of Strasbourg has often
considered questions pertaining to environmental protection and
highlighted their importance (as seen in Taşkın and Others v.
Turkey;25 Moreno Gómez v. Spain;26 Fadeïeva v. Russia;27 Giacomelli v. Italy).28 Protection of the environment is therefore:
. . . a value, the defence
of which arouses a constant and steady interest
of public opinion, and as a
consequence public authorities. Economic imperatives
and even some fundamental rights, like the right of
property, should not been
granted primacy ahead
of considerations relating
to environmental protection, in particular when the
state has legislated on the
subject.29
In the light of the case law
of the Court of Strasbourg, anything may be used in order to counter solutions that may not
bring about the right objectives (Chassagnou and Others v.
France).30 In fact, in areas like environmental protection, the
Court respects the assessment of the national legislator, except
when the result is manifestly unreasonable (Immobiliare Saffi v.
Italy).31 The confrontation between state law and the law of the
acephalous society32 shows how under the guidance of human
rights, the levels of law have evolved over time.

Until recently,
the instruments of
international human
rights have typically
accorded minimal
attention to environmental
issues.

53

“Consitutionalisation” of Environmental
Human Rights as a Domestic Solution
In this respect, the case of the Constitution of the French
Fifth Republic is extremely interesting. As mentioned, the
French National Assembly incorporated the 2004 Charter for the
Environment into the declaration of rights. The Charter can be
classified as a third generation declaration of rights. The National
Assembly’s procedure included amending the first line of the
Preamble of the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic.33 The
Preamble of the Constitution refers to the first and second generation of rights, through the Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizens of 1789 (the first generation of rights) and the Preamble
of the Constitution of the French Fourth Republic (the second
generation of rights). In 2005, the National Assembly updated
the Constitution and inserted a reference to the third generation
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

of rights by applying the Charter. In the comment made during the preparation of the Charter, legislators made clear that
third generation rights were a continuation of the earlier generations.34 The first and second generations of rights created a veil
of protection for the environment prior to the enshrinement of
third generation rights into law.35 Thus, the constitutionalisation
of rights has become an important process.
The “constitutionalisation” of environmental protection
through the “constitutionalisation” of human rights saw an exponential increase since the 1972 Stockholm conference,36 and
environmental protection is now a component of many constitutions in Western Europe.37 Then again, the environment itself is
characterized by an absence of limit and it seems logical to think
about international rules rather than a patchwork of domestic
solutions. However, “constitutionalisation” could be perceived
as a more efficient way of protecting the environment. “Constitutionalisation” replaces international law in Rodolfo Sacco’s terms the law of the “grande Société acephalique,”38 and
is supposed to make the protection effective. After 1972, more
nation-states “constitutionalised” environmental law, initially by
enshrining it more or less explicitly within their constitutions.39
This enshrinement came via second generation rights such as
the right to a healthy environment, which derived more or less
from the right to health and the duty of the state, and sometimes
the citizen, to protect the environment, and natural resources.40
The right to a healthy environment, considered here as a general human right of environmental protection, established the
idea of environmental protection based on human rights that
evolve around the protection of the human both now and in the
future. The Charter, as a sort of pure third generation declaration, went further in defining the link between human rights and
the environment.
In 1958, the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic created the French Constitutional Council to control the constitutionality of statutes.41 As a consequence, France assumed that
the French Administrative Supreme Court would not operate
any kind of constitutional control. In this respect, the French
Administrative Supreme Court considers a statute as a specific
set of norms operating as a “screen” between the Constitution
and the administrative acts of central and local governments that
the administrative courts examine. Therefore, the administrative
judges reviewing an administrative act’s conformity to a statute that manifestly did not conform to the Constitution would
always refuse to declare the administrative act void, because the
judges would not want to consider the non-constitutionality of
the statute. One could argue that because of the way that constitutional control and judicial review operate under the imperium
of the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic, declarations
of rights are the basis for constitutional control rather than for
judicial review. It is important to note that the Constitution of
the French Fifth Republic never intended to incorporate any declarations of rights. The 1958 Constitution conformed to French
tradition by creating a formal constitution composed only of an
institutional architecture and very few substantive rules. Due
to the rulings of the constitutional council, the legislators built
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a formal constitution around the core of the formal one. Thus,
this movement to enlarge the notion of the Constitution included
the 2004 Charter for the Environment. As such, this movement
acknowledged certain changes. Specifically, the movement
acknowledged that human rights are recognized as part of the
most authoritative norm on French territory. At the same time,
however, the rationale behind the 1958 novelty of having one
institution for constitutional justice and one for administrative
justice, made it fairly certain that the Charter, like the other declarations of rights, would remain a text presenting rights to be
protected by the French Constitutional Council rather than the
French Administrative Supreme Court. Thus, only under the
specific procedure of constitutional control would the extended
Constitution be used to protect human rights. The use of the text
of the Charter by French courts and particularly by administrative justice shocked many observers.

The 2004 Charter for the Environment and
the French Conseil d’Etat
The issue becomes more complex when considering how
the French Administrative Supreme Court applies the Charter.
Major developments highlight the environmental protection at
different levels, from the “simple” action of declaring rights,
to more complex and more operational system of protection of
these declared rights.
The French Administrative Supreme Court was not a novice
in terms of environmental protection. It has shown an openness
towards environmental protection in various judgements, such as
quashing the authorization for a high-voltage power line to cross
the Verdon park in the south of France;42 stopping the construction of a dam because it would endanger species;43 ordering the
dismantling of a nuclear power plant by Electricité de France
because of a failure to respect the public right to information;44
or in the matter of exporting the aircraft carrier Clemenceau to
be dismantled in India because of risks to environmental protection and public health.45 The work of the French Administrative Supreme Court on environmental protection seems to have
been steady. More specifically, the precautionary principle in its
legislative version has long been a reference point for operating judicial review. Since the transposition of the principle into
French law, the administrative courts have enforced the respect
of the precautionary principle in central and local governments’
decision-making.46 The precautionary principle acted as an
embryo of environmental protection, until the administrative
courts extended the scope of control to general environmental
protection and public health. Following the “constitutionalisation” of the Charter, and particularly the precautionary principle,
an administrative court may now analyze the nature of the uncertainty of risk to health as a fundamental ground for the court’s
ruling. The recognition of environmental protection as a human
right, therefore, developed and went even further than expected.
The Charter became a usable document so that the “layman-citizen” reified the declaration of rights and used it as an instrument
of protection.

54

During the first years of the Charter (2005-06), the lower
courts’ rulings were clearly going in that direction. However, at
that time, a discrepancy existed in the appreciation of the Charter’s value within the administrative courts and between local
lower courts and the French Administrative Supreme Court. On
the one hand, local administrative courts ruled using the basis
of the Charter, establishing it as containing fundamental freedoms considered to be of constitutional value.47 On the other,
the French Administrative Supreme Court’s reticence to change
showed in the way it applied the Charter, as demonstrated in two
2006 rulings.48 That said, the French Administrative Supreme
Court merely respected its function of control of legality and
avoided operating a control of constitutionality. In December
2006, the Conseil d’Etat rejected the Charter’s legal authority
because it believed it would be too vague to solely mention the
breach of the Charter.49
In 2007 and 2008, a series of cases referred to the Charter
in various ways. In each case, the parties, mainly environmental
associations, acted consistently in considering the Charter as one
of their legal bases for seeking judicial review. In January, the
French Administrative Supreme Court considered the Charter
together with the Kyoto Protocol and the political context of an
area in northeast of France as the legal basis for its decision. In
this case, however, the French Administrative Supreme Court
rejected the review of a decision to build the A 52 motorway.50
In February, the French Administrative Supreme Court referred
to the Charter, and particularly to the precautionary principle, to
reject the review of a regulation concerning the closing dates of
hunting on the application of four environmental associations.51
In May and June, the French Administrative Supreme Court
used similar reasoning to that used in the December 2006 case,
considering that it was too vague to solely mention the breach
of the Charter.52 In three cases from June and October 2007, the
French Administrative Supreme Court cited the Charter as a legal
basis (the highest one), but did not consider it in its ruling.53 In
October 2007, in the case M. F, M. E, M. C, M et Mme B., M. et
Mme A, the French Administrative Supreme Court developed an
interesting point of view.54 The French Administrative Supreme
Court argued that when the French Parliament acted to apply
the principles enshrined in article 7 of the Charter (the right to
information and public participation), the legality of regulations
would be considered in light of the statutes.55 The judges went
on to explain that statutes enacted prior to the Charter should
respect the Charter.56 Consequently, the French Administrative
Supreme Court followed tradition and the judges ruled on the
basis of the French Environmental Code and not on the Charter.57 This decision marked progress on the path towards the
2008 landmark case analyzed in the next section. However, the
French Administrative Supreme Court did not confirm this position and, in two separate cases on the same day, acted according
to its previous position of December 2006,58 as it did in cases in
December 2007 and August 2008.59 Though the Charter became
valued as a legal instrument and is now taken into account by
claimants in the administrative courts, the way the courts have
considered and used this instrument remains variable. This is
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perhaps because of the lack of clarity in the preparation of the
Charter in defining the real aims of the text. The administrative
judges have mentioned in many instances, such as in the December 2006 case, that the use of the Charter as a legal basis is not
legitimate because of its lack of precision. In fact, the changes
affecting the administrative judges may be seen as an evolution
and passage from one phase of modernity to another from “the
land does not lie” to “human rights do not lie.”

A radical change? The 2008 Case
In the 2008 case, Commune d’Annecy, the French Administrative Supreme Court went a step further. The Commissaire
du gouvernement Aguila, charged with presenting a final report
to the French Administrative Supreme Court before the decision of its plenary assembly, concluded in eight points. These
eight points will be examined here as an introduction to this section. First, Aguila considered that the context needed clarification, for the following three reasons: the case law of the French
Administrative Supreme Court in the matter was not yet clearly
fixed; the work of the committee reviewing the fundamental
rights that contributed to a general reflection on the necessity for
clarifying the value of the principles enshrined in the Preamble
of the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic (together with
the principles included in the Charter);61 and the constitutional
amendment of July 2008, introducing the possibility to bring
a statute before the constitutional council after its promulgation. In the second point the Commissaire noted that the Charter served as an autonomous constitutional text, unique in the
world although the unfinished preparatory work created uncertainty making judicial use difficult.62 The third point served as
a reminder that administrative justice has always been involved
in the development and the application of environmental law.63
The fourth and fifth points concern the case itself, and will be
developed later. The Commissaire created point six in the form
of a question: is the Charter for the Environment a text that may
be invoked before an administrative court directly by the parties
concerned and does it have “full” constitutional value?64 Point
seven concerned the increase of parliamentary power over environmental issues as a result of the charter.65 On this last point,
Aguila concluded by listing the expected results of the case
thereby quashing the government regulation on the grounds of
a violation of the charter; reinforcing the role of Parliament in
the area of environmental law, as sought by the authors of the
Charter; and renewing the traditional mission of the administrative judge to look after the respect of the common good, and the
fundamental rights of citizens.66 The report of Aguila reflected
the materialization of deep change.
The 2008 case relates to the specific protection of large
mountain lakes (larger than 1,000 hectares).67 These lakes are
currently protected by both the “mountain law”68 and the “littoral law.”69 Some towns and cities are very happy about this
double protection, while other towns and cities tried to relax the
laws to allow for new developments (principally real estate projects). The case concerns article 187 of the statute of February
23, 2005.70 This covers the development of rural territories,71
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which introduced a new paragraph to article L. 145-1 of the
town planning code:
However, concerning mountain lakes having an area
greater than 1,000 hectares, a government regulation
after advice of the Conseil d’Etat delimits the sector
within which the measures specific to littoral (as stated
in Chapter VI of the present title) apply solely, having taken into account the topology of the area and the
advice of waterside municipalities. This sector cannot
reduce the littoral strip of 100 metres defined by article
L. 164-4, part III. In other areas of waterside municipalities, and located within the areas of mountains
mentioned in the first paragraph, the dispositions specific to mountains of the present chapter apply solely.72
The Commune d’Annecy contested the government regulation of August 1, 2006,73 adopted as part of the application of the
new article of the town planning code, to complete and introduce
new measures into the “regulations” section of the code.74 In the
local authority’s opinion, the new measures would reduce the
protection of mountain lakes, by reducing the perimeter of application of the littoral law around
mountain lakes. According to
the government regulation, the
perimeter should be delimited
by local authorities’ decisions,
made on a case-by-case basis
for each lake. The 2006 decree
introduced a series of regulations, codified under articles R.
145-11 to -14, which outline a
detailed decision-making process. Article R. 145-11 stated
that either the state or the waterside municipalities (town or
city) had the authority to delimit
the perimeter around mountain
lakes of more than a 1,000 hectares. Article R. 145-12 stated in section I that when the responsibility for delimiting the perimeter falls to the state, then the
prefect (representing the state in the département75) should forward a file to the waterside municipalities comprising: a) a map
of the perimeter; and b) a note presenting the rationale behind
the limits of the perimeter (considering places, built or unbuilt;
visibility from the lake; waterside preservation of economic
and ecologic equilibrium; and sites and landscape quality). The
municipalities had two months from the transmission of the file
to the local mayors to decide on the project before their approval
was assumed. Section II stated that when the municipalities
were responsible for the process, they should send a similar file
to the prefect with each administrative decision (i.e. namely a
déliberation from each local council). Article R. 145-13 stated
that the file had to be sent with the advice or proposal from each
municipality to be submitted to a public inquiry by the prefect
(as stated by articles R. 123-7 to -23 of the Environmental code).
The prefect had to communicate the file and the results of the

inquiry to the government minister in charge of town planning.
Finally, article R. 145‑14 stated that the central government had
to approve the perimeter by decree upon receiving advice of the
French Administrative Supreme Court, which the Journal Officiel de la République Française published.76
The Commune d’Annecy criticized the government regulation specifically because it would breach the right to information
and participation of the public in the decision making process
which would impact the environment. The government regulation did not allow for public consultation before the decisions
required by the public inquiry of article R. 145-13 and -14 and
therefore violated article 7 of the Charter. Aguila’s sixth point
concerned this issue: can the Charter for the Environment be
invoked before an administrative court directly by the parties
concerned? Or in other words, can human rights influence the
way administrative courts operate?
The Constitution of the French Fifth Republic introduced
a mini revolution in 1958. The French Parliament is not free
to enact everything it desires but can only act on the matters
listed, which became the “domain of statute law,” as stipulated
in article 34 of the Constitution.
The responsibility of the 2005
constitutional amendment that
constitutionalised the Charter
for the Environment and also
added to article 34’s list that the
expression of the fundamental
principles on the preservation
of the environment fell to Parliament. In consequence, only
a statute could be adopted to
determine those principles, not
a regulation.77 In the 2008 case,
the administrative judges of the
French Administrative Supreme
Court considered that the scope
of action of the French parliament
had been altered by the 2005 amendment. Furthermore, the
judges declared in article 7 of the Charter that, “[e]veryone has
a right, within the conditions and limits of Law, to access information relating to the environment in the possession of public
authorities and to participate in the public decision making process which have an incidence on the environment.”78 The collection of rights and duties defined in the Charter (indeed, all
rights and duties that proceed from the Preamble of the 1958
Constitution), therefore had constitutional value.79 These rights
and duties are imposed on public powers and administrative
authorities in their respective domains of responsibility.
In addition, the French Administrative Supreme Court considered that under the constitutional amendment of March 1,
2005, the French Parliament had sole legislative competence for
fixing conditions and limiting the exercise of the right to information relative to the environment. This competence included
the right to access all information held by public authorities
and to participate in the elaboration of public decisions that

For some, and
France in particular,
environmental protection
is best accomplished
by declaring it a
constitutionally protected
human right
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may have an effect on the environment. As a consequence, the
government had no general competence in this area, although
it could exceptionally make complementary legislation. Therefore, since 2005, a regulation could be taken as a complement to
a statute, within the scope of article 7 of the Charter, posterior
or anterior to 2005, so long as the regulation conformed with the
substantive rights included in the Charter.
The French Administrative Supreme Court went on to comment on the importance of article L. 110-1 of the Environmental
code. The French Administrative Supreme Court decided that
the article should proclaim principles and not determine the conditions and limits required by article 7 of the Charter. Furthermore, as explained above, according to article L. 145-1 of the
town planning code, which protects mountain lakes of an area
greater than 1,000 hectares, a decree following the advice of the
French Administrative Supreme Court should not determine the
conditions and limits of the right to information and participation of the public or competence of the French parliament. Since
no statute has been enacted to determine these conditions or limits, the French Administrative Supreme Court properly used the
2004 Charter as a reference. In consequence, the 2006 governmental regulation became illegal because it fixed measures that
were within the scope of article 7 of the 2004 Charter for the
Environment. This is a great evolution for many reasons, but
especially because human rights and environmental considerations finally came together in the same legal culture.

Conclusion
This paper described the links between human rights and
environmental protection, and the modification in the operation
of French administrative courts under the pressure of the constitutionalisation of environmental human rights. The paper noted
the evolution from the adoption of the Charter for the Environment and its incorporation into the (material) Constitution of
the French Fifth Republic. The Charter represents a domestic
development in terms of human rights, as it expresses the third
generation of human rights. The weight and pressure of environmental issues forced the French Administrative Supreme Court
to modify its way of operating. This is a profound modification,
as the French Administrative Supreme Court is not separated
from the administration of the Republic. Indeed, the French
Administrative Supreme Court is not only the highest administrative court; it is also a government advisor and the organ in
charge of preparing the bills and regulations for both the French
parliament and the government. We now see the increased consideration for human rights and their dissemination in the legal
culture to such an extent that we may have entered a new spatiotemporal dimension. Mankind fears the reality of its mortality,
and has realized that its area of “play” must be protected. For
some, and France in particular, environmental protection is best
accomplished by declaring it a constitutionally protected human
right. The Charter is aligned with this new trend. The evolution
of the jurisprudence of the highest French administrative court is
a witness of the changes as is illustrated in the recent case law of
the French Administrative Supreme Court.
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Third Party Petitions as a Means of
Protecting Voluntarily Isolated
Indigenous Peoples
by Nickolas M. Boecher*

T

here are more than one hundred isolated indigenous
groups worldwide with more than half living in Peru
and Brazil.1 Loggers, colonists, and oil companies are
encroaching on the lands of these groups, which are at an additional risk of extinction from diseases to which they have no
immunity.2 A procedural element of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights allowing the entry of petitions by third
parties may provide an important means to ensure the future protection of these groups, their culture, and the forests they inhabit.
Oil and gas development in the western Amazon may soon
increase rapidly.3 These blocks overlap some of the most biologically diverse regions on the planet that are still inhabited by
native indigenous groups, many of which are voluntarily isolated.4 The combination of oil, primary rain forest, and isolated
indigenous groups is a recipe for disaster.
A line of decisions from the Inter-American human rights
system recognizing indigenous property rights offers hope.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”) is a human rights body that exercises jurisdiction to hear
contentious human rights cases over all Member States of the
Organization of the American States (“OAS”).5 The Commission can submit a case to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (“Court”) if the offending state has ratified the American Convention on Human Rights and has explicitly accepted
the Court’s jurisdiction.6 The States encompassing the western
Amazon - Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia - have
all done so.7
In The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua,8 the Court ordered Nicaragua to grant property rights to
the Awas Tingi people who faced threats of logging on their
ancestral lands.9 This landmark case recognized the rights of
indigenous groups to the land that they inhabit based on their
need to sustain themselves and their culture.10 With this precedent, the Court has simultaneously permitted other indigenous
groups to establish their rights to property, and presented a
potential solution to the problem of environmental degradation
in the Amazon.
Indigenous cultures have lived with the Amazon forest for
millennia, and its composition is a result of their active management.11 The UN has recognized the importance of indigenous
culture and its ability to contribute to sustainable development.12
Since Awas Tingni, other contacted indigenous groups have
succeeded in asserting indigenous property rights before the
Court.13 Studies have demonstrated that contacted tribes rapidly
acquire modern technologies and after a single generation can
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drastically move away from the lifestyles that maintained their
population in closer balance with the surrounding environment.14
The Commission permits third parties to submit petitions
on behalf of an injured party if the actual injured party is unable
to submit a petition for itself.15 Concerned parties have submitted petitions in favor of isolated groups and have successfully
elicited precautionary measures from the Commission in their
favor.16 This procedural mechanism provides a means to simultaneously protect indigenous groups, their culture, and the forests they inhabit.
There are also challenges to the establishment of indigenous
property rights for isolated groups, many associated with effective representation. First, it may be difficult to determine the true
interests of isolated groups. Second, self-interested parties could
enter a petition in the name of an isolated group to advance their
own interests. Similarly, there is a risk that third party petitioners will not be zealous advocates. Finally, there are often severe
difficulties in gathering evidence documenting human rights
abuses of silent victims in remote regions.
Further, Inter-American Court precedent, while promising, also poses problems. The Court has limited indigenous
land rights to the traditional use of the territory, therefore, state
parties can still grant concessions for the extraction of natural
resources after consultation with the affected group.17 Additionally, the Court has permitted state parties to make the ultimate
determination of which lands are returned to indigenous groups
after consultation with them.18 These rulings are incompatible
with the nature of isolated groups, which face extinction on contact with foreign diseases, are not available for consultation, and
live an itinerant lifestyle irrespective of established boundaries.
A possible solution includes referencing neighboring contacted groups as a proxy for the interests of uncontacted groups,
as well as for a source of information about where traditional
territories lie. Additionally, natural boundaries such as rivers
or settlements of contacted groups can assist in delimiting land
rights. If similar solutions are not implemented soon, it could be
to the detriment of the rights of isolated groups, their culture, and
the forests they inhabit. Any future Court decision, therefore,
must be tailored to the groups’ unique and compelling situation.
Endnotes: Third Party Petitions as a Means of Protecting Voluntarily
Isolated Indigenous Peoples continued on page 89
*Nickolas M. Boecher is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University
Washington College of Law.
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Sustainability and the Courts:
A Snapshot of Canada in 2009
by Katia Opalka and Joanna Myszka*

C

Introduction

anada is a country with a small population, a large
resource base, and only one big neighbor.   Canada’s
influence in the post-World War II period owed a lot
to the role of External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson, who
found a peaceful resolution to the Suez Canal Crisis.1  The future
Prime Minister helped shape the world’s image of Canada as a
big, green place populated by reasonable, peace-loving people.
Likewise, the desire of Canada’s governments and its people to
solve problems amicably has limited the role of the courts in
advancing sustainable development in Canada.  While the government continues to view litigation as “un-Canadian,” citizens
and environmental groups are using litigation as a means to
protect the environment. Meanwhile, Canada’s green brand has
lost value, mainly because the government has shied away from
environmental regulation and enforcement.

Use of the Courts by the Government
We should begin by saying that sustainable development—
that is, development that meets the needs of current generations
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their needs—is achieved through standard-setting and planning,
not litigation. In other words, judicial action can enforce compliance with plans (like land use plans) and standards (like building
codes), but it cannot fill the void when plans and standards are
missing.

Land Use Planning
After Canada became the first industrialized country to
ratify the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity in
1992,2 it developed, but ultimately failed to put into practice, an
ecological land use planning framework3 that would provide a
degree of certainty to natural resource industries (for example,
mining, oil and gas, and forestry). The framework was intended
to help establish where development would be prohibited and
where it might be allowed, subject to intense coordination across
industry sectors. For example, such coordination could minimize the overall impacts associated with expansion of the road
network into wild areas.4
The reason for Canada’s relative failure to plan resource
development in a sustainable fashion lies in the constitutional
division of legislative powers between the provinces and the
federal government.5 The provinces own most of the land in
Canada.6 In that respect, the provinces still resemble the individual colonies that banded together to form a compact in 1867.7
The provinces also have exclusive legislative authority, subject
to rules of federal paramountcy, to legislate regarding natural
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resource development on these “provincial Crown lands.”8 In
principle, regardless of how poorly a province performs in conserving biodiversity on its land base, the federal government
does not step in.

Treaties
In Canada, as in the United States, the federal government represents the country when it comes to reporting on the
implementation of international treaties.9 Because of their wide
ranging legislative jurisdiction under the Constitution, the provinces play a key role in treaty implementation. Thus, in regard
to the Biodiversity Convention, for example, while the federal
government must report to the international community regarding Canada’s progress on implementation, there is little the federal government can do to force the provinces to achieve such
implementation. Similarly, the federal government cannot force
the provinces to implement the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (“NAAEC”),10 under which each
of Canada, the United States, and Mexico commit to effectively
enforce their environmental laws. Only Alberta, Manitoba, and
Quebec have ratified the NAAEC, and therefore, Canada is only
accountable for those three provinces as regards enforcement of
provincial environmental laws in Canada.11
For all rules, there are exceptions, and the Migratory Birds
Convention12 signed with the United States in 1916 is the exception here. Great Britain entered into the Convention on behalf of
Canada, and therefore, because of a rule in the Canadian Constitution, the federal government has sole authority to implement
that treaty.13 Because birds are everywhere, the federal government has very broad power to use the courts to enforce migratory bird protection legislation on provincial Crown land (and
by extension regulate natural resource extractive industries that
operate there) but has hesitated to do so.
R. v. Hydro-Québec
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) in
R. v. Hydro-Québec14 is a leading SCC ruling on the federal
authority to legislate on environmental matters, but the decision
*Katia Opalka is a graduate of McGill University in Montreal (History `92,
Common Law and Civil Law `97) and a member of the Quebec Bar. Katia spent
six years investigating environmental law enforcement at the NAFTA environmental commission (www.cec.org/citizen) before returning to private practice in
2008. As head of the Blakes LLP environmental group in Montreal, she counsels
clients in all areas of environmental law and policy. Joanna Myszka obtained a
B.A. in Political Science from McGill University (2005) as well as a Common
Law and Civil Law degree from McGill University (2009). Joanna is currently
working as an articling student at Blakes, where she is gaining experience in
many different areas of law, including environmental law and policy. Prior to
her legal career, Joanna worked in the IT department of a major aerospace
company in Québec, on a part-time basis.
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is controversial. In Hydro-Québec, the SCC upheld the toxics
provisions of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1988
on the basis that the provisions constituted a valid exercise of
the federal government’s constitutional authority to legislate
criminal law.15 That decision, though a victory for the federal
government, also seemed to tie its hands. Because the criminal law power is the power to create prohibitions and impose
sanctions, not the power to create elaborate regulatory schemes,
some commentators argue that the SCC should have upheld the
legislation as a valid exercise of the federal government’s constitutional power to make laws for the “peace, order and good
government” of Canada (the “POGG Power”).16 Had the legislation been upheld under the POGG Power, the federal government would not have been left feeling hampered in its ability
to adopt federal environmental regulations, though here again,
views differ.17

The Common Law

most of the senior personnel at Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, and all provincial environmental departments
retired or preparing to retire, many posts have been eliminated
or left vacant.23 Because prosecution sometimes results in constitutional challenges to the underlying legislation24 and crossdemands against the Government, private firms must be hired
and costs can quickly spiral out of control.25 Those costs are
absorbed by departments with environmental protection responsibilities. Those departments normally choose to use their scant
resources to focus on programs that are assured to deliver some
benefits for the environment, rather than take a risk with protracted litigation.26 However, Canada does have one notable
prosecution success story. In 1993, Tioxide Canada Inc. was
fined four million Canadian dollars for consistently failing to
heed Government demands that it install a system to treat its
toxic effluent before discharging it into the Saint Lawrence
River.27

Use of the Courts by Citizens and
Environmental Groups

There is no common law requirement that governments
enforce the law—environmental or otherwise.18 There is only
potential civil liability if the government adopts an enforcement policy and then acts contrary to that policy, causing
harm.19 Enforcement policies for federal environmental laws
in Canada are fraught with provisions that make prosecution
highly unlikely. The policies
identify enforcement responses
to instances of suspected noncompliance, reserving prosecution for cases where the intent
to commit the offense can be
established, and where harm to
the environment is significant.20
Because most violations of environmental laws are unintended,
and because most violations do
not have major environmental
impacts (though thousands of
little violations by hapless violators probably do), prosecution
normally does not occur.

As explained above, governments in Canada have generally
not relied on the courts to achieve sustainable development. This
is in part owed to a failure to adopt a planning framework and
regulations that courts would
help enforce compliance with.
That said, citizens and environmental groups have turned to the
courts with some success, using
the very limited regulatory tools
at their disposal. These citizens
and environmental groups have
succeeded when they have used
the publicity that comes with litigation as a high profile means
of forcing the government’s
hand. Litigants have been less
successful in their attempts to
get around carefully worded
provisions in environmental
laws that essentially allow the government to do nothing. Examples are provided below.

The Department of Justice

 Private Prosecutions (Fisheries Act)

While a department such as Environment Canada may
recommend prosecution in certain cases, the decision to press
charges is made by the Attorney General (the Department of
Justice).21 That department has its own rules for deciding which
cases will go forward.

Under the federal Fisheries Act, it is an offense to disturb
or destroy fish habitat and to discharge deleterious substances
into waters frequented by fish.28 Individuals can bring charges
against violators, though the provincial or federal attorneys
general can stay those charges or take over the prosecution.29
Private prosecutions are often stayed. When they have not been
stayed, however, private prosecutions have led to high profile
guilty verdicts, notably against municipalities.30 Environmental
scientists who were laid off by governments have helped environmental groups, such as the Environmental Bureau of Investigation, gather evidence of Fisheries Act violations. EcoJustice,
a non-governmental organization, has provided legal representation for environmental groups seeking judicial redress for

Enforcement policies for
federal environmental
laws in Canada are
fraught with provisions
that make prosecution
highly unlikely

Budgets and Politics
Finally, budgetary and political concerns affect the Government’s use of the courts to enforce environmental legislation. Politicians decide whether to allocate human and financial
resources to environmental law enforcement. In Canada, environmental budgets have been cut in successive rounds of program review every couple of years since the early 1990s.22 With
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environmental wrongs.31 These groups document government
and industry failures regarding compliance with the Fisheries
Act by tracking municipal effluent quality across the country,32
discharges from pulp and paper mills, etc. The groups also
publish publicly-available guides on how to launch a private
prosecution.33

Civil Suits
Two interesting decisions of the SCC involving civil suits
on environmental matters are summarized below.34 Here, we
will only mention a civil suit provision in a Canadian environmental statute.
Under the NAAEC, Canada committed to provide environmental remedies to its citizens.35 The Canadian Environmental
Protection Act, 1999 (“CEPA”) creates an “environmental protection action,” a civil suit that can be launched by adult residents of Canada against a party alleged to have committed an
offense under CEPA.36 Provided that the alleged harm to the
environment is significant, the plaintiff may apply for various
sorts of injunctive relief, but not damages.37 Before taking such
an action, the plaintiff must have first requested that Environment Canada investigate the matter, and then must have convinced a judge that Environment Canada’s response was either
too slow or unreasonable.38 To
our knowledge, no environmental protection actions have been
brought since the act came into
force.

Judicial Review

Supreme Court Decisions
Summarized below are leading SCC decisions, rendered in
the last decade, on matters related to sustainable development.

The Precautionary Principle—Spraytech
In Spraytech v. Hudson,46 the SCC decided the constitutionality of a by-law adopted by the Town of Hudson, Québec,
banning the use of cosmetic pesticides. Charged with using pesticides in violation of the bylaw, Spraytech moved to have
the Superior Court of Québec
declare the by-law inoperative and ultra vires the town’s
authority because it conflicted
with the provincial Pesticides
Act.47 The Superior Court held,
and the Québec Court of Appeal
confirmed, that Hudson had the
power to enact the by-law.48
The SCC upheld the by-law
because it did not impose a total
ban on the use of pesticides.49
The by-law only prohibited the
use of pesticides in non-essential cases, such as for “purely
aesthetic pursuits.”50
The SCC’s decision in Spraytech appears to be informed by a broad vision of environmental
law and the role of government in promoting the general welfare. For example, Justice L’Heureux Dubé began her opinion
by stating that the context of the case includes “the realization
that our common future, that of every Canadian community,
depends on a healthy environment.”51 The Court deferred to the
authority of elected municipal bodies, holding that courts should
not dictate to municipalities what is best for their constituents.52
The Court also emphasized that the purpose of the by-law was in
line with the precautionary principle recognized in international
law, namely, that sustainable development policies “anticipate,
prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation.”53

[C]itizens and
environmental groups
have succeeded when they
have used the publicity
that comes with litigation
as a high profile means of
forcing the government’s
hand

Applications for judicial
review are favored by environmental groups in Canada as a
means of forcing the government to implement conservation
statutes such as environmental
assessment or endangered species legislation. Such litigation
generally turns on an analysis
of the administrative authority’s
discretion—in other words, does
the act say “the Minister shall” or
“the Minister may”? The SCC ruling in Friends of the Oldman
River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport)39 is the leading case regarding ministerial discretion on permitting decisions
that trigger environmental assessment requirements. The decision of the SCC in that case set in motion a process that resulted
in the adoption of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
(“CEAA”).40
The principal focus of judicial review applications under
CEAA has been the federal government’s reluctance to conduct
wide-ranging reviews of project environmental impacts. Though
environmental groups have had some notable successes in this
area,41 the tendency of the Federal Court has been to stick to the
plain language of the act, which gives federal authorities broad
discretion as regards project and assessment “scoping,” provided
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the agency can establish that it did not actively avoid applying
the law—for example, by relying on a provincial agency to follow up on matters covered by the federal legislation.42
Environmental groups have been somewhat successful
in using judicial review to pressure the federal government to
develop recovery strategies for species listed under the Species
at Risk Act.43 Here, the litigation has focused on questions, such
as whether it is reasonable for the federal government not to
intervene where provincial recovery actions are potentially ineffectual,44 and whether the federal government must identify (and
therefore protect) the critical habitat of a species as part of the
development and implementation of a recovery strategy, along
with the question of what is the difference between habitat and
critical habitat.45
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The Polluter Pays Principle (Clean-Up Orders)—
Imperial Oil
In Imperial Oil Ltd v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment)54 the SCC decided the legality of a clean-up order issued
by the Quebec Minister of the Environment (the “Minister”)
against Imperial Oil (“Imperial”) under provincial polluter-pay
legislation. In the 1980s, a real estate developer discovered oil
pollution at a former Imperial oil site on the shore of the Saint
Lawrence River, opposite Quebec City. The land was decontaminated with the approval of provincial governmental authorities and houses were built, but the pollution resurfaced in the
1990s. Residents brought an action against the developer, the
town, Imperial Oil, and the environment ministry.55 The Minister ordered Imperial to carry out a site assessment.56 Imperial claimed that the Minister had a conflict of interest because
the Minister had approved earlier clean-up work and was now
being sued.
In deciding that the Minister
did not have a conflict of interest, the SCC held that the Minister wears two hats, adjudicative
and managerial, and that when
the Minister issued the assessment order the Minister was
not adjudicating but rather performing the Minister’s jobs of
implementing Québec’s environmental protection legislation.57
The Minister had a political duty
to address the contamination
problem and “choose the best
course of action, from the standpoint of the public interest.”58 The SCC went beyond analyzing
principles of administrative law when it decided Imperial Oil by
also considering the context of environmental protection legislation. As in Spraytech, the SCC emphasized that Québec environmental legislation is concerned not only with safeguarding the
environment of today, but it is also concerned with “evidence of
an emerging sense of inter-generational solidarity and acknowledgment of an environmental debt to humanity and the world of
tomorrow.”59

SCC also found that Article 976 of the Civil Code requires no
proof of fault.63 This article reads: “Neighbours shall suffer the
normal neighbourhood annoyances that are not beyond the limit
of tolerance they owe each other, according to the nature or location of their land or local custom.”64
According to the SCC, conduct is not the deciding criterion
when it comes to abnormal annoyances under Article 976.65
Rather, liability is triggered when the nuisance becomes excessive or intolerable. The SCC relied on legal commentary and
precedent to find that Article 976 required no proof of fault,
but the court also asserted that no-fault liability “furthers environmental protection objectives” and “reinforces the application of the polluter-pay principle, which [the] Court discussed
in [Imperial Oil].”66 Quoting Imperial Oil, the SCC reinforced
the principle that, in order to promote sustainable development,
polluters should be liable for the direct and immediate costs
of pollution.67

Canada’s refusal to own
up to its shortcomings
has resulted in Canadian
delegations being
sidelined at global
summits

The Polluter Pays Principle (Class Actions)—
St. Lawrence Cement
In St. Lawrence Cement Inc v. Barrette,60 residents of
Beauport, Québec, instituted a class action against St. Lawrence
Cement Inc. (“SLC”) for dust, odor, and noise nuisances related
to the operation of a local cement plant. The residents based their
claim on the general rules of fault-based civil liability, as well as
on the good-neighbour provision of the Québec Civil Code.61
Under Article 1457 of the Civil Code, the claimants were
required to establish fault, damage, and causation.62 The SCC
reversed the Québec Court of Appeal and upheld the decision of
the trial judge, finding that SLC had not committed a civil fault
since plant operations complied with applicable standards. The
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Environmental Loss—
Canfor

In British Columbia v.
Canadian Forest Products
Ltd.,68 the British Columbia
(“BC”) government sought a
damages award against Canadian Forest Products Ltd.
(“Canfor”) in connection with
a forest fire that burned 1,491
hectares of forest in the BC interior. Canfor was largely responsible for the fire. 69 The BC
government sued in its capacity
as owner of the land, that is, it
launched a commercial action for the diminution of the value
of timber.70 The SCC ruled that the government could also have
sued as a representative of the public, for damages resulting
from the environmental impact of the forest fire.
The SCC held that as defender of the public interest, the
government can sue for environmental loss based on the law
of public nuisance.72 The Court considered, and eventually
dispensed with, the argument that in such cases, only injunctive relief is available. First, it noted that Canadian courts have
not always adhered to the narrow view that the role of the government in public nuisance is to put a stop to the activity that
constitutes an interference with the public’s rights.73 Second,
the Court indicated that, under the common law of the United
States, “it has long been accepted that the state has a common
law parens patriae jurisdiction to represent the collective interests of the public.”74
According to the Court, the parens patriae doctrine has led
to successful claims for monetary compensation for environmental damage in the United States, and there should be no legal barrier to a government claim for compensation in an action based
on public nuisance in Canada.75 Nonetheless, the SCC refused
to assess and award such damages because complete arguments
for such a claim were not made at the trial and appellate level.76
62

Conclusion
Neither the common law nor Canada’s environmental statutes make the government liable for failing to enforce environmental laws. This makes it difficult for environmental groups
to require government to improve its performance in this area.
Private law is returning to the fore as a source of remedies for
citizens seeking redress for environmental wrongs. Until Canada
has a government plan for sustainable development, one that is
translated into binding standards, the courts will be of limited
assistance. Canada’s international influence will continue to
wane.
There is some irony to Canada’s predicament. Since the
1950’s, Canada has enjoyed an unlikely place at the sides of
the world’s powerful countries because of its ability to exercise moral suasion effectively. In the 1980’s, when Canada and
the world began to fully appreciate the need to protect people
and nature from the negative effects of economic development, the government sought to gain acceptance of domestic

environmental regulation by inviting stakeholders to do the right
thing, an approach that had worked for Canada in international
relations. If only the federal government could work on a cooperative basis with industry and the provinces to achieve mutually
beneficial outcomes, it was thought, Canada would again shine
through its non-confrontational approach. Unfortunately, after
twenty years of industry self-regulation, voluntary programs,
and federal-provincial environmental accords, the country is
nowhere near its goal of building a sustainable economy.
Canada’s refusal to own up to its shortcomings has resulted
in Canadian delegations being sidelined at global summits. In
all likelihood, it is not so much the failure itself as the refusal to
own up to it that has other countries riled. What they are probably thinking is: if the country with the second largest land base
(and one of the smallest populations) in the world cannot figure
out how to meet the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs, then at
the very least, we should stop taking their advice.
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10 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.Mex., art. 5, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAEEC], available
at http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/naaec/naaec03.
cfm?varlan=english.

11

NAAEC, Canadian Implementation, http://www.naaec.gc.ca/eng/implementation/implementation_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009) (noting that most environmental legislation in Canada falls under the jurisdiction of the provinces).
12 Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 S.C, ch. 22, schedule 1 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-1994-c-22/latest/sc-1994-c-22.
html.
13 See Constitution Act, supra note 5, § 132 (“The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or proper for performing the
Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire,
towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such
Foreign Countries.”).
14 R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (Can.), available at http://csc.
lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1997/1997rcs3-213/1997rcs3-213.
15 See id. at para. 161 (finding that the provisions of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act are constitutional because the Parliament of Canada acted
within its jurisdiction pursuant to the Constitution Act, 1867).
16 Paul Muldoon & Richard D. Lundgren, The Hydro-Quebec Decision: Loud
Hurray or Last Hurrah?, Law Times, Sept. 16, 1997, available at http://www.
cela.ca/publications/hydro-quebec-decision-loud-hurray-or-last-hurrah.
17 Cf. id. (explaining that the federal government is being forced to push its
environmental responsibilities onto the provinces because of budgetary concerns).
18 Laurentide Motels Ltd. v. City Beauport, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 705, para. 355 (Can.),
available at http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1989/1989rcs1-705/1989rcs1-705.
html (explaining that the public authority to enforce the law is discretionary).
19 Id.
20 See Environment Canada, Compliance and Enforcement Policies for the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 4 (2001), available at http://
www.ec.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang=En&n=8233E4B5-1 (weighing multiple factors, including intent of the alleged violator, past violations, and the
seriousness of the harm when determining the nature of an alleged violation).
21 See id. (stating that Environment Canada’s enforcement activities include
measures to compel compliance through court action but remaining silent on
how such actions are initiated).

Endnotes: Sustainability and the Courts: A Snapshot of Canada
in 2009 continued on page 89
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Precautionary Principle in the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
by Yoona Cho*

T

he World Trade Organization (“WTO”) encourages its
members to fully exhaust negotiations and consultations
before bringing a case before its Dispute Settlement
Body.1 Indeed, a majority of all WTO disputes are resolved
in consultations,2 allowing its members to gain accountability,
“save face,” and preserve sovereignty. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”), an international environmental dispute resolution body, should follow the lead of the
WTO in requiring a pre-dispute consultation period and encouraging its members to resolve differences outside of the Tribunal’s dispute settlement process.3 Although the WTO sets a fine
example in the area of consultations and dispute settlement, it
sets a less impressive and less relevant standard on the precautionary principle. In contrast to the WTO, the ITLOS should
continue to deftly define and employ the precautionary principle
to increase its authority and protect ocean resources.
The precautionary-like principle that WTO members may
invoke is set forth in Article 5.7 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.4 It allows members to make a final decision on the safety of a product when
faced with insufficient scientific data.5 It also requires the
members to actively seek new information and to review the
measures within “a reasonable period of time.”6 In reality, this
approach has failed to achieve much success within the WTO
system. The debate over the use of the precautionary principle
presented itself in WTO cases such as the beef hormone debate
where the European Communities (“EC”) tried to ban all hormone-treated beef from the United States, and in the EC Biotech
Products dispute where the EC attempted to ban all genetically
modified food and seed.7 In these decisions, the WTO rejected
the use of the precautionary principle.8 Similarly, when Japan
tried to ban American apples from entering its domestic market
by invoking Article 5.7, the Appellate Body of the WTO ruled
that determination of “reasonable period of time” was on a caseby-case analysis and that Japan had failed to meet the requirement for reviewing its measures.9
In contrast to the treatment the precautionary principle
has received at the WTO, the precautionary principle has been
instrumental to achievements in the area of international environmental law. When scientists began linking the use of chlorofluorocarbons to ozone depletion, the use of the precautionary
principle in an international agreement galvanized and justified
global action.10 The Montreal Protocol forced the international
community to take cost effective actions to deal with irreversible
consequences even in light of scientific uncertainties.11 Effective implementation of environmental law needs to proceed in
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spite of scientific uncertainties in order to prevent irreversible
damage.
The ITLOS has successfully increased its legitimacy by
demonstrating an effective formula through incorporation of
the precautionary approach in its judgments.12 In the Southern
Bluefin Tuna case, the ITLOS encouraged the parties to act
with “prudence and caution” in order to ensure conservation
of marine life.13 In 1999, its decision revealed a precautionary
approach and became the first instance of an international judicial decision employing this notion.14
To avoid overuse of the precautionary approach, which
could result in diminished legitimacy, the ITLOS established a
clear threshold in the Mixed Oxide Fuel plant case (“MOX”).15
MOX involved a dispute over marine pollution between the
United Kingdom (“UK”) and Ireland in which Ireland requested
that ITLOS stop the UK from releasing radioactive waste from
the MOX plant into the Irish Sea, amongst other provisional
measures.16 The Tribunal took this opportunity to clarify the
extent and limits in the use of the precautionary approach. In
doing so, the Tribunal emphasized the requirement of indicating the seriousness of the potential harm to the marine environment.17 The ITLOS ruled that Ireland had failed to meet the
necessary threshold in demonstrating the urgency and the seriousness of the potential harm.18
The Tribunal’s judgment in the MOX plant case was in line
with Montreal Protocol’s Principle 15, in which the precautionary approach was narrowly construed.19 In order to invoke the
precautionary approach, the harm to be prevented cannot be general, but has to be identifiable and clear. Furthermore, the threat
must pose serious or irreversible damage to the environment.
The precautionary principle is not without its constraints.
There is a threshold that the parties have to prove in order for
the Tribunal to use the approach.20 Effective international environmental law requires a precautionary approach, and the existence of scientific uncertainties should not hinder society from
taking effective actions today. The willingness of the ITLOS to
employ the precautionary approach in its judgments has not only
demonstrated its appreciation and concern for environmental
issues, but has also given it legitimacy and a workable formula
to enhance its role.
Endnotes: Precautionary Principle in the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea continued on page 90

*Yoona Cho is a J.D. Candidate, May 2011, at American University Washington
College of Law.
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Giving Power to the People: Comparing the
Environmental Provisions of Chile’s Free Trade Agreements with
Canada and the United States
by Rachel T. Kirby*
“Trade, of course, is neither inherently good nor bad; but
how it is conducted in the future is now a matter of deep concern—and unprecedented opportunity.”1

IV concludes that free trade agreements offer an avenue for
increased enforcement of environmental laws, and that citizen
enforcement procedures strengthen those agreements.

Introduction

Background

S

ixteen years ago, a new U.S. President offered an opportunity to increase North American environmental protection with an environmental side agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) that gave citizens
a voice in enforcing environmental laws.2 The side agreement,
known as the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (“NAAEC”), provides a mechanism for citizens
to aim the international spotlight on a government’s failure to
enforce domestic environmental laws.3 A similar agreement
between Chile and Canada, the Canada-Chile Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (“CCAEC”), allows ordinary citizens to ask an international body to investigate alleged nonenforcement of environmental
laws.4 While these mechanisms
are commonplace in a number
of international trade agreements, the U.S.-Chile Free
Trade Agreement (“USCFTA”)
includes a state-to-state dispute
resolution mechanism, but does
not allow for citizen submissions
on enforcement.5
As the international community turns its attention to
environmental crises around
the world, the United States
must decide how to address lax
enforcement of environmental
laws by its trading partners.6 While
a free trade agreement is only one avenue for the United States
and environmental activists to pursue more effective enforcement of every country’s environmental laws, this article argues
that a citizen enforcement mechanism is a vital tool that must be
included in future agreements. Part I outlines the enforcement
mechanisms under the CCAEC, NAAEC, and the USCFTA.
Part II argues that agreements without citizen enforcement
mechanisms cannot effectively increase environmental enforcement, while agreements with these provisions encourage interest
in environmental issues and pressure to strengthen environmental regulations. Part III recommends including citizen enforcement mechanisms in future U.S. trade agreements. Finally, Part

CCAEC & NAAEC Citizen Enforcement
Procedures
The CCAEC and NAAEC address ineffective enforcement
of domestic environmental laws in two ways. The first is a stateto-state dispute resolution mechanism for a persistent failure
to enforce a party’s own environmental laws in a manner that
interferes with free trade.7 The second is a citizen submission on
enforcement procedure.8 This mechanism allows any citizen to
send a submission to either National Secretariat asserting that a
party to the CCAEC or NAAEC is “failing to effectively enforce
its environmental law.”9
The CCAEC established a
Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (“CEC”) made up
of a Council, a Joint Submission
Committee, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.10 A
citizen submission to the CEC
must meet seven largely procedural criteria and be grounded
in a specific incident of nonenforcement.11 The Joint Submission Committee decides
whether the submission merits
a response from the state, then
decides whether to produce a
public factual record.12 While
the intent of the factual record is
to describe and report events without passing judgment on parties’ actions, parties still resist the process.13

The United States must
decide how to address
lax enforcement of
environmental laws by its
trading partners.
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USCFTA Environmental State-to-State Dispute
Resolution Procedures
Like the CCAEC and NAAEC, the USCFTA obliges both
parties to “effectively enforce” domestic environmental laws.14
The process can only begin if a party has persistently failed to
effectively enforce its environmental laws “in a manner affecting

*Rachel T. Kirby is a J.D./M.A. Candidate, 2010, American University
Washington College of Law and School of International Service.
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trade between the Parties.”15 Under the CCAEC, a citizen can
pursue an enforcement matter for a single failure to effectively
enforce an environmental law.16 The dispute settlement provisions of the USCFTA, however, are strictly between government
parties, and require both a persistent pattern of non-enforcement
and a showing that the failure affects trade between the parties.17
Parties first address disputes under the environmental provisions of the USCFTA with consultations.18 If consultations fail
to resolve the matter within sixty days, the complaining party
can initiate the USCFTA dispute resolution procedures.19 First,
the parties convene a meeting
of the Commission to resolve
the issue.20 Next, the parties
convene an arbitral panel if the
issue remains unresolved.21 The
panel can impose fines of up to
fifteen million dollars per day on
the non-enforcing party.22 The
complaining party can suspend
USCFTA trade benefits if the
party fails to pay the fine.23

State Espousal Mechanisms Lead to Mutual NonEnforcement
Both states in a free trade agreement have non-environmental reasons to sign an agreement.32 As a result, environmental
disputes are unlikely because each state has an interest in not
enforcing environmental provisions of the treaty.33 A citizen
alleging that her government has failed to enforce environmental laws has little control over the diplomatic concerns of either
government party to the treaty.34 Because environmental issues
are not a priority, neither party has
an interest in enforcing environmental treaty provisions. At the
same time, the consequences
of state-to-state dispute resolution are trade sanctions, which
undermine the purpose of the
agreement: free trade.35 As a
result, no party has used the
NAAEC or CCAEC government arbitration provisions or
the USCFTA state-to-state dispute resolution procedures.36

No state party has used
the state-to-state dispute
resolution procedures

Analysis
Effective Enforcement of Environmental Laws
Protect the Environment, Human Health, and
Foreign Investment Streams
Environmental laws do not enforce themselves; governments or private citizens must enforce those laws.24 The importance of enforcement is especially true in Latin America, where
many countries have an inconsistent historical relationship with
the rule of law.25 Effective environmental protection requires
both effective environmental laws and consistent enforcement
of those laws.26
Foreign and domestic investors are unlikely to comply with
environmental laws if there are no consequences for violations.
Because environmental compliance can be expensive, companies and investors that violate environmental regulations gain a
competitive advantage against those who do comply. Effective
enforcement reassures investors that competitors are not gaining a competitive advantage by avoiding environmental compliance.27 Overall, trade and investment that leads to increased
prosperity may strengthen effective environmental protections,
but the government or citizens must enforce those protections.28

State-to-State Dispute Resolution Alone Does
Not Increase Enforcement of Environmental Laws
While state-to-state dispute resolution theoretically provides a venue for environmental advocates to work though their
governments, government action carries burdens that make
action unlikely.29 States have neither the capacity nor authority
to effectively monitor enforcement of another state’s environmental laws.30 The absence of a citizen enforcement mechanism
and the requirement that the disputed pattern of non-enforcement affect trade between the parties hampers efforts to improve
environmental protection through treaty provisions.31
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High Burdens of Proof Make an Unused Procedure More
Difficult
The USCFTA provides a dispute resolution mechanism for
state parties to pursue trade sanctions.37 A state party must show
that there is a persistent pattern of non-enforcement and that
the pattern affects trade between Chile and the United States.38
These hurdles to successful sanctions are high even if a state had
an incentive to pursue a dispute.39
The state must first show that there was a persistent pattern
of non-enforcement.40 Effective enforcement requires consistency to be effective, but enforcement in Latin America is more
likely to be inconsistent, precluding proof of a consistent pattern.41 Second, a state must show that the pattern of non-enforcement affected trade between the countries.42 For example, the
state could show that non-enforcement gives domestic facilities
in the complained-against country an advantage over facilities in
the complaining country.43 In a complex global economy, a state
is unlikely to be able to prove a specific impact on trade between
the parties.44 These high burdens of proof substantially limit the
already unlikely state-to-state dispute resolution procedure.

A Citizen Enforcement Procedure is a Better
Mechanism for Increasing Enforcement of
Environmental Laws and Promoting Public
Interest in the Environment
A citizen enforcement mechanism strikes a balance between
state sovereignty and the public desire for a cleaner environment.45 Because citizen submissions do not rely on government
action, countries cannot subsume environmental issues to other
diplomatic concerns.46 Enforcement of domestic law preserves
state interest in sovereignty because the treaty does not impose
an international standard.47 At the same time, a defined mechanism for action fosters civil society interest in the environment.48
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Citizen Submissions Do Not Rely on a Government to
Initiate Treaty Enforcement Actions
Unlike state-to-state dispute resolution, the citizen submission process provides a venue for citizens to report instances of
non-enforcement in their own neighborhoods or in a protected
area used by the public.49 Citizens have an interest in protecting
the natural areas they use, and are
more likely to report a failure to
enforce than the government.50
Citizens can directly observe
environmental violations and
a lack of state action in their
neighborhoods.51 In contrast,
limited resources restrict state
monitoring of another state’s
enforcement activity.52 Citizens
and other private actors are also
better equipped to identify ineffective enforcement because
they are closer to violations.53

Citizen Enforcement Fosters the Development of a
Community of Environmental Activists
While the citizen submission process is theoretically accessible to the general public without legal assistance, this process
can be more successful when there is a civil society community ready to bring claims.63 At the same time, the process’ concrete avenue for action provides a
mechanism for environmental
organizations in more developed countries to work with
growing organizations in Latin
America.64 These connections
between environmental organizations foster the development
of the environmental community, strengthening domestic
environmental protections as
well as the citizen submission
process.65 Some criticize the citizen submission process because
it does not legally bind the government to take any action.66
However, even a limited citizen
submission process is a valuable
tool for environmental advocates to pressure government actors
to pursue environmental protection.67

Because citizen
submissions do not rely
on government action,
countries cannot subsume
environmental issues to
other diplomatic
concerns

Citizen Submissions Balance
State Sovereignty and Public
Interest in Enforcement of
Environmental Laws
Relying on citizen enforcement addresses the widespread
concern of Latin American countries that environmental provisions in free trade agreements are an effort to restrict their sovereignty with outside standards.54 The CAAEC’s requirement
to enforce domestic environmental laws allows a country to set
a level of environmental protection it feels is appropriate.55 At
the same time, as an environmental community develops, that
community can pressure the government to increase levels of
environmental protection and enforcement.56 States also see the
citizen submission as a lesser threat because of the absence of
trade sanctions associated with a factual record.57
Enforcement of domestic environmental law imposes lower
sovereignty costs on Latin American states.58 Because only citizens can initiate the submission process, the process does not
raise concerns of a lack of democratic accountability.59 As a
community of environmental activists develops, that community
can lobby for more protective environmental laws, making the
government more responsive to community concerns.
In contrast to the dispute resolution proceeding under the
USCFTA, the citizen submission process does not carry a direct
threat of trade sanctions and instead relies on the deterrent effect
of factual records.60 This limitation preserves the benefits of the
free trade agreement while providing consequences for nonenforcement of the terms of the agreement.61 The absence of
trade sanctions also prevents a state-to-state dispute resolution
from punishing exporters and other private parties who might
not have been involved in the state’s non-enforcement.62
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Recommendations
As long as the United States continues to expand free trade
with Latin America, free trade agreements should include a citizen enforcement mechanism. To ensure citizens have environmental laws to monitor, the United States should refrain from
signing agreements with states that do not have an effective
legal framework for environmental protection. While access to a
citizen submission process will not immediately provide effective environmental protection, it is an important step.

Include a Citizen Submission on Enforcement
Mechanism in Future Free Trade Agreements
While the CCAEC citizen submission process is weak
when compared to U.S. citizen suit provisions, the process is an
innovative mechanism in international law.68 Historically, private citizen action in the international arena was only available
through state action, but citizen submissions allow governments
to stay an arm’s length from the proceedings. States cannot
accuse other governments of manipulating the environmental
dispute resolution process for other purposes because the submission process does not involve government action.
A citizen submission mechanism harnesses the collective
knowledge of citizens to identify instances of environmental
non-enforcement.69 State interests in preserving sovereignty
would likely limit any effort for states to monitor each others’
domestic environmental enforcement.70 A citizen enforcement
mechanism balances the public interest in consistent enforcement and the state interest in sovereignty.
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At the same time, the CEC governing bodies should have
more freedom to prepare factual records without political interference.71 The practical consequences of a factual record are limited to public disclosure of state action, and the state can blunt
criticism of any absence of enforcement with future enforcement
action.72 Because treaties require enforcement of domestic law,
not of a politically unattainable international standard, governments should be able to effectively enforce their own domestic
law.73 Overall, a citizen submission process within a free trade
agreement can be an effective mechanism to improve enforcement of environmental laws if the CEC has the political freedom
to pursue factual records.74 A trading partner, however, needs
a basic environmental framework before increased enforcement
will increase environmental protection.

Do Not Enact Free Trade
Agreements with States
that Do Not Provide
for Environmental
Protection

the recent U.S.-Peru Agreement does not increase environmental protection.77 Peru has environmental laws, but those laws do
not meet the “high level” of environmental protection required
by the treaty.78 Trade agreements can foster increased environmental enforcement, but only if the partner country has effective
environmental laws. If increasing environmental protection is a
goal of the United States and other developed countries, those
countries should not sign trade agreements with countries that
lack legal environmental protection.

Conclusion
While inclusion of any environmental provisions in free
trade agreements is a step forward, lip service to increased
enforcement of environmental laws is not sufficient. Effective
enforcement of domestic environmental laws should be a standard condition of future U.S.
free trade agreements. Allowing
state-to-state dispute resolution
on environmental issues is not
sufficient to actually increase
enforcement because states
tend to rely on mutual nonenforcement when there are no
other consequences. A citizen
submission on enforcement process is much more effective at
increasing enforcement because
it takes advantage of, and even
increases, public awareness of
non-enforcement. While a citizen enforcement process alone
will not solve the world’s environmental problems, it is an important step towards increasing government accountability for effective enforcement of
environmental laws.

Effective environmental
laws must be in place
before a free trade
agreement can improve
their enforcement

While a citizen submission
process can increase effective
enforcement of environmental
laws, increased enforcement of
laws that do not exist cannot
protect the environment. While
some argue that free trade brings
increased prosperity that will
in turn increase environmental
protections, investor protection
provisions in free trade agreements are a threat to new environmental laws.75 Because of these
investor protection provisions, effective environmental laws
must be in place before a free trade agreement can improve their
enforcement.76
While the United States and Chile enacted the USCFTA
after Chile had achieved a high level of environmental protection,
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Conference Proceedings
21st Century Infrastructure: Opportunities
and Hurdles for Renewable Energy
Development1

N

Introduction: Overview

ot enough attention has been paid to renewable energy
infrastructure development critical to ensure successful
project development for wind, biomass, solar, biofuels,
geothermal, distributed generation, and waste management projects. With almost $13 trillion slated to be spent in the upcoming decade on energy supply and infrastructure, the Conference
sought to elucidate the type of integrated Federal, State, and
Wall Street support for infrastructure, we need to see:
• Renewable energy and efficiency supplies growing in
the mix
• An estimated market clearing price for carbon
• Increased renewable infrastructure investment
• Access to capital
The American University Washington College of Law
(“WCL”) and the Renewable & Distributed Generation
Resources Committee of the ABA Section of Environment,
Energy and Resources co-sponsored this conference to evaluate the issues surrounding renewable infrastructure development. The national Conference was held at WCL on September
10, 2009. Podcasts of the panel discussions and lunch keynote speech by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) Chairman Jon Wellinghoff are available through the
WCL podcast directory.2

Electric Transmission Gaps and Bottlenecks:
Issues and Potential Solutions3
Assuming that we can generate all the renewable energy
we need in this country, sufficient electric transmission, distribution, and storage is critical to move power from where it is
generated to where it is needed and used. One of the primary
issues with transmission development is determining who is
going to pay and how. The issue of who pays is in flux between
the regulated model with long-term purchase agreements and the
participant pay model, where the beneficiaries of the additional
transmission themselves pay for the cost of development.

Transmission Development: RTO/ISO Context
In the RTO/ISO reliability and planning processes, several
payment methodologies have emerged. First is the cost allocation method, whereby one-third of the transmission development
69

costs are shared regionally through an increase in rate base, and
two-thirds of the costs are allocated to the regional zones in
which the transmission upgrade/expansion is located. The cost
allocation method is the basic plan generally used for adding a
designated network resource on the transmission grid.
Another payment method is the balanced portfolio approach.
In the balanced portfolio, 100 percent of the costs are spread
across the entire region. Strict tests are in place to show how the
benefits exceed the costs for the whole region. This approach is
flexible enough to make adjustments to ensure that the costs are
balanced region-wide. If the analysis shows that certain areas
will not see as much benefit, then adjustments can be made to
the cost assessment for better parity within the region.

Transmission Development: Private Investors
The goal of merchant transmission development is for private investors to enter the market to build transmission lines,
often to connect renewable generation. On February 19, 2009,
the FERC, by order, adjusted the policy for merchant lines.4 The
pre-existing FERC policy required negotiated rates based on ten
criteria to qualify as a merchant line. In contrast, the new policy
enables private negotiations with an “anchor customer” to help
diversify the risk. Instead of ten criteria, the new policy for merchant transmission lines consists of only four criteria: (1) just
and reasonable rates (i.e. merchant has to be an investor assuming the full risk of the line), (2) no undue discrimination (i.e.
when the remaining assets of the line are sold in an open market,
there must be consistency among all investors with regards to
the investment terms and conditions), (3) no undue preference
and affiliate concern (i.e. the anchor cannot be an affiliate of the
investor), and (4) regional reliability and operation efficiency
(i.e. RTO classification no longer required).

Lessons learned from the transmission development
projects

•

•

Eminent domain and control of the environmental permitting process can be trumped by “NIMBY” conditions in the relevant market
Municipal utilities and cooperatives are more receptive
to building transmission than IOUs because of differences in their business models
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•

Computing and quantifying the benefits of transmission construction can help minimize potential lawsuits
enjoining development and also attract stakeholder
support
• Having state regulators and permitting authorities
review transmission projects in groups, not one-by-one,
together with stakeholder engagement can accelerate
the permitting process
The crucial question is still who pays for the transmission investment. State and Federal government cooperation is
essential in answering this question because to date it has been
the combination of state mandates and federal tax incentives
that have enabled the success of renewable energy. FERC has
solid experience in siting and approving natural gas pipelines
and LNG terminals that can be applied to this task. If regulatory
certainty can be provided, transmission investment by third parties could be a major cleantech financial play for the upcoming
decade.

Generation Resources: Finding the Right Mix5
Renewable energy has had several technologies dominate
the market for years, but new innovations are developing all
the time. The panel also examined what the renewable energy
generation portfolio could look like under proposed climate
legislation.
A longstanding player in renewable energy is solar power.
Solar power has numerous benefits like low operating and maintenance costs, very little degradation, low variability, and relatively easy permitting. The price for photovoltaic panels has
dropped dramatically in the last 18 months, but solar power still
faces issues with scale-up. Government policies have been too
focused on single rooftop installations and provide more money
for small solar installations by
imposing size limits. To achieve
greater market penetration, solar
power will have to become more
than a small distributed generation resource.
Transmission is the largest
current constraint on the use of
renewable energy sources regardless of whether that energy is
wind, solar, biomass, or geothermal. New transmission lines must
be built to accommodate new
population centers and new locations of renewable energy. But even with the potential problems
of transmission, wind power is the most ready for large-scale
production today. The Department of Energy has reported that
the United States could meet 20 percent of its total energy needs
using wind energy. Baseload renewables for the future to watch
are: biomass, geothermal, hydropower, and waste management
projects. Their dispatchability offers premium renewable energy

benefits to the utility and its customers especially in a carbon
constrained world.
Natural gas has emerged as the largest competitor to
renewable energy. Prices for natural gas have dropped due to
advances in drilling technology. However, government policies
are shifting to promote renewable energy with natural gas support as a transition fuel through 2030. The policy drivers for an
efficient energy mix include: energy security, energy independence, national security, stabilization of energy prices, and, most
importantly, decreasing greenhouse gas emissions. These policies will result in a better renewable energy generation portfolio
with more innovation and operating efficiencies from transmission and storage.
Any climate or energy legislation incentives must address
the characteristics of project finance in order to encourage the
development of renewable energy. Projects must have a firm
method of revenue generation (either through a contract or
rate base) and revenue streams must be able to be aggregated
(securitized). Furthermore, a market must be fluid to function
properly, but must promote regulatory certainty for long-term
planning. Only by keeping these project finance characteristics
in mind will policy-makers effectively incentivize and promote
the development of renewable energy.

Private Investment and the Role of the
Federal Government: “The Goldilocks
Conundrum”6
The government’s role in the development and promotion
of renewable energy needs to be the right size to be effective—
neither too big nor too small. Typically, the government role in
development is to fund basic
and early applied research. As
technologies develop, entrepreneurs and industry begin
to identify technologies with
market applications, and the
government’s role shifts. In the
energy field, however, the government role in investment is
more important because of the
high risk involved in financing capital-intensive projects.
The limited availability of
capital since 2008 has also
fostered an important government role in facilitating market
transformation.
The government must
reconcile competing national interests: national security, climate change, supply reliability, and economic competitiveness.
Free market investors are hesitant to invest when policies are
uncertain. Without a national legislative mandate, unpredictability reigns as regulations change rapidly and state government
policies develop in patchwork fashion. The utility market is a
particularly conservative market that tends to wait to see which

Transmission is the
largest current constraint
on the use of renewable
energy sources regardless
of whether that energy is
wind, solar, biomass, or
geothermal

Fall 2009

70

technologies the government will mark as winners and losers.
Adding to the uncertainty, Wall Street is recasting its business model after the financial meltdown. Particularly in a market downturn, private investors tend to avoid risking corporate
investment into new technologies.
To develop domestic energy in the United States, the government must assume a strong role by providing increased funding. If left solely to the free market, energy development will
happen slowly; megacities, population growth, and resource
pressure will eventually force
prices to rise and result in new
technologies in response to
the need. However, the U.S.
can become an energy leader
and avoid the painful spikes in
energy costs if the government
steps in to fund the bridge to
facilitate market transformation.
Export markets for clean technology products must also be
preserved. Small businesses will
be hurt by large government investment because they lack the
resources to participate in the government contracting process;
but small businesses will always foster technology development
by assuming entrepreneurial risk and will require special private
investment and government support to be an incubator of future
innovation.
To make a difference in addressing greenhouse gas emissions, we need to focus on three objectives: (1) a reliable electric system; (2) reasonable prices for electricity; and (3) an
environmentally benign electric utility system. The federal
government can encourage more private sector participation
and entrepreneurial response by clearly defining its legislative
goals. The current climate legislation proposals are not clearly
defined enough for capital markets to play a crucial role as advisor or principal investor. The capital markets need stability and
certainty to function properly. Markets are more efficient than
government policies for picking winners and losers. The marketbased process of seeking the most commercially viable projects
tends to eliminate those that are not viable based on price, scale,
or capital cost recovery.

sectors of investment for the mid-term which will be harmful to
renewable energy companies.
Entrepreneurs and project developers must focus on the
basic needs and benefits of project proposals when positioning
for institutional support. Consumers in general are technology
neutral, meaning that they do not care what technology is used
to power their cars as long as the car performs. Instead, consumers are concerned with whether a technology meets their needs
(low cost) and has additional benefits (quality and convenience).
Technological advancements in
each sector of renewable energy
will create winners and losers
in the short term. However, the
market will likely create the
long-term winners, subject to
regulatory policy.
Reviving the Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) market is
critical for funding emerging
renewable energy technologies.
During the NASDAQ bust of
2000-2001, the market responded with larger investment banks
taking over smaller ones. Since the smaller investment banks
were the primary sources of funding for the research and development of new products and services by entrepreneurs, the bust
caused a shortage of capital for new ventures and innovations.
The demise of the IPO market has also caused a stressed environment for VCs. The lack of a vibrant IPO market means that
VCs are locked into current investments and are unable to recoup
original investments to fund new projects. If the IPO market is
not revived, new technologies may die on the vine for want of
funding during this decade.
Acquiring credit to fund renewable energy projects has
become very difficult. The financial downturn has pushed banks
into an ultra-conservative mode in order to stay solvent. The
question remains, has the IPO market experience been transferred to the credit markets? Notably, credit markets are still
considering investments in sound renewable energy projects
with quality participants and a strong cash flow. In order to
secure credit, projects require concrete yields, well-structured
deals, and investment grade credits. Investment grade credits are
critical for power purchase agreements, construction, and ongoing operations and maintenance in today’s markets.
As an alternative, the United States should not establish
a sovereign wealth fund. The federal government often funds
“political” projects and continues to fund them even when they
are not profitable. Elected officials are ill-positioned to make
difficult decisions that will cause companies to fold and cause
constituents to become unemployed. On the other hand, a fund
created by a group of states and modeled on the National Science Foundation, where projects do not have specific outcome
requirements, could be more successful than a sovereign wealth
fund. Such a fund could team with private equity investors to
form joint ventures to fund renewable project development.
The Clean Energy Development Authority (“CEDA”) under

Free market investors are
hesitant to invest when
policies are uncertain

Financing Issues: Views from Wall Street to
Sand Hill Road7
The issue of project financing is where the rubber hits the
road—where the sources of capital assess the project to determine whether it is worthy of investment. Venture capitalists
(“VCs”) are one source for financing renewable energy project
development. VCs have made significant investments in renewable energy “moonshot” projects in fields such as solar, wind,
and biofuels, but only 20–30 percent of those investments are
likely to mature to the projected rate of return. The short-term
effect of the financial downturn has been that VCs are increasingly concerned about return on capital. Many VCs have gravitated toward conservative investment approaches in familiar
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consideration in the Senate also offers promise as an alternate
financing vehicle.

Policies for the Transition to a CarbonConstrained Economy8
Climate change has created a pressing need for a technological transition to a reduced carbon infrastructure, but the transition
also requires our vigilance against
unintended economic and environmental consequences. Distributed power generation will
be part of this solution, but it
is not economical enough to be
the only approach. We need to
develop a utility-scale renewable energy generation sector.
This new energy sector will
require revising federal and state
laws and regulations. Currently,
renewable energy policies are
developed at the state level. The
need for rapid development of
renewable energy to meet climate and carbon-reduction goals
will require the federal government to provide more stable direction and a market clearing price that properly evaluates the cost
of carbon.
Large scale renewable generation will require a grid overhaul. Climate legislation alone is insufficient in reducing carbon
emissions without addressing the national transmission issues.
While a national super-grid may not be effective from a cost
perspective, an alternative proposal would be to create several
regions to plan total energy infrastructure and transmission systems. Such plans would simultaneously conform to a national
carbon budget. The federal government can facilitate renewable
energy development by accelerating siting approval instead of
the current difficult and slow state approval processes. Smart
grid and advanced metering will be essential for the solution.

This approach should also recognize that effective energy and
environmental policy in the U.S. is best implemented on the
regional level.
At present, carbon prices are neither high enough, nor integrated on a national level, to prompt a national renewable energy
source portfolio. Compounding this situation are the differing needs of states, and varying amounts of in-state renewable
resources, forcing states to grapple with the choice of whether
to create in-state green jobs
through development of renewable energy, or simply buy
cheap, out-of-state energy credits. Many energy and environmental policy decisions are best
made at the state or regional
level. However, decisions about
transmission infrastructure,
planning, and siting, which
must often be done simultaneously, are best coordinated at
the federal level to remove barriers to development and allow access to capital investment.

Climate legislation alone
is insufficient in reducing
carbon emissions without
addressing the national
transmission issues

Conclusion
Energy, economics, and the environment have merged to
drive renewable energy development. We must manage these
sectors in an integrated manner by coupling the power of internet technology, advanced metering, storage, and smart grid with
access to capital. The U.S. is a center of innovation and financial
structuring as well as the “Saudi Arabia” of waste heat, materials, and greenhouse gases. We will need 21st century infrastructure to achieve important national solutions, meet our renewable
energy goals, and compete with emerging global economies.
Achieving these goals requires political leadership working with
the wisdom of men and women and the rule of law to contribute
to a better modern global society.

Endnotes: 21st Century Infrastructure: Opportunities and
Hurdles for Renewable Energy Development

1

Conference sponsored by American University Washington College of
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Scott Richey, Winfield Wilson, Meti Zegeye, and Beth Zgoda. The Committee
also thanks WCL, the Committee Program Vice-Chairs Roger Stark and Girard
Miller, and the special assistance of Jennifer Rohleder of Thompson Hine LLP.
2 http://www.wcl.american.edu/podcasts/
3 Moderator: William Snape, Fellow in Environmental Law and Practitioner
in Residence, Washington College of Law. Panelists: Stephen Zaminski, Executive Vice President and Managing Director, Starwood Energy Group Global;
Craig Roach, Ph.D., President, Boston Pacific Company, Inc.
4 126 FERC ¶ 61,134.
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Moderator: Girard Miller, Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P. Panelists:
Roger Feldman, Andrews & Kurth LLP; Greg Wetstone, Director, Government
Relations, Terra-Gen Power, LLC; Robert Hemphill, President & CEO, AES/
SOLAR.
6 Moderator: Girard Miller, Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P. Panelists:
Todd Lee, Morgan Stanley; Elliot Roseman, Vice President, ICF International;
Patti Glaza, Executive Director/CEO, Clean Technology and Sustainable Industries.
7 Moderator: Roger Stark, Partner, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP.
Panelists: Peter Flynn, Principal, Bostonia Partners; Scott Livingston, Principal,
Livingston Securities, LLC; Jean-Luc Park, Calvert Funds.
8 Moderator: Roger Stark, Partner, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle
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Knapp, General Counsel, Wind Capital Group; Peter Fox-Penner, Principal and
Chairman Emeritus, The Brattle Group.
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Litigation Preview
by Jessica B. Goldstein*

I

n June 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Stop
the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,1 a case concerning the rights of states
to maintain and restore coastal areas. The case has created a
great deal of interest, with a majority of U.S. state attorneys general, as well as a number of public interest groups, filing amicus
briefs in support of Florida and multiple private property rights
groups filing in support of the land owners.2 The case will be
heard in December and the Supreme Court may use it to answer
the question of whether a judicial decision can create a constitutional taking.
Judicial taking occurs when
a statute is challenged for “taking” private property and the
court rules that the property right
in dispute never existed.3 In this
case, the question is whether
the Florida Supreme Court was
correct in ruling that landowners did not have rights over
increased future beach property
resulting from natural deposition and, therefore, a Florida law
did not violate the Constitutional
regulatory takings clause.4 The
U.S. Supreme Court has previously
declined to intervene in similar cases because they are deeply
rooted in state property law.5
Although the challenge that led to the present case was filed
in 2004 by landowners in Florida attempting to stop a planned
beachfront restoration,6 the Florida Beach and Shore Preservation Act was enacted in 1961 by the Florida Legislature. The
purpose of the Act is to address beach erosion, which the legislature found to be a problem affecting the local economy and
general welfare of society.7 The state has a duty under the State
Constitution to protect and conserve Florida’s beaches as they
are important natural resources and held in trust for public use.8
The Act charged the Florida Department of Environmental Protection with the determination of which beaches are in need of
restoration and authorized spending for up to seventy-five percent of the actual costs of restoration.9
Under the Florida Beach and Shore Preservation Act, the
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund
establishes a fixed erosion control line (“ECL”) to replace the
mean high water line (“MHWL”), which fluctuates with the rise

and fall of the water level.10 In establishing the ECL, the Board
considers the MHWL, the extent of erosion, and landowners’
rights.11 As a result, the ECL becomes the new fixed property
line, dividing public lands and upland property.12 When cities
and towns restore beaches eroded by hurricanes, the increased
beach area below the ECL becomes public beach because the
restoration is done using public funds.13 The ECL allows upland
owners to continue to exercise littoral rights,14 such as boating, fishing, and swimming.15 The Act states that “there is no
intention on the part of the state to extend its claims to lands not
already held by it or to deprive
any upland or submerged land
owner of the legitimate and constitutional use and enjoyment of
his or her property.”16
At issue in Stop the Beach
Renourishment is the plan to
“renourish” beaches critically
eroded by a hurricane in 1995
through the addition of sand,
and the establishment of an ECL
in conjunction with the project.17 In 2006, a Florida District
Court held that the state’s restoration effort was an unconstitutional property taking that denied
property owners their right to water contact and accretion, which
is the increase of shoreline gradually added by a body of water.18
Under Florida case law, landowners were allowed to use the
doctrine of accretion to own land.19 However, upon appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that the Florida Beach and Shore
Preservation Act does not deprive owners of their littoral rights
and reversed the district court’s ruling.20
While the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged landowners’ littoral rights, it drew a distinction between the present
rights of use and access and the future rights of accretion and
reliction,21 unrelated to the present use of the shore and water.
Landowners claim these littoral rights are private property
rights and, therefore, that the state’s action constitutes a taking,
which requires just compensation.22 The Florida Supreme Court
held, however, that the right does not exist unless land is added

There is much speculation
over whether the Supreme
Court will address the
issue of judicial takings
and use this case to
establish precedent
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through accretion or reliction.23 Because the state adds the sand
for restoration, landowners do not have a property right to the
increased beachfront.24 Furthermore, the court adds that there
is no right of contact with water under Florida common law.25
The Supreme Court of Florida stated the Florida Beach and
Shore Preservation Act carefully balances private property and
public interests because it not
only prevents future erosion but
also restores presently damaged
beaches.26 The court also noted
that, in the interest of upland
owners, the Act restores their
beaches and protects their property from future damage and erosion.27 Beach restoration costs
between three and five million
dollars per mile and Florida officials believe restoring the beach
is enough to compensate landowners.28 The Surfrider Foundation, a non-profit environmental
organization, filed an amicus
brief arguing that (1) the Florida beach access provisions are
consistent with the Florida Constitution; (2) that private property
owners’ rights are not violated by the Act; and (3) judicial takings do not apply under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.29
However, the upland owners argue that the Act converts
private waterfront property into merely water view property
without compensation, as required under the Constitution.30 The

Coalition of Property Rights, which includes Florida coastal
property owners,31 claims that the Act lowers property values by
allowing the general public to use the beach.32 They argue that
in order to implement this Act, the government abandoned the
decades-old right of accretion, and landowners claim that this
constitutes an uncompensated taking of private property, violating the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.33
There is much speculation over whether the Supreme
Court will address the issue of
judicial takings and use this
case to establish precedent,
since it has avoided the issue in
the past. The Florida Supreme
Court reasonably determined
that accretion rights are future
property rights and if the state
did not preserve the beaches,
accretion would not occur due
to the erosion problem. In fact,
landowners could lose more of
their beach than what the Act makes public. The Court should
take into consideration the benefit that landowners derive from
the Florida Beach and Shore Preservation Act. Not only is the
state restoring their beachfront property but also continuing to
preserve it and, therefore, beachfront property values. Is it too
great a price to pay that the public has access to that beach? The
Supreme Court will have to decide.

upland owners argue that
the Act converts private
waterfront property
into merely water
view property without
compensation
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World News
by Nick Alarif and Kate Halloran*

Americas

The Caribbean’s fragile marine ecosystem is at a grave risk
due to a non-native intruder, the red lionfish.1 The red lionfish
is especially destructive to ecosystems because of its voracious
eating habits.2 A single red lionfish is able to reduce the number of small fish in a coral patch reef by eighty percent in as
little as five weeks.3 It is believed that the red lionfish was introduced to the Atlantic during Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which
is thought to have shattered private aquariums releasing the fish
into Miami’s Biscayne Bay.4 Covered with poisonous pectoral
spines, the red lionfish has no natural predator in the Atlantic
and has increased in numbers tenfold from 2005 through 2007.5
To try and solve this potentially devastating ecological
threat, conservationists have developed an innovative plan by
combining business and conservation: sell the fish to consumers.6 Companies, such as Sea to Table, have begun to work with
local fishermen in the Bahamas by helping the fishermen sell
their red lionfish catch to upscale metropolitan restaurants in the
United States.7 During initial trials in New York and Chicago,
restaurants sold out of the red lionfish within two nights.8

Asia

A former luxury American ocean liner that is believed to be
laden with high quantities of toxins recently arrived in Alang,
India, the hub of India’s ship-breaking yards.9 The Platinum-II
was previously anchored forty miles from Alang as the Indian
government decided whether or not to allow the ship to be dismantled on its shores.10 According to the Indian Platform on
Ship-breaking, the Platinum-II contains close to 200 tons of
asbestos and about 210 tons of materials contaminated by toxic
polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) as well as radioactive
substances.11 Groups such as Greenpeace opine that Alang’s
ship-breaking yards are ill-equipped to safely dismantle such
poison-laden ships.12
The scrapping of the Platinum-II is in violation of the
Basel Treaty,13 which bans signing countries, including India,
from receiving hazardous waste from countries who have not
signed the treaty, which includes the United States.14 However,
Indian authorities have stipulated that the Platinum-II should be
beached and disassembled in Alang, citing safety concerns that
the Platinum-II was in too poor a condition and may break apart
in the open ocean.15 Earlier this year, the Environmental Protection Agency enacted fines against the owners of the Platinum-II
75

in amounts close to $518,000 for illegal distribution and export
of a ship containing PCBs. The Platinum-II, however, was not
recalled to U.S. shores.16
In addition, the health costs of dismantling aging ocean-liners is extremely high to the local Indian shipyard workers; a 2006
report by India’s Supreme Court showed that one in six Alang
shipyard laborers was suffering from symptoms of asbestosis, a
fatal illness, and that the number of fatal accidents in the shipyard was six times higher than even the average in the nations
mining industry.17 Most shipyard laborers earn only about $2 to
$3 a day. Even with such risks to workers, Indian authorities are
hesitant to close down the shipyard as it is extremely profitable;
scrapping a single ship can bring in revenues of close to $10
million.18

Africa

The proposed construction of a hydroelectric dam along
the Zambezi River in Mozambique has stirred conflict between
locals and environmental advocates.19 While government officials argue the dam will benefit local villages by supplying
electricity and fostering development, environmental activists
assert the construction will displace approximately 1,400 small
farmers.20 The advocates also contend that another dam on the
Zambezi River has negatively affected the ecology of the river,
disrupting fishing and agriculture in the area, and that a second
dam would only worsen the situation.21 The Mozambican government believes it can build the dam and minimize impacts to
the environment.22 Construction is scheduled to begin in 2011.23
In eastern Africa, the United Nations World Food Programme projects that $285 million is needed to stem a hunger
crisis resulting from disastrous drought conditions.24 Some harvests have been completely wiped out.25 A severe lack of rainfall
has contributed to the crisis and forced residents to drink water
from contaminated sources.26 Oxfam argues that, in addition to
addressing the immediate food needs of eastern Africa, better
irrigation and wells are essential tools to reduce the impact of
drought in the future.27 The Food and Agricultural Organization
advocates a resilient variety of rice packed with more nutrition
that could help curb the food crisis.28
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Europe

Swedes are gaining a fresh perspective on their food as
many markets and restaurants are listing the amount of carbon
dioxide emitted on package labels and menus.29 This initiative
follows new nutritional guidelines released over the summer by
the Swedish National Food Administration.30 The pioneering
labels couple environmental concerns over climate change with

health concerns.31 The guidelines advocate choosing vegetables
and meats that require less energy to produce and do not recommend consuming fish due to Europe’s suffering fish stocks.32
Critics argue that the average consumer may feel overwhelmed
by the deluge of considerations when buying a bunch of carrots,
and that it is difficult to accurately calculate the emissions generated by a food product.33
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Book Review
Adjudicating Climate Change
Edited by William C.G. Burns and Hari M. Osofsky
Reviewed by Scott M. Richey and Karla O. Torres*

T

he U.S. Federal Government has been slow in accepting and adapting to empirical findings of human affected
climate change. Some, therefore, are turning to the judiciary to affect change. Adjudicating Climate Change1 is a collection of self-contained essays discussing a range of law suits
brought against those who directly or indirectly produce greenhouse gases. The book brings together relevant and topical case
studies of recent litigation, many of which are also available
online at the Social Science Research Network.2
The book comprises three
sections: subnational, national,
and supranational litigation. The
subnational section includes
case studies from the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand. Stephanie Stern posits in
“State Action as Political Voice
in Climate Change Policy: A
Case Study of the Minnesota
Environmental Cost Valuation
Regulation” that litigation, even
under substantially symbolic
state statutes, opens discourse,
encourages further legislation,
and pressures private actors to
take voluntary regulation. She focuses on a Minnesota statute
requiring that public utilities report their environmental impact
to a state commission. These reports allow the state to pursue
utilities with the lowest societal cost. Although no utility provider has ever been turned down for potentially having too great
an environmental impact, Stern points out that no utility company in Minnesota has applied to construct a high-emissions
coal-fired power plant in the ten years since enactment of the
law.
The national section presents case studies based on federal litigation. In “Tort-based Climate Litigation,” David A.
Grossman proposes viable tort theories for climate litigation.
The author describes currently pending tort actions for public
nuisance, comparing them to pollution and handgun cases. He
then suggests that a products liability action might also be viable
based on claims for failure to warn and design defect. An action

might be brought against a manufacturer for failing to warn consumers of the dangers of climate change resulting from use of
its products. Alternatively, a manufacturer might be found liable
for a design defect if an alternative design with reduced or no
emissions is possible.
Federal district courts, however, have dismissed public nuisance actions as within the purview of legislators, not judges,
and the actions are currently pending on federal circuit court
dockets. Grossman contends the Supreme Court has affirmed
justiciability in cases where a
producer of noxious pollution in
one state was successfully sued
by those harmed by the nuisance
in another state and this is sufficiently analogous to producers
of greenhouse gases. Further, he
asserts that the pending actions
do not comprise political questions, but rather are ordinary
actions in the context of a politically charged problem. While
standing, preemption, and justiciability are impediments to
a plaintiff’s claims, Grossman
seems optimistic in view of
Massachusetts v. EPA,3 in which several states successfully sued
the Environmental Protection Agency for its failure to regulate
greenhouse gases.
The book’s final section presents supranational case studies
highlighting how climate change can be addressed in international forums. “The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialects
of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” an essay
by co-editor Hari Osofsky, discusses creative lawyering by Inuit
in the United States and Canada who filed a petition with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 2005. They
asserted that the United States contributed a substantial portion
of the world’s greenhouse gases but was not taking adequate
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policy steps to reduce them, and that the resulting global climate
change phenomenon had significant impacts on the Inuit. The
petition further claimed that these impacts violated the Inuit’s
rights protected under the Inter-American human rights system, including their rights to life, physical integrity, and security. Osofsky suggests that, notwithstanding the petition’s initial
rejection, it generated publicity that may have placed pressure
on states to change their behavior or at least engage in a dialogue
with affected indigenous communities. More importantly, petitions like these reinforce the idea that international human rights
tribunals are appropriate forums for addressing problems that
cut across several legal issues. Echoing one of the book’s goals,

this essay emphasizes how the Inuit petition can serve as a “port
of entry” for making progress on climate change and environmental rights issues.
Adjudicating Climate Change presents an interesting survey
of climate change litigation at local, national, and international
levels. The book optimistically points out how political and
environmental change can be affected by governmental and nongovernmental actors through the judiciary. Further, the essays
describe how such litigation works to create dialogue with and
place pressure on slow moving lawmakers and large producers
of greenhouse gases.
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63 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
64 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
65 129 S. Ct. at 2465.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2483.
68 Id. at 2480, n.1.
69 See Id. at 2477-78.
70 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
71 Id. at 1149-53.
72 Id. at 1147.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1147-48.
75 Id. at 1148.
76 Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp.2d 994 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
77 Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 697-98 (9th Cir. 2007).
78 129 S. Ct. at 1149-50.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1150.
81 Id. at 1150-51.
82 Id. at 1154.
83 Id. at 1157.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1156.
86 Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522-23 (2007)) (emphasis in
original).
87 BNSF Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
88 Id. at 1881.
89 Id. at 1877.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1878.
92 Id. at 1879.
93 Id. at 1878.
94 Id. at 1879.
95 Id. at 1880.
96 Id. at 1878-79.
97 Id. at 1882-83.

Id. at 1885 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
106 See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 551 U.S. 1129
(2007).
107 Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
108 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330 (2007).
109 Id. at 334.
110 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
111 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
112 550 U.S. 330 at 332.
113 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
114 Id. at 533, 534.
115 Id. at 501.
116 Id. at 560.
117 Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007).
118 Id. at 576.
119 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
120 Based on the author’s search of cases, briefs, and transcripts of the search
terms “sustainability,” “sustainable development,” and “ecologically sustainable development,” on Westlaw (last searched Nov. 9, 2009), and on the U.S.
Supreme Court database, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ (last visited Nov. 9,
2009).
121 One amicus brief makes a passing reference to “sustainability.” Brief of
economists Frank Ackerman, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 14, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009) (Nos. 07-588,
07-589, 07-597) (“When such goals are recognized as politically- or normatively-imposed constraints, economic theory evaluates them under frameworks
that are analytically distinct from conventional cost-benefit optimization. For
instance, an extensive economic literature exists analyzing environmental and
natural resource decisionmaking under “sustainability” or “safe minimum standard”). Other than incorporation of the word “sustainable” in corporate titles or
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http://www.commonlii.org/in/cases/INSC/1980/138.html.
24 For example, in the Nawimana case in Sri Lanka, what emerged from litigation was in fact a mediated settlement between the parties laying down the
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others, (1994) 2 Sri L.R. 271 (13 July 1992), available at http://www.commonlii.org//cgi-bin/disp.pl/lk/cases/LKCA/1992/18.html?query=keangnam; Municipal Council Ratlam v. Vardhichand & others, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1622, available
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Trade Agreement: Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 14
Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 119, 141–42 (2003) (arguing that free trade
agreements should be used to advance environmental protection standards). But
see French, supra note 1, at 51 (detailing the difficulties of reforming existing
trade agreements to address environmental concerns).
7 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 23.1; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 23.1.
8 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14–15; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14–15.
9 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.1. A citizen is any “person or organization
residing or established in the territory of a Party.” Id. art. 14.1(f).
10 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 8. See generally Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, Bringing the Facts to Light: A Guide to Articles 14 and 15 of
the NAAEC (2007) (providing information about the NAAEC process to the
public), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/SEM/Bringing%20the%20
Facts_en.pdf.
11 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.1; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14.1. The
National Secretariat will forward a submission that:
(a) is in writing . . . ; (b) clearly identifies the person or organization
making the submission; (c) provides sufficient information . . . ; (d)
appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing industry; (e) indicates that the matter has been communicated in
writing to the relevant authorities of the Party and indicates the Party’s response, if any; (f) is filed by a person or organization residing
or established in the territory of a Party; and (g) includes, in the case
of submissions [regarding] Canada, a declaration to the effect that
the matter will not subsequently be submitted [under the NAAEC],
with a view to avoiding duplication in the handling of submissions.
CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.1. While these criteria are largely procedural, the
CCAEC Council found one of four submissions to the CCAEC governing body
to be insufficient, and terminated the submissions. CCAEC Submissions Registry, http://can-chil.gc.ca/English/Profile/JSC/Registry /Registry.cfm.
12 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.2; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14.2. The Committee considers whether:
(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the submission; (b) the submission . . . raises matters whose
further study in this process would advance the goals of this Agreement; (c) private remedies available under the Party’s law have been
pursued; and (d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass
media reports.
Id. Of the three submissions the CCAEC Joint Submission Committee has
considered, all three merited a response from the party. CCAEC Submissions
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provinces where the federal environmental agency does not have control).
14 USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 19.2.
15 Id. art. 19.2.1(a).
16 CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.1; NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14.1.
17 USCFTA, supra note 5, art. 19.6. The USCFTA requires both parties to
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Act to bring about clean water in the United States on ineffective enforcement).
25 Cf. Guillermo O’Donnell, Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin
America: A Partial Conclusion, in The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America 303, 307–08 (Juan E. Méndez et al. eds. 1999)
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Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 815, 845–46
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the NAAEC).
26 See, e.g., French, supra note 1, at 32 (describing toxic discharges into open
ditches at three-quarters of the sampled factories in Mexico’s border region,
even though Mexico’s environmental laws were comparable to those in the
United States).
27 E.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving
Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1181, 1223 (1998)
(“In environmental law, consistent treatment is particularly crucial so that regulated entities believe they are competing on a level playing field.”).
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empower a Party’s authorities to undertake environmental law enforcement
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31 See Philip M. Moremen, Private Rights of Action to Enforce Rules of International Regimes, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 1127, 1153 (2006) (describing pressure on
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32 United States Trade Representative, Trade Agreements Home, (2009) http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements (providing the U.S. trade strategy to “create
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33 See Bickel, supra note 25, at 847 (explaining that states do not have an
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L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002) (finding no economic impact from
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38 Id., art. 19.2.1(a) (providing that a state party must show that the accused
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44 Cf. Moremen, supra note 31, at 1154 (explaining that the complicated
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48 See Block, supra note 13, at 516 (remarking on the increased citizen participation in public fora in Mexico after the NAAEC); see also Torres, supra
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community around the NAFTA negotiation process and rise in public interest in
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49 Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 734, 734–35 (1972) (holding that a
plaintiff must be a current user of a resource to have standing to bring a lawsuit
protecting that resource).
50 See Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 Loy.
L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 389, 404–05 (2004) (explaining that citizens and
NGOs are more likely than a government to report violations because they are
close to the affected environment or specialize in identifying violations).
51 See generally id. (contrasting three citizen alert mechanisms: “police
patrols,” “fire alarms,” and government monitoring of treaty compliance; and
crediting the diffusion of information to the success of citizen monitoring
efforts and citizen suits under U.S. environmental law).
52 See infra (arguing that states concerned about sovereignty are also unlikely
to accept foreign patrols to identify ineffective enforcement).
53 See Raustiala, supra note 50, at 406 (explaining that private actors have
various incentives to report violations; compliant facilities have an economic
incentive to report violations by competitors, users of a natural resource have an
interest in preventing harm, and environmental NGOs have an interest in fulfilling their common purpose).

Fall 2009

54

See Benjamin Martin, Note, An Environmental Remedy to Paralyzed Negotiations for a Multilateral Foreign Direct Investment Agreement, 1 Golden
Gate U. Envtl. L.J. 209, 226 (2007) (explaining that developing nations have
hesitated to enter into investment and trade agreements that include human
rights and religious freedom conditions because they see these conditions as “an
unreasonable interference with state sovereignty”).
55 See CCAEC, supra note 4, art. 3 (allowing each party to “select its own levels of domestic environmental protection” as well as requiring a “high level” of
environmental protection). But see French, supra note 1, at 13 (explaining that
environmental regulations in one country can cause “massive degradation” in
other countries in the absence of global environmental regulations).
56 See French, supra note 1, at 57 (describing the European environmental
community’s increased involvement with enforcement when European Union
treaties provided for a citizen enforcement mechanism with little power to
impose penalties).
57 While a factual record could form the basis of a state-to-state dispute, there
have been no such disputes under the NAAEC or CCAEC, which makes that
possibility remote. John J. Kirton, Winning Together: The NAFTA TradeEnvironment Record, in Linking Trade, Environment, and Social Cohesion 74,
90 (John J. Kirton & Virginia W. Maclaren eds., 2002) (contrasting the twentyeight citizen submissions with the absence of any state-to-state disputes in the
first six and a half years of the NAAEC).
58 See Moremen, supra note 31, at 1155 (explaining that the limited nature of
the NAAEC’s capacity imposes limited sovereignty costs, but any complaintbased procedure has a greater sovereignty cost than a state-dependent procedure); see also French, supra note 1, at 55 (describing Mexico’s concern with
the powers of an international governing body).
59 But see Raustiala, supra note 50, at 410 (arguing that relying on citizen “fire
alarms” removes autonomy from the government, and may advance private
interests at the expense of the collective interest).
60 See Sagar, supra note 22, at 942 (explaining that Mexico stopped a pier
project after the release of a factual record suggesting that going forward would
violate Mexico’s environmental laws).
61 See id. (finding evidence of a deterrent from the preparation of a factual
record alone, although a record is not as “detrimental as monetary penalties or
trade sanctions”).
62 Cf. David Rieff, Were Sanctions Right?, N.Y. Times, July 27, 2003, (Magazine) at 41 (describing the effects of long-lasting trade sanctions against Iraq
and concluding that sanctions had little impact on Iraqi rulers while causing
much suffering among the Iraqi population).
63 See Moremen, supra note 31, at 1177 (suggesting that the NAAEC citizen
submissions mechanism is reasonably successful because of the active environmental community in North America that has the capacity and organizational
incentive to monitor and challenge instances of non-enforcement).
64 See Natural Resources Defense Council, NRDC’s BioGems: Save Patagonia (2009), http://www.savebiogems.org/Patagonia (describing the Natural
Resources Defense Council’s work with Chilean activists to call for an environmental review of a dam project in Patagonia, Chile). The campaign involves
a submission to the CCAEC. Along with other international and domestic
pressure, the citizen submission led Chile’s environmental minister to reject
the disputed environmental impact statement and request a new study from the
developers. Allison Siverman, Natural Resources Defense Council, Patagonia
BioGem Campaign Status Update, (2008) (on file with author).
65 See Moremen, supra note 31, at 1177 (explaining that a system reliant on
citizen complaints can only be effective if there is a “community of . . . NGOs
willing to bring claims”).
66 See, e.g., Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International Law: A Paradigm for a Changing World, 8 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol.
160, 178–79 (2006) (critizicing the NAAEC process for insufficient independence and lack of citizen enforcement autonomy). Some commentators call for
an independent arbitration process, which citizens could begin autonomously,
for environmental disputes. Id. at 192.
67 See David L. Markell, Governance of International Institutions: A Review
of the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen
Submissions Process, 30 N.C. J. Int’l. L. & Com. Reg. 759, 790–92 (2005)
(remarking that environmental organizations continued to file submissions after
the NAAEC governing body refused to consider patterns of non-enforcement).
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See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 50, at 392 (remarking that the citizen submissions process was “ground-breaking” direct involvement of individuals in
generally “state-centric” international law).
69 See id. at 398 (noting that the NAAEC submissions process “shifts the
search for noncompliance” from governments to private actors).
70 See French, supra note 1, at 55 (speculating that the Mexican government
would be hesitant to sign an agreement that delegated too much sovereignty to
an international environmental body).
71 See id. at 541–42 (decrying the requirement that the politicized Council has
to vote to allow preparation and release of each factual record as an unwelcome
intrusion of politics into the process); see also Geoff Garver, Tooth Decay, The
Environmental Forum, May-June 2008 at 34, 36 (criticizing U.S. interference
with the CEC process).
72 See Sagar, supra note 22, at 941–42 (using the Cozumel Island factual
record, which prompted the Mexican government to cancel a cruise ship pier
project, to argue that a factual record has some deterrent effect).
73 See Torres, supra note 36, at 207 (explaining that Mexican non-governmental organizations recognize the risk of less effective enforcement if Mexican
government institutions are overwhelmed by citizen submissions and have held
back to avoid that possibility).
74 See Markell, supra note 67, at 788–89 (reporting that many environmental
advocacy groups support the NAAEC process and offer some evidence that
environmental governance has improved under the NAAEC); see also Torres, supra note 36, at 210–14 (concluding that the NAAEC has helped Mexico
improve its environmental governance by strengthening the environmental
community and the capacity of government institutions charged with environmental protection).
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E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 289, art. 1110; see also International Institute for Sustainable
Development & World Wildlife Fund, Private Rights, Public Problems:
A Guide to NAFTA’s Controversial Chapter on Investor Rights 1 (2001),
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/trade_citizensguide.pdf (criticizing
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 for allowing foreign investors to bring the host country
into binding, confidential arbitration without proving for community input, and
potentially requiring the host country to compensate a foreign investor for costs
associated with new environmental regulations).
76 See, e.g., Pierre Marc Johnson & André Beaulieu, The Environment and
NAFTA: Understanding and Implementing the New Continental Law 69–110
(1996) (explaining that new environmental legislation must not unjustifiably
restrict trade).
77 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Apr. 12, 2006, U.S.-Peru, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/finaltext.
78 See Aaron Cosbey, Brave New Deal? Assessing the May 10th U.S. Bipartisan Compact on Free Trade Agreements, IISD Commentary, 3–4, Aug. 2007
(concluding that enacted changes to the USPTPA “probably [do] not” increase
the effectiveness of environmental enforcement in Peru), available at http://
www.iisd.org/PUBLICATIONS/pub.aspx?id=888.
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